Bila kalian merasa punya pengetahuan dan wawasan yang luas, saatnya untuk membuktikan. Tunjukkan bakat dan prestasi, wakili Indonesia untuk menjadi Duta Muda ASEAN – Indonesia 2007 Ketentuan
Mahasiswa dan mahasiswi dari seluruh Universitas/Akademi di Indonesia
Berprestasi
Indeks Prestasi Komulatif di atas 2,75 bagi mahasiswa D-3/S-1 dan 3,00 bagi mahasiswa S-2
Berwawasan luas dan memahami tentang Indonesia dan ASEAN
Pengalaman organisasi
Mempunyai bakat bidang seni dan budaya
Menguasai Bahasa Indonesia dan Bahasa Inggris atau bahasa asing lainnya
Kreatif dan inovatif
Berpenampilan menarik dengan tinggi badan minimum 165 cm untuk mahasiswa dan 160 cm untuk mahasiswi
Umur peserta tidak lebih dari 30 tahun pada tanggal 8 Agustus 2007 dan belum menikah. Persyaratan peserta:
Mengisi dan mengirim formulir pendaftaran
Menyertakan copy Kartu Mahasiswa Universitas/Akademi yang masih berlaku
Menyertakan foto berwarna ukuran kartu pos seluruh badan dan close up masing-masing 2 lembar, tanpa rekayasa, menggunakan kaos putih dan celana panjang berwarna gelap
Menyertakan tulisan sendiri dengan tema “Duta Muda ASEAN-Indonesia 2007 Towards ASEAN Community’ dalam dalam Bahasa Inggris maksimal 2 halaman kwarto, huruf Arial 12, diketik 1,5 spasi
Menyertakan copy bukti prestasi pendukung
Formulir dapat diambil dari Website Departemen Luar Negeri RI dengan alamat http://www.deplu.go.id
Batas Waktu Pendaftaran
Formulir dan kelengkapannya diterima selambat-lambatnya Sabtu, 12 Mei 2007 dan ditujukan kepada:
Sekretariat Panitia Lomba Pemilihan Duta Muda ASEAN-Indonesia 2007 C.q. Direktorat Kerjasama Fungsional ASEAN Departemen Luar Negeri RI Jl. Pejambon No. 6 , Gedung Utama Lantai 9 Jakarta 10110
FORMULIR BISA DIAMBIL DI SAYA ATAU HUBUNGI KANTOR JURUSAN HI UMM
Saturday, May 05, 2007
Do Want to join?
Alhamdulillah....
Akhirnya dengan perjuangan keras selama 8 bulan, April 2007 saya berhasil mencapai jabatan manager tertinggi, Senior Manager 21% di Oriflame Indonesia! Sungguh sesuatu yang sebenarnya sangat jauh dari banyangan saya, terlampau cepat mungkin namun saya yakin ITU SEMUA ADALAH HARGA YANG SAYA DAPATKAN atas PERJUANGAN DAN USAHA KERAS SELAMA INI!
Semoga dengan posisi ini saya lebih bisa mengabdikan diri untuk kemajuan bersama! dan saya bertekad harus menjadikan orang-orang lain SEPERTI SAYA!
Oleh karena itu pada kesempatan ini saya ingin mengajak mahasiswa saya untuk bergabung dan bekerja bersama terutama yang merasa nganggur dan butuh pekerjaan sampingan karena saya yakin anda juga bisa sukses seperti saya.
Saya akan dengan senang hati menerima anda bergabung dalam tim saya dan mari kita berusaha bersama.
Thank you for everybody who stand behind me!
Veronika Agustin, Hen Xie-xie, Wo hen gaoxing de ni she wo de ai ren. Xie.. Xie...!
Ko Handoko, Cie Marliah, Cie Suk Cen, Ko Yudisthira, Apin....
Tim ku yang tangguh : Jesica, Real, Monalisa, Endah . . . . Tim PGSD, Tim HI UJ, Tim Faperta, Tim Laros de el - el
Ruli....
Mari bergabung bersama saya dan temukan dunia yang nyata dan baru yang bisa membuat anda mengerti tentang hidup sebenarnya dan lebih jauh lagi bisa mengabdikan hidup anda untuk dunia
Thank You
Tonny
Akhirnya dengan perjuangan keras selama 8 bulan, April 2007 saya berhasil mencapai jabatan manager tertinggi, Senior Manager 21% di Oriflame Indonesia! Sungguh sesuatu yang sebenarnya sangat jauh dari banyangan saya, terlampau cepat mungkin namun saya yakin ITU SEMUA ADALAH HARGA YANG SAYA DAPATKAN atas PERJUANGAN DAN USAHA KERAS SELAMA INI!
Semoga dengan posisi ini saya lebih bisa mengabdikan diri untuk kemajuan bersama! dan saya bertekad harus menjadikan orang-orang lain SEPERTI SAYA!
Oleh karena itu pada kesempatan ini saya ingin mengajak mahasiswa saya untuk bergabung dan bekerja bersama terutama yang merasa nganggur dan butuh pekerjaan sampingan karena saya yakin anda juga bisa sukses seperti saya.
Saya akan dengan senang hati menerima anda bergabung dalam tim saya dan mari kita berusaha bersama.
Thank you for everybody who stand behind me!
Veronika Agustin, Hen Xie-xie, Wo hen gaoxing de ni she wo de ai ren. Xie.. Xie...!
Ko Handoko, Cie Marliah, Cie Suk Cen, Ko Yudisthira, Apin....
Tim ku yang tangguh : Jesica, Real, Monalisa, Endah . . . . Tim PGSD, Tim HI UJ, Tim Faperta, Tim Laros de el - el
Ruli....
Mari bergabung bersama saya dan temukan dunia yang nyata dan baru yang bisa membuat anda mengerti tentang hidup sebenarnya dan lebih jauh lagi bisa mengabdikan hidup anda untuk dunia
Thank You
Tonny
Monday, April 23, 2007
Materi kuliah ke 5
UNIVERSITAS MUHAMMADIYAH MALANG
JURUSAN ILMU HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL
Mata Kuliah : Ekonomi Internasional
Semester : Genap/II
Pertemuan : VI
Tema : Siklus Perdagangan Bebas Menuju Sistem Perlindungan Tarif dan Blok Perdagangan
Pengajar : Tonny D Effendi
Pendahuluan
Perkembangan perdagangan internasional pada awalnya telah diwarnai denga pasar bebas. Pasar bebas pada awalnya membawa harapan tentang semakin mudahnya aliran barang dan jasa antar negara sehingga memicu peningkatan kualitas dan kualitas brang yang diperdagangkan karena terkait dengan persaingan yang tinggi. Namun disisi lain, pasar bebas juga mendapatkan kritikan dari beberapa pihak terutama dari negara dunia ketiga.
Negara dunia ketiga beranggapan bahwa pasar bebas justru membawa kesengsaraan karena “dipaksakan” kepada kondisi perekonomian mereka yang belum mamapu menerima arus peraingan bebeas yang bergulir dalam pasar bebas. Terapat kekhawatiran bahwa dengan adanya pasar bebas maka produksi atau industri didalam negeri akan mati akrena tergerus oleh masuknya barang dari luar negeri dengan kualitas yang lebih bagus dan harga yang bersaing. Oleh karena itu kemudian usulan pasar bebeas mendapatkan tentangan dari negara-negara dunia ketiga dan menganggap pasar bebas dalah bentuk dari imperialisme gaya baru dari negara-negara kaya.
Ternyata kritikan dan ketakutan akan hancurnya produksi dalam negeri akibat dari perdagangan bebas tidak hanya dirasakan oleh negara dunia ketiga yang sebagian besar adalah negara-negara berkembang. Negara-negara maju pun ternyata memiliki kekhawatiran terhadap pasar bebas yang mereka gagas sendiri. Hal ini terkait dengan perkembangan yang ada dimana, taruhlah benar jika mereka menguasai teknologi dan informasi sebagai sebuah komoditas yang menjanjikan di era masyarakat moden, namun disisi lain produksi non teknologi seperti migas, barang pertanian dan manufktur, ternyata industri dalam negeri mereka tidak mencukupi untuk kebutuhan dalam negerinya. Dengan kata lain mereka harus impor dari negara lain. sebagain besar impor produk pertanian mereka berasal dari negara berkembang. Ketika negara berkembang sedang mengalami limpahan produksi pertanian maka muncul kekhawatirand ari engara maju tentang bahaya limpahan produk pertanian ini terhadap produk pertanian lokal mereka.
Menghadapi fenomena yang demikian itu maka beberapa negara mencoba untuk melakukan penanggulangan dalam menghadapi dampak pasar bebas bagi perekonomian domestik mereka. Setidaknya mereka mengambil dua cara dari dalam dan dari luar :
Dari dalam negeri, mereka melakukan berbagai hambatan dan prokteksi untuk beberapa produk dalam negeri
Dari luar negeri, dengan cara menggandeng beberapa negara untuk membentuk blok perdagngan untuk melindungi ekonomi domestik amsing-masing negara.
Oleh karena itu kemudian berkembanglah siklus utama dalam perekonomian internasional yaitu :
siklus 1 : dimana pernaan dari perdagngan bebas (free trade) sangat dominan
siklus 2 : terjadi sistem perlindungan tarif terhadap produk hasil industri didalam negeri.
Free Trade
Gagasan ini diusung oleh Adam Smith dan David Ricardo untuk menciptakan spesialisasi perdagangan antar negara melalui pembagian kerja untuk menghasilkan produk yang melebihi kebtuhan dalam negeri dan mengeluarkan kelebihannya dengan produk lain yang tidak dihasilkan atau tidak produktif. Siklus ini dapat terjadi ketika pemerintah tidak ikut campur atau tidak ada hambatan tarif. Permasalahan yang ekmudian muncul adalah ketika spesialisasi barang dari suatu negara merupakan spesialisasi brang pula di negar lain. hal ini akan munmbuhkan persaingan sekaligus ancaman terhadap produk dalam negeri. Oleh karena itu gagasan tentang pasar bebas menjadi diperhitungkan ulang.
Tarrif Protection
Pada masa ini kemudian muncul aktor baru yang menjadi sangat dominan yaitu MNC. Dlaam penelitian Earn Engel diketahui pada masa awal pasar bebas terjadi perubahan perdangan berdasarkan Fast Track of rapid Growth Development dimana negara-negara mulai melakukan spesialisasi dengan mendahulukan berdirinya perusahaan industri yang mendukung sektor pertanian. Dan hal ini banyak dilakukan oleh MNC , terbukti dengan terjadinya transfer of goods and services sebagai akibat adanya kemajuan dan perkembangan teknologi transportasi.
Dalam perkembangan ini, fakta yang terjadi di Eropa adalah ketika harga barang impor lebih rendah daripada harga barang sejenis di Eropa sehingga hal ini merupakan pukulan berat bagi hasil produksi Eropa. Untuk melindungi industri dalam negeri Eropa, negara-negara MEE memberlakukan perlindungan tarif. Dalam sisi ini akhirnya kita bisa melihat bahwa telah terjadi pergeseran paradigma dari sitem free trade menjadi sistem proteksi tarif.
Blok Perdagangan
Sebagai tindak lanjut dari perkembangan proteksi tarif, beberapa negara di dunia mengeluhkan adanya proteksi tarif yang terlalu berlebihan di negara-negara tertentu sehingga menyulitkan perdagangan antar negara. Hal itulah yang kemudian mendorong beberapa negara untuk mengadakan perjenjian tentang tingkat tarifperdagangan atau yang disebut dengan GATT (General Agreement for Trade and Tarifft).
Namun terjnyata pad atahun 1993 – 1994 anggota GATT tidak mencapai kesepakatan menegnai tarif ini di Geneva. Oleh karena itu beberapa negara akhirnya mengambil inisiatif untuk membentuk blok perdagangan dengan negara lain yaitu kerjasama intensif yang diarahkan pada perlindungan produksi dalam negeri. Beberapa yang terkenal yaitu blok perdagangan Amerika Utara (NAFTA), blok perdagangan Eropa (EFTA) dan mengusung pada blok perdagngan Asia (AFTA)
Bentuk Proteksi Dalam Negeri
Tarif Barrier
Tarrift Barrier terdiri dari duamacam yaitu bea masuk dan bea mauk tambahan. Yaitu trindakan pembebanan bea impor atas pos tarif hasil industro yang akan diimpor masuk ke pabeanan Indonesia misalnya. Bila bea masuk tidak cukup tinggio misalnya BM = 10%, dalam situasi tertentu untuk melindungi hasil produksi dalam negeri dapat dikenakan bea masuk tambahan misalnya BMT = 10 % sehingga totalnya 20%.
Quota (pembatasan impor)
Quota meruapakn cara yang cukup efektif untuk membatasi impor dari luar negeri. Analoginya adalah ketika kebutuhan dalam negeri tidak bisa dicukupi oleh produksi dalam negeri maka pemerintah mengadakan impor dari luar yang jumlahnya telah ditentukan sehingga terjadi pembatasan jumlah barang yang masuk.
Non Tarif Barrier (NTB)
Pembatasan ini berkaitan dengan segala hambatan yang dilakukan oleh pemerintah diluar tarif. Salah satu caranya adalah melalui perijinan dengan hanya memberikan satu kesempatan kepada pihak tertentu untuk mengadakan impor. Misalnya dengan melakukan penunjukan kepada salahs atu perusahaan tertentu untuk melakukan impor.
Duty Draw dan Duty Exemption
Pemberian subsidi ekspor yang dikenal sebagai sertifikasi ekspor telah berhasil mendorong ekspor non migas, tetapi menghadapi tindakan balasan dari negara tujuan.
Blok Perdagangan
Untuk mengatasi permasalahan pemasaran barang-barang hasil industri dalam negeri, negara sosialislah yang pada awalnya memberntuk blok perdagangan.
Counter Purchases
Negara sosialis melkukan praktek blok pedagangan melalui barter gaya baru yang disebut sebagai imbal beli (counter purchases)
Blok Perdagangan MEE
Lahirnya Economics European Community (EEC) adalah untuk melakukan perdagangan regional atau kerjasama perdagangan diantara negara-negara anggota MEE
Blok Perdagangan Amerika
NAFTA terdiri dari negara-negara Amerika, Kanada dan Amerika Latin. Pada hakikatnya, tujuan NAFTA adalah untuk mengatasi maslaah perdagangan hasil industri dalam negeri anggota blok perdagangan.
JURUSAN ILMU HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL
Mata Kuliah : Ekonomi Internasional
Semester : Genap/II
Pertemuan : VI
Tema : Siklus Perdagangan Bebas Menuju Sistem Perlindungan Tarif dan Blok Perdagangan
Pengajar : Tonny D Effendi
Pendahuluan
Perkembangan perdagangan internasional pada awalnya telah diwarnai denga pasar bebas. Pasar bebas pada awalnya membawa harapan tentang semakin mudahnya aliran barang dan jasa antar negara sehingga memicu peningkatan kualitas dan kualitas brang yang diperdagangkan karena terkait dengan persaingan yang tinggi. Namun disisi lain, pasar bebas juga mendapatkan kritikan dari beberapa pihak terutama dari negara dunia ketiga.
Negara dunia ketiga beranggapan bahwa pasar bebas justru membawa kesengsaraan karena “dipaksakan” kepada kondisi perekonomian mereka yang belum mamapu menerima arus peraingan bebeas yang bergulir dalam pasar bebas. Terapat kekhawatiran bahwa dengan adanya pasar bebas maka produksi atau industri didalam negeri akan mati akrena tergerus oleh masuknya barang dari luar negeri dengan kualitas yang lebih bagus dan harga yang bersaing. Oleh karena itu kemudian usulan pasar bebeas mendapatkan tentangan dari negara-negara dunia ketiga dan menganggap pasar bebas dalah bentuk dari imperialisme gaya baru dari negara-negara kaya.
Ternyata kritikan dan ketakutan akan hancurnya produksi dalam negeri akibat dari perdagangan bebas tidak hanya dirasakan oleh negara dunia ketiga yang sebagian besar adalah negara-negara berkembang. Negara-negara maju pun ternyata memiliki kekhawatiran terhadap pasar bebas yang mereka gagas sendiri. Hal ini terkait dengan perkembangan yang ada dimana, taruhlah benar jika mereka menguasai teknologi dan informasi sebagai sebuah komoditas yang menjanjikan di era masyarakat moden, namun disisi lain produksi non teknologi seperti migas, barang pertanian dan manufktur, ternyata industri dalam negeri mereka tidak mencukupi untuk kebutuhan dalam negerinya. Dengan kata lain mereka harus impor dari negara lain. sebagain besar impor produk pertanian mereka berasal dari negara berkembang. Ketika negara berkembang sedang mengalami limpahan produksi pertanian maka muncul kekhawatirand ari engara maju tentang bahaya limpahan produk pertanian ini terhadap produk pertanian lokal mereka.
Menghadapi fenomena yang demikian itu maka beberapa negara mencoba untuk melakukan penanggulangan dalam menghadapi dampak pasar bebas bagi perekonomian domestik mereka. Setidaknya mereka mengambil dua cara dari dalam dan dari luar :
Dari dalam negeri, mereka melakukan berbagai hambatan dan prokteksi untuk beberapa produk dalam negeri
Dari luar negeri, dengan cara menggandeng beberapa negara untuk membentuk blok perdagngan untuk melindungi ekonomi domestik amsing-masing negara.
Oleh karena itu kemudian berkembanglah siklus utama dalam perekonomian internasional yaitu :
siklus 1 : dimana pernaan dari perdagngan bebas (free trade) sangat dominan
siklus 2 : terjadi sistem perlindungan tarif terhadap produk hasil industri didalam negeri.
Free Trade
Gagasan ini diusung oleh Adam Smith dan David Ricardo untuk menciptakan spesialisasi perdagangan antar negara melalui pembagian kerja untuk menghasilkan produk yang melebihi kebtuhan dalam negeri dan mengeluarkan kelebihannya dengan produk lain yang tidak dihasilkan atau tidak produktif. Siklus ini dapat terjadi ketika pemerintah tidak ikut campur atau tidak ada hambatan tarif. Permasalahan yang ekmudian muncul adalah ketika spesialisasi barang dari suatu negara merupakan spesialisasi brang pula di negar lain. hal ini akan munmbuhkan persaingan sekaligus ancaman terhadap produk dalam negeri. Oleh karena itu gagasan tentang pasar bebas menjadi diperhitungkan ulang.
Tarrif Protection
Pada masa ini kemudian muncul aktor baru yang menjadi sangat dominan yaitu MNC. Dlaam penelitian Earn Engel diketahui pada masa awal pasar bebas terjadi perubahan perdangan berdasarkan Fast Track of rapid Growth Development dimana negara-negara mulai melakukan spesialisasi dengan mendahulukan berdirinya perusahaan industri yang mendukung sektor pertanian. Dan hal ini banyak dilakukan oleh MNC , terbukti dengan terjadinya transfer of goods and services sebagai akibat adanya kemajuan dan perkembangan teknologi transportasi.
Dalam perkembangan ini, fakta yang terjadi di Eropa adalah ketika harga barang impor lebih rendah daripada harga barang sejenis di Eropa sehingga hal ini merupakan pukulan berat bagi hasil produksi Eropa. Untuk melindungi industri dalam negeri Eropa, negara-negara MEE memberlakukan perlindungan tarif. Dalam sisi ini akhirnya kita bisa melihat bahwa telah terjadi pergeseran paradigma dari sitem free trade menjadi sistem proteksi tarif.
Blok Perdagangan
Sebagai tindak lanjut dari perkembangan proteksi tarif, beberapa negara di dunia mengeluhkan adanya proteksi tarif yang terlalu berlebihan di negara-negara tertentu sehingga menyulitkan perdagangan antar negara. Hal itulah yang kemudian mendorong beberapa negara untuk mengadakan perjenjian tentang tingkat tarifperdagangan atau yang disebut dengan GATT (General Agreement for Trade and Tarifft).
Namun terjnyata pad atahun 1993 – 1994 anggota GATT tidak mencapai kesepakatan menegnai tarif ini di Geneva. Oleh karena itu beberapa negara akhirnya mengambil inisiatif untuk membentuk blok perdagangan dengan negara lain yaitu kerjasama intensif yang diarahkan pada perlindungan produksi dalam negeri. Beberapa yang terkenal yaitu blok perdagangan Amerika Utara (NAFTA), blok perdagangan Eropa (EFTA) dan mengusung pada blok perdagngan Asia (AFTA)
Bentuk Proteksi Dalam Negeri
Tarif Barrier
Tarrift Barrier terdiri dari duamacam yaitu bea masuk dan bea mauk tambahan. Yaitu trindakan pembebanan bea impor atas pos tarif hasil industro yang akan diimpor masuk ke pabeanan Indonesia misalnya. Bila bea masuk tidak cukup tinggio misalnya BM = 10%, dalam situasi tertentu untuk melindungi hasil produksi dalam negeri dapat dikenakan bea masuk tambahan misalnya BMT = 10 % sehingga totalnya 20%.
Quota (pembatasan impor)
Quota meruapakn cara yang cukup efektif untuk membatasi impor dari luar negeri. Analoginya adalah ketika kebutuhan dalam negeri tidak bisa dicukupi oleh produksi dalam negeri maka pemerintah mengadakan impor dari luar yang jumlahnya telah ditentukan sehingga terjadi pembatasan jumlah barang yang masuk.
Non Tarif Barrier (NTB)
Pembatasan ini berkaitan dengan segala hambatan yang dilakukan oleh pemerintah diluar tarif. Salah satu caranya adalah melalui perijinan dengan hanya memberikan satu kesempatan kepada pihak tertentu untuk mengadakan impor. Misalnya dengan melakukan penunjukan kepada salahs atu perusahaan tertentu untuk melakukan impor.
Duty Draw dan Duty Exemption
Pemberian subsidi ekspor yang dikenal sebagai sertifikasi ekspor telah berhasil mendorong ekspor non migas, tetapi menghadapi tindakan balasan dari negara tujuan.
Blok Perdagangan
Untuk mengatasi permasalahan pemasaran barang-barang hasil industri dalam negeri, negara sosialislah yang pada awalnya memberntuk blok perdagangan.
Counter Purchases
Negara sosialis melkukan praktek blok pedagangan melalui barter gaya baru yang disebut sebagai imbal beli (counter purchases)
Blok Perdagangan MEE
Lahirnya Economics European Community (EEC) adalah untuk melakukan perdagangan regional atau kerjasama perdagangan diantara negara-negara anggota MEE
Blok Perdagangan Amerika
NAFTA terdiri dari negara-negara Amerika, Kanada dan Amerika Latin. Pada hakikatnya, tujuan NAFTA adalah untuk mengatasi maslaah perdagangan hasil industri dalam negeri anggota blok perdagangan.
materi kuliah k 4
UNIVERSITAS MUHAMMADIYAH MALANG
JURUSAN ILMU HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL
Mata Kuliah : Ekonomi Internasional
Semester : Genap/II
Pertemuan : V
Tema : Kerjasama Ekonomi Antar Negara
Pengajar : Tonny D Effendi
Pendahuluan
Sejarah perdagangan internasional telah berkembang sejak abad pertengahan yang dimulai dengan masa merkantilisme dimana kerajaan dan bangsawan turut serta dalam kegiatan perdagangan dengan memberikan proteksi kepada pedagang dalam melakukan perdagangand engan pedagang dari negara lain. perkembangan selanjutnya, merkantilisme justru menimbulkan banyak hambatan dalam perdagangan internasional karena proteksi yang diberikan oleh pemerintah. Oleh karena itu kemudian perdagangan internasional mulai beralih pada pendapat Adam Smith dengan aliran Klasiknya yang menyatakan bahwa negara-negara sebaiknya melakukan spesialisasi prouk perdagangan untuk mendapatkan keunggulan konparatif. Pada saat produksi didalam negeri melimpah, negara-negara melakukan pengurangan hambatan perdagngan internasional dan negara-ngara mulai beralih pada perdagangan bebas untuk mempertukarkan kelebihan barangnya (ekspor) dan mengimpor barang yang dibutuhkan
Pada masa sebelum Perang Dunia II, terjadi perkembangan besar dalam teknologi transportasi yang menyebabkan biaya kirim barnag menjadi rendah, sehingga pemerintah mulai melakukan pengetatan kembali dalam perdagangan internasional untuk melindungi produksi dalam negeri melalui kebijakan proteksi. Selanjutnya, pasca Perang Dunia II, terjadi kerusakan ekonomi yang cukup parah di Eropa, sehingga Amerika Serikat melalui menteri keuangannya, Bretton Woods memberikan tiga paket kebijakan perdagangan bebas untuk mempercepat pertumbuhan ekonomi, dengan membentuk tiga badan yaitu :
International Monetary Fund (IMF) yang berfungsi untuk membantu negara-negara yang menghadapi permasalahan internasional seperti ketidakseimbangan dalam neraca perdagangan,
International Trade Organization, yang berfungsi untuk menangani perdagangan internasional dan mendorong berkembangnya perdagangan bebas berdasarkan mekanisme pasar tanpa campur tangan pemerintah. Namun pada tahun 1948, senat Amerika Serikat tidak menyetujui ITO.
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, atau World Bank, yang berfungsi untuk menyalurkan modal investasi internasional bagi negara-negara yang membutuhkan modal.
Kerjasama perdagangan antar negara
Negara-negara melakukan kerjasama perdagangan internasional dengan negara lain untuk meningkatkan perdagangan luar negeri melalui lembaga internasional bilateral, regional dan multilateral. Namun yang menjadi hambatan utama saat itu adalah maslaah tarif yang diberlakukan dimasing-masing negara berbeda sehingga dapat menimbulkan hambatan. Oleh karena itu pada tahun 1947, 23 negara angota GATT mencapai kesepakatan bersama untuk mengurangi berbagai hambatan perdagangan internasional. Dan pada pertemuan tahun 1994 yang kemudian dikenal dengan Putaran Uruguay, 100 anggota GATT menandatangani perjanjian untuk mengubah sistem perdagangan yang proteksionis menjadi lebih liberal.
Selanjutnya kerjasama perdagangan antara negara yang semakin pesat tela menimbulkan ketergantungan anatar negara dan antara penduduk yang semakin besar. Oleh karena itu negara-negara kemudian melakukan spesialisasi produksi dan melakukan kerjasama yang lebih spesifik. Bentuk kerjasama ekonomi antar negara secara umum terdiri dari :
Daerah Perdagangan Bebas. Negara-negara anggota dapat mengurangi hambatan tarif dan quota atar perpindahan barang diantara negara anggota dengan masing-masing negara anggota tetap mempertahankan sistem tarif eksternal dan quotanya sendiri terhadap negara yang bukan anggota. Contoh kerjasama ekonomi ini adalah : NAFTA, EFTA dan AFTA
Perserikatan Pabean. Perserikatan pabean berfungsi untuk mengkoordinasikan beberapa kebijakan ekonomi dari beberapa negara anggota dengan cara menggabungkan tarif negara-negara anggota menjadi satu sistem tarif.
Pasar Bersama. Pasar bersama merupakan gabungan dari perserikatan pabean dengan daerah perdagangan bebas untuk mempermudah mobilitas faktor produksi tenaga kerja dan modal.
Kebaikan pasar bersama :
- melakukan kebijakan ekonomi, sosial dan politik yang homogen
- setiap negara menjaga konsitensi peraturan perdagngan antara negara anggota
Kelemahan pasar bersama :
- penafsiran yang berbeda akan menimbulkan rintangan non tarif
Bentuk-bentuk Integrasi Ekonomi
Integrasi ekonomi dapat dilakukan minimal oleh dua negara sehingga disebut sebagai integrasi ekonomi bilateral. Jika banyak negara yang bergabung maka kemudian disebut sebagai integrasi ekonomi multilateral.
Integrasi ekonomi bilateral. Integrasi ekonomi bilateral merupakan persetujuan perdagngan antara dua negara dengan tujuan utama untuk mengatasi permasalahan :
- keseimbangan negara perdagangan. Dua negara atau G to G mengadakan persetujuan untuk menjaga keseimbangan neraca perdagngan (trade account). Misalnya antara Amerika Serikat dengan Jepang
- kebutuhan dana investasi. Permaslahan kebutuhan dana investasi ini dapat diatasi dengan mendorong investasi di negara berkembang dengan mengadakan perjanjian bilateral dengan negara investor dalam hal asuransi kerugian atas investasi dan negara tuan rumah harus memenuhi kewajiban mengembalikan investasi.
- pembatasan perdagangan produk khusus. Perjanjian ini digunakan untuk membatasi perdagangan produk-produk khusus seperti misalnya minyak dan gas bumi.
Integrasi Ekonomi Multilateral
Iklim usaha yang cukup pesat dalam perdagangan internasional telah menjadikan industri rumahtangga menjadi sebuah perusahaan raksasa yang tidak mengenal batas-batas negara dan banyaknya MNC ini telah mendorong terjadinya transmisi internasional yang didukung dengan adanya perkembangan dibidang keuangan, perbankan, investor, jasa konsultan, konstruksi, sehingga batas-batas negara menjadi kabur dan memperbesar saling ketergantungan antar negara, saling keterganutungan inilah yang kemudian menyebabkan beberapa negara memiliki rencana untuk membentuk suatu kerjasama multilateral seperti contohnya Masyarakat Ekonomi Eropa yang kemudian terintegrasi lagi menjadi Uni Eropa.
Hubungan Antara Negara Besar-Kecil atau Negara Maju-Berkembang
Negara Debitor-Kreditor
Untuk melaksanakan pembangunan ekonomi suatu negara maka negara berkembang khususnya memerlukan dana investasi yang dapat diperoleh setelah mendapatkan bantuan dari negara kreditur.
negara kreditor (creditor country) adalah negara yang memiliki nilai kekayaan sendiri yang melebihi jumlah nilai seluruh kekayaan asing yang tertanam dinegaranya. Nilai kekayaan sendiri terdiri dari pemilikan harta benda, penyertaan modal dan piutang.
Negara debitur (debitur country) adalah negara yang seluruh kekayaan yang tertanam diluar negeri lebih kecil daripada jumlah nilai kekayaan negara lain yang tertanam dinegara tersebut.
Masing-masing negara, baik negara maju maupun negara berkembang memiliki keunggulan komparatif masing-masing. Negara berkembang biasanya memiliki keunggulan komparatif yang terdiri dari sumber daya alam dan tenaga kerja. Sedangkan negara maju memiliki keunggulan komparatif dibidang teknologi dan kapital. Pertemuan kebutuhan dari kedua negara kecil dan negara besar ini menimbulkan adanya ketergantungan dalam bentuk transaksi perdagangan internasional yang dapat dilihat pada neraca pembayaran dari kedua negara tersebut.
Penanaman Modal Asing
Penduduk dari suatu negara (domestic) dapat melakukan kerjasama dengan penduduk negara lain (foreign), misalnya untuk mendirikan perusahaan patungan dalam rangka penanaman modal asing (PMA) atau penanaman modal dalam negeri (PMDN)
Utang Piutang
Negara berkembang biasanya belum siap dengan sarana prasarana untuk kepentingan umum agar penduduk negerinya dapat membangun perusahaan-perusahaan industri. Hal ini biasanya disebabkan oleh permasalahan klasik dimana penerimaan dalam negeri dari pajak, retribusi atau pungutan lainnya hanya sekedar menutupi pengeluaran operasional, tetapi tidak mencukupi kebutuhan dana pembangunan sarana publik. Untuk mambangun sarana jalan, jembatan, listrik, air bersih dan telekomunikasi, negara kecil memperoleh bantuan dari negara besar dalam bentuk pinjaman luar negeri.
JURUSAN ILMU HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL
Mata Kuliah : Ekonomi Internasional
Semester : Genap/II
Pertemuan : V
Tema : Kerjasama Ekonomi Antar Negara
Pengajar : Tonny D Effendi
Pendahuluan
Sejarah perdagangan internasional telah berkembang sejak abad pertengahan yang dimulai dengan masa merkantilisme dimana kerajaan dan bangsawan turut serta dalam kegiatan perdagangan dengan memberikan proteksi kepada pedagang dalam melakukan perdagangand engan pedagang dari negara lain. perkembangan selanjutnya, merkantilisme justru menimbulkan banyak hambatan dalam perdagangan internasional karena proteksi yang diberikan oleh pemerintah. Oleh karena itu kemudian perdagangan internasional mulai beralih pada pendapat Adam Smith dengan aliran Klasiknya yang menyatakan bahwa negara-negara sebaiknya melakukan spesialisasi prouk perdagangan untuk mendapatkan keunggulan konparatif. Pada saat produksi didalam negeri melimpah, negara-negara melakukan pengurangan hambatan perdagngan internasional dan negara-ngara mulai beralih pada perdagangan bebas untuk mempertukarkan kelebihan barangnya (ekspor) dan mengimpor barang yang dibutuhkan
Pada masa sebelum Perang Dunia II, terjadi perkembangan besar dalam teknologi transportasi yang menyebabkan biaya kirim barnag menjadi rendah, sehingga pemerintah mulai melakukan pengetatan kembali dalam perdagangan internasional untuk melindungi produksi dalam negeri melalui kebijakan proteksi. Selanjutnya, pasca Perang Dunia II, terjadi kerusakan ekonomi yang cukup parah di Eropa, sehingga Amerika Serikat melalui menteri keuangannya, Bretton Woods memberikan tiga paket kebijakan perdagangan bebas untuk mempercepat pertumbuhan ekonomi, dengan membentuk tiga badan yaitu :
International Monetary Fund (IMF) yang berfungsi untuk membantu negara-negara yang menghadapi permasalahan internasional seperti ketidakseimbangan dalam neraca perdagangan,
International Trade Organization, yang berfungsi untuk menangani perdagangan internasional dan mendorong berkembangnya perdagangan bebas berdasarkan mekanisme pasar tanpa campur tangan pemerintah. Namun pada tahun 1948, senat Amerika Serikat tidak menyetujui ITO.
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, atau World Bank, yang berfungsi untuk menyalurkan modal investasi internasional bagi negara-negara yang membutuhkan modal.
Kerjasama perdagangan antar negara
Negara-negara melakukan kerjasama perdagangan internasional dengan negara lain untuk meningkatkan perdagangan luar negeri melalui lembaga internasional bilateral, regional dan multilateral. Namun yang menjadi hambatan utama saat itu adalah maslaah tarif yang diberlakukan dimasing-masing negara berbeda sehingga dapat menimbulkan hambatan. Oleh karena itu pada tahun 1947, 23 negara angota GATT mencapai kesepakatan bersama untuk mengurangi berbagai hambatan perdagangan internasional. Dan pada pertemuan tahun 1994 yang kemudian dikenal dengan Putaran Uruguay, 100 anggota GATT menandatangani perjanjian untuk mengubah sistem perdagangan yang proteksionis menjadi lebih liberal.
Selanjutnya kerjasama perdagangan antara negara yang semakin pesat tela menimbulkan ketergantungan anatar negara dan antara penduduk yang semakin besar. Oleh karena itu negara-negara kemudian melakukan spesialisasi produksi dan melakukan kerjasama yang lebih spesifik. Bentuk kerjasama ekonomi antar negara secara umum terdiri dari :
Daerah Perdagangan Bebas. Negara-negara anggota dapat mengurangi hambatan tarif dan quota atar perpindahan barang diantara negara anggota dengan masing-masing negara anggota tetap mempertahankan sistem tarif eksternal dan quotanya sendiri terhadap negara yang bukan anggota. Contoh kerjasama ekonomi ini adalah : NAFTA, EFTA dan AFTA
Perserikatan Pabean. Perserikatan pabean berfungsi untuk mengkoordinasikan beberapa kebijakan ekonomi dari beberapa negara anggota dengan cara menggabungkan tarif negara-negara anggota menjadi satu sistem tarif.
Pasar Bersama. Pasar bersama merupakan gabungan dari perserikatan pabean dengan daerah perdagangan bebas untuk mempermudah mobilitas faktor produksi tenaga kerja dan modal.
Kebaikan pasar bersama :
- melakukan kebijakan ekonomi, sosial dan politik yang homogen
- setiap negara menjaga konsitensi peraturan perdagngan antara negara anggota
Kelemahan pasar bersama :
- penafsiran yang berbeda akan menimbulkan rintangan non tarif
Bentuk-bentuk Integrasi Ekonomi
Integrasi ekonomi dapat dilakukan minimal oleh dua negara sehingga disebut sebagai integrasi ekonomi bilateral. Jika banyak negara yang bergabung maka kemudian disebut sebagai integrasi ekonomi multilateral.
Integrasi ekonomi bilateral. Integrasi ekonomi bilateral merupakan persetujuan perdagngan antara dua negara dengan tujuan utama untuk mengatasi permasalahan :
- keseimbangan negara perdagangan. Dua negara atau G to G mengadakan persetujuan untuk menjaga keseimbangan neraca perdagngan (trade account). Misalnya antara Amerika Serikat dengan Jepang
- kebutuhan dana investasi. Permaslahan kebutuhan dana investasi ini dapat diatasi dengan mendorong investasi di negara berkembang dengan mengadakan perjanjian bilateral dengan negara investor dalam hal asuransi kerugian atas investasi dan negara tuan rumah harus memenuhi kewajiban mengembalikan investasi.
- pembatasan perdagangan produk khusus. Perjanjian ini digunakan untuk membatasi perdagangan produk-produk khusus seperti misalnya minyak dan gas bumi.
Integrasi Ekonomi Multilateral
Iklim usaha yang cukup pesat dalam perdagangan internasional telah menjadikan industri rumahtangga menjadi sebuah perusahaan raksasa yang tidak mengenal batas-batas negara dan banyaknya MNC ini telah mendorong terjadinya transmisi internasional yang didukung dengan adanya perkembangan dibidang keuangan, perbankan, investor, jasa konsultan, konstruksi, sehingga batas-batas negara menjadi kabur dan memperbesar saling ketergantungan antar negara, saling keterganutungan inilah yang kemudian menyebabkan beberapa negara memiliki rencana untuk membentuk suatu kerjasama multilateral seperti contohnya Masyarakat Ekonomi Eropa yang kemudian terintegrasi lagi menjadi Uni Eropa.
Hubungan Antara Negara Besar-Kecil atau Negara Maju-Berkembang
Negara Debitor-Kreditor
Untuk melaksanakan pembangunan ekonomi suatu negara maka negara berkembang khususnya memerlukan dana investasi yang dapat diperoleh setelah mendapatkan bantuan dari negara kreditur.
negara kreditor (creditor country) adalah negara yang memiliki nilai kekayaan sendiri yang melebihi jumlah nilai seluruh kekayaan asing yang tertanam dinegaranya. Nilai kekayaan sendiri terdiri dari pemilikan harta benda, penyertaan modal dan piutang.
Negara debitur (debitur country) adalah negara yang seluruh kekayaan yang tertanam diluar negeri lebih kecil daripada jumlah nilai kekayaan negara lain yang tertanam dinegara tersebut.
Masing-masing negara, baik negara maju maupun negara berkembang memiliki keunggulan komparatif masing-masing. Negara berkembang biasanya memiliki keunggulan komparatif yang terdiri dari sumber daya alam dan tenaga kerja. Sedangkan negara maju memiliki keunggulan komparatif dibidang teknologi dan kapital. Pertemuan kebutuhan dari kedua negara kecil dan negara besar ini menimbulkan adanya ketergantungan dalam bentuk transaksi perdagangan internasional yang dapat dilihat pada neraca pembayaran dari kedua negara tersebut.
Penanaman Modal Asing
Penduduk dari suatu negara (domestic) dapat melakukan kerjasama dengan penduduk negara lain (foreign), misalnya untuk mendirikan perusahaan patungan dalam rangka penanaman modal asing (PMA) atau penanaman modal dalam negeri (PMDN)
Utang Piutang
Negara berkembang biasanya belum siap dengan sarana prasarana untuk kepentingan umum agar penduduk negerinya dapat membangun perusahaan-perusahaan industri. Hal ini biasanya disebabkan oleh permasalahan klasik dimana penerimaan dalam negeri dari pajak, retribusi atau pungutan lainnya hanya sekedar menutupi pengeluaran operasional, tetapi tidak mencukupi kebutuhan dana pembangunan sarana publik. Untuk mambangun sarana jalan, jembatan, listrik, air bersih dan telekomunikasi, negara kecil memperoleh bantuan dari negara besar dalam bentuk pinjaman luar negeri.
Materi kuliah k3
UNIVERSITAS MUHAMMADIYAH MALANG
JURUSAN ILMU HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL
Mata Kuliah : Ekonomi Internasional
Semester : Genap/II
Pertemuan : IV
Tema : Neraca Pembayaran Internasional
Pengajar : Tonny D Effendi
Pendahuluan
Dalam menganalisa perdagangan internasional yang dilakukan oleh suatu negara, seringkali perhitungan tentang keuntungan atau kerugian yang dicapai oleh negara dilihat dari neraca pembayaran sebgai bukti berbagai transaksi yang telah dilakukan negraa terhadap negara lain.
Fungsi utama dari neraca pembayaran yang pada definisi dasarnya adalah catatan tentang transaksi ekonomi ini adalah untuk memberikan informasi tentang berbagai transaksi yang dapat menjadikan negara tersebut menerima keuntungan (surplus) atau kerugian (defisit).
Definisi Neraca Pembayaran Internasional
Menurut Nopirin, neraca pembayaran suatu negara adalah catatan yang sistematis tentang transaksi ekonomi internasional antar penduduk negara itu dengan penduduk negara lain dalam jangka waktu tertentu. Catatan semacam ini sangat penting dengan tujuan utamanya adalah untuk memberikan informasi kepada penguasa atau pemerintah tentang posisi keuangan dalam hubungan ekonomi dengan negara lain serta membantu didalam pengambilan kebijaksanaan moneter, fiskal, perdagangan dan pembayaran internasional.
Seperti dijelaskan diatas bahwa neraca pembayarana suatau engfara mencatat transaksi yang dilakukan oleh penduduknya dengan penduduk negara yang lain. penduduk disini dalam artian adalah :
- orang perorangan/individu, orang perorangan yang tidak mewakili suatu pemerintahan, misalnya turis, dianggap sebagai penduduk dimana mereka mempunyai tempat tinggal tetap atau tempat dimana mereka memperoleh “center of interest”. Untuk menentukan center of interest ini, diukur dengan dimana mereka memperoleh penghasilan tetap atau dimana mereka bekerja.
- badan hukum, pengertian badan hukum sebagai penduduk suatu negara adalah ketika suatu usaha tersebut telah memperoleh status sebagai Badan Hukum dan jika suatu perusahaan memiliki cabang-cabang perusahaan diluar negeri maka cabang-cabang tersebut dianggap sebagai penduduk diluar negeri.
- pemerintah, adalah penduduk dari negara yang diwakilinya seperti contohnya adalah diplomat dimana transaksi yang mereka lakukan dinegara lain dianggap sebagai transaksi ekonomi internasional.
Transaksi dalam Neraca Pembayaran Internasional
Dalam neraca pembayaran suatu negara kita perlu membedakan beberapa istilah transaksi yaitu :
Transaksi debit, yaitu transaksi yang menimbulkan kewajiban untuk melakukan pembayaran kepada penduduk negara lain.
Transaksi kredit adalah transaksi yang menimbulkan hak untuk menerima pembayaran dari penduduk negara lain.
Transaksi yang sedang berjalan (current account) adalah transaksi yang meliputi barang dan jasa. Hadiah (gisft), bantuan (aids) dan transaksi satu arah yang lain (unilateral transfer) dapat digolongkan dalam transaksi sedang berjalan atau sebagai transaksi tersendiri yaitu transaksi satu arah.
Transaksi kapital (capital account) adalah transaksi yang menyangkut investasi modal dan emas.
Transaksi Barang dan Jasa (current account)
Transaksi barang dan jasa meliputi ekspor maupun impor barang dan jasa. Ekspor barang meliputi barang yang bisa dilihat secara fisik seperti minyak bumi, bahan alam dansebagainya. Sedangkan ekspor jasa misalnya penjualan jasa angkutan, taourisme dan asuransi.transaksi yang dilakukan dalam ekspor termasuk dalam transaksi debit karena menimbulkan hak untuk menerima pembayaran dari penduduk negara lain atau dengan kata lain menyebabkan aliran dana masuk.
Impor barang meliputi misalnya barang konsumsi, bahan mentah industri, sedangkan impor jasa meliputi pembelian jasa-jasa dari penduduk negara lain. pembayaran pendapatan (bunga, deviden atau keuntungan) untuk modal yang ditanam oleh penduduk negara lain juga dapat dikategorikan dalam impor jasa. Transaksi yang berkaitan dengan impor termasuk dalam transaksi kredit karena menimbulkan kewajiban untuk melakukan pembayaran kepada penduduk negara lain atau menyebabkan aliran dana keluar negeri.
Surplus dalam neraca sedang berjalan berarti ekspor lebih besar daripada impor. Hal ini berarti bahwa suatu negara memiliki akumulasi kekayaan valuta asing, sehingga mempunyai saldo positif dalam investasi luar negeri. Sedangkan defisit dalam neraca transaksi sedang berjalan adalah jika impor lebih besar daripada impor sehingga terjadi pengurangan dinvestasi diluar negeri. Oleh karena itu transaksi yang sedang berjalan erat kaitannya dengan penghasilan nasional sebab ekspor dan impor merupakan komponen utama dalam pendapatan nasional.
Transaksi Modal
Yang termasuk dalam transaksi modal adalah :
transaksi modal jangka pendek, meliputi :
- kredit dari negara lain untuk perdagangan (transaksi kredit) atau kredit yang diberikan kepada penduduk negara lain (transaksi debit)
- deposito bank diluar negeri (transaksi debit) atau deposito bank didalam negeri milik penduduk negara lain (transaksi kredit).
- Pembelian surat berharga luar negeri jangka pendek (transaksi debit) atau penjualan surat berharga dalam negeri jangka pendek kepada penduduk negara lain (transaksi kredit).
transaksi modal jangka panjang, meliputi :
- investasi langsung diluar negeri (transaksi debit) atau investasi asing didalam negeri (transaksi kredit)
- pembelian surat berharga jangka panjang milik penduduk negara lain (transaksi debit), atau pembelian surat berharga jangka panjang dalam begeri oleh penduduk asing (transaksi kredit)
- pinjaman jangka panjang yang diberikan kepada penduduk negara lain (transaksi debit) atau pinjaman jangka panjang yang diterima dari penduduk negara lain (transaksi kredit).
Transaksi Satu Arah (unilateral transfer)
Transaksi satu arah adalah transaksi yang tidak menimbulkan kewajiban untuk melakukan pembayaran, misalnya hadiah (gift) dan bantuan (aid). Apabila suatu negara memberi hadiah atau bantuan kepada negara lain maka termasuk dalam transaksi debit, sedangkan jika suatu negara menerima bantuan atau hadiah dari negara lain maka termasuk dalam transaksi kredit.
Errors and Ommisions
Errors and ommisions atau selisih perhitungan adalah sebuah rekening yang digunakan sebagai penyeimbang apabila transaksi kredit tidak persis sama dengan nilai transaksi debit. Dengan adanya rekening selisih perhitungan ini maka jumlah total nilai sebelah kredit dan debit dari suatu neraca pembayaran internasional akan selalu sama (balance)
Beberapa Pengertian “balance” dalam suatu neraca pembayaran
Banyak sekali pengertian balande dalam neraca pembayaran namun setidaknya terdapat empat pengertian utama yaitu :
Basic balance
Basic balance terdiri dari balance dalam transaksi yang sedang berjalan (current account balance) ditambah dengan transaksi modal jangka panjang. Basic balance akan berubah –ubah apabila terjadi perubahan prinsipil dalam perekonomian seperti perubahan harga, kurs valuta asing dan pertumbuhan ekonomi. Basic balance memberikan informasi tentang akibat perubahan perkonomian terhadap neraca pembayaran, yitu berakibat pada pada aliran modal jangka pendek.
Balance transaksi “autonomous”
Balance ini terdiri dari basic balance ditambah dengan aliran modal jangka pendek. Dalam hal ini pemerintah seharusnya lebih memperhatikan balance transaksi autonomous daripada basic balance sebab kenyataanya aliran midal jangka pendek jarang sekali sama dengan nol. Defisit atau surplus suatu neraca pembayaran dilihat dari balance transaksi autonomous yang kemudian tercermin dalam transaksi accomodating yaitu aliran modal pemerintah jangka pendek.
Transaksi accomodating merupakan transaksi yang timbul sebagai akibat dari adanya transaksi lain sedangkan transaksi autonomous merupakan transaksi yang muncul dengan sendirinya tanpa dipengaruhi oleh transaksi lain. yang termasuk dalam transaksi autonomous adalah transaksi sedang berjalan, transaksi kapital dan transaksi satu arah.ketidakseimbangan antara transaksi autonomous debit dan kredit menimbulkan transaksi lalu lintas moneter seperti misalnya mutasi dalam hubungan dengan IMF, pasiva luar negeri serta aktiva luar negeri. Defisit atau surplus suatu neraca pembayaran dapat diketahui dari transaksi autonomous tersebut.
Liquidity balance
Konsep ini dikembangkan di Amerika Serikat untuk mengukur posisi neraca pembayarannya. Perbedaan dengan balance autonomous adalah perlakuan terhadap pemilikan kekayaan (assets) jangka pendek. Kekayaan asing (seperti surat berharga jangka pendek atau deposito bank) yang dimiliki oleh penduduk Amerika diperhitungkan sebagai faktor yang mempengaruhi ketidakseimbangan neraca pembayaran.
Balance transaksi pemerintah jangka pendek
Konsep ini juga berkembang di Amerika Serikat. Menurut konsep ini, neraca pembayaran terdiri dari penjumlahan basic balance, selisih yang diperhitungkan dan rekening modal jangka pendek (sesudah dikurangi dengan modal Amrika jangka pendek yang dimiliki oleh lembaga moneter negara lain). ketidak seimbangan yang timbul dalam neraca pembayaran diseimbangkan dengan cadangan modal pemerintah serta modal pemerintah jangka pendek yang dimiliki oleh lembaga moneter asing.
Masalah dalam Analisa Neraca Pembayaran
Kita sudah menegnal minimal empat konsep balance yang digunakan dalam menganalisa suatu neraca pembayaran. Namun kesulitan muncul ketika harus menentukan konsep balance yangmana yang paling relevan misalnya untuk pengambilan keputusan bagi pemerintah, analisa trend suatu perekonomian atau membuat suatu perkiraan tentang arah perkembangan ekonomi. Setiap konsep balance menunjukkan aspek yang berbeda. Tujuan analisa neraca pembayaran berbeda-beda dan perbedaan ini menentuakan pola analisanya. Kesulitan timbul dalam m\penentuan secara umum pola analisa tersebut.
Suatu Neraca Pembayaran Internasional Secara Pembukuan Selalu Seimbang
Setiap transaksi dalam neraca pembayaran selalu dicatat dalam rekening debit dan kredit sehingga selalu menghasilkan keseimbangan. Misalnya ketika suatu negara menerima ekspor kayu sebesar US$ X maka hasilnya semuanya digunakan untuk mengimpor mesin sebesar US$ X pula. Atau jika hasil ekspor kayu tersebut disimpan dibank diluar negeri maka terdapat deposito bank luar negeri dengan nilai US$ X yang sama.
Neraca Pembayaran Internasional, Neraca Perdagangan Internasional dan Neraca Harta Kekayaan dan Utang Piutang.
Jika neraca pembayaran internasional mencatat semua transaksi yang dilakukan oleh penduduk suatu negera adengan penduduk dari negara lain, maka neraca perdagangan internaasional hanya mencatat transaksi ekspor dan impor barang dan jasa saja (transaksi sedang berjalan). Sedangkan neraaca harta kekayaan dan utang pituang adalah suatu ikhtisar tentang seluruh harta kekayaan dan utang pituang dari penduduk suatu negara dinegara lain serta harta kekayaan dan utang piutang milik penduduk negara lain di negara itu. Karena yang dicatat bukan transaksi melainkan keadaan harta kekayaan dan utang pituang maka dasar penyusunannya adalah waktu tertentu.
Kesulitan dalam penyusunan neraca harta kekayaan dan utang pituang adalah :
pengumpulan data yang sulit karena pemerintah tidak memiliki administrasi yang baik dalam pencatatatn kekayaatn penduduknya yang ada diluar negeri dan penduduk sendiri yang secara diam-diam tidak melaporkan kekayaannya yang ada diluar negeri
kesulitan dalam menentuakan nilai kekayaan, misalnya perusahaan asing yang ada di Indonesia sangat sulit dihitung nilai bersihnya.
JURUSAN ILMU HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL
Mata Kuliah : Ekonomi Internasional
Semester : Genap/II
Pertemuan : IV
Tema : Neraca Pembayaran Internasional
Pengajar : Tonny D Effendi
Pendahuluan
Dalam menganalisa perdagangan internasional yang dilakukan oleh suatu negara, seringkali perhitungan tentang keuntungan atau kerugian yang dicapai oleh negara dilihat dari neraca pembayaran sebgai bukti berbagai transaksi yang telah dilakukan negraa terhadap negara lain.
Fungsi utama dari neraca pembayaran yang pada definisi dasarnya adalah catatan tentang transaksi ekonomi ini adalah untuk memberikan informasi tentang berbagai transaksi yang dapat menjadikan negara tersebut menerima keuntungan (surplus) atau kerugian (defisit).
Definisi Neraca Pembayaran Internasional
Menurut Nopirin, neraca pembayaran suatu negara adalah catatan yang sistematis tentang transaksi ekonomi internasional antar penduduk negara itu dengan penduduk negara lain dalam jangka waktu tertentu. Catatan semacam ini sangat penting dengan tujuan utamanya adalah untuk memberikan informasi kepada penguasa atau pemerintah tentang posisi keuangan dalam hubungan ekonomi dengan negara lain serta membantu didalam pengambilan kebijaksanaan moneter, fiskal, perdagangan dan pembayaran internasional.
Seperti dijelaskan diatas bahwa neraca pembayarana suatau engfara mencatat transaksi yang dilakukan oleh penduduknya dengan penduduk negara yang lain. penduduk disini dalam artian adalah :
- orang perorangan/individu, orang perorangan yang tidak mewakili suatu pemerintahan, misalnya turis, dianggap sebagai penduduk dimana mereka mempunyai tempat tinggal tetap atau tempat dimana mereka memperoleh “center of interest”. Untuk menentukan center of interest ini, diukur dengan dimana mereka memperoleh penghasilan tetap atau dimana mereka bekerja.
- badan hukum, pengertian badan hukum sebagai penduduk suatu negara adalah ketika suatu usaha tersebut telah memperoleh status sebagai Badan Hukum dan jika suatu perusahaan memiliki cabang-cabang perusahaan diluar negeri maka cabang-cabang tersebut dianggap sebagai penduduk diluar negeri.
- pemerintah, adalah penduduk dari negara yang diwakilinya seperti contohnya adalah diplomat dimana transaksi yang mereka lakukan dinegara lain dianggap sebagai transaksi ekonomi internasional.
Transaksi dalam Neraca Pembayaran Internasional
Dalam neraca pembayaran suatu negara kita perlu membedakan beberapa istilah transaksi yaitu :
Transaksi debit, yaitu transaksi yang menimbulkan kewajiban untuk melakukan pembayaran kepada penduduk negara lain.
Transaksi kredit adalah transaksi yang menimbulkan hak untuk menerima pembayaran dari penduduk negara lain.
Transaksi yang sedang berjalan (current account) adalah transaksi yang meliputi barang dan jasa. Hadiah (gisft), bantuan (aids) dan transaksi satu arah yang lain (unilateral transfer) dapat digolongkan dalam transaksi sedang berjalan atau sebagai transaksi tersendiri yaitu transaksi satu arah.
Transaksi kapital (capital account) adalah transaksi yang menyangkut investasi modal dan emas.
Transaksi Barang dan Jasa (current account)
Transaksi barang dan jasa meliputi ekspor maupun impor barang dan jasa. Ekspor barang meliputi barang yang bisa dilihat secara fisik seperti minyak bumi, bahan alam dansebagainya. Sedangkan ekspor jasa misalnya penjualan jasa angkutan, taourisme dan asuransi.transaksi yang dilakukan dalam ekspor termasuk dalam transaksi debit karena menimbulkan hak untuk menerima pembayaran dari penduduk negara lain atau dengan kata lain menyebabkan aliran dana masuk.
Impor barang meliputi misalnya barang konsumsi, bahan mentah industri, sedangkan impor jasa meliputi pembelian jasa-jasa dari penduduk negara lain. pembayaran pendapatan (bunga, deviden atau keuntungan) untuk modal yang ditanam oleh penduduk negara lain juga dapat dikategorikan dalam impor jasa. Transaksi yang berkaitan dengan impor termasuk dalam transaksi kredit karena menimbulkan kewajiban untuk melakukan pembayaran kepada penduduk negara lain atau menyebabkan aliran dana keluar negeri.
Surplus dalam neraca sedang berjalan berarti ekspor lebih besar daripada impor. Hal ini berarti bahwa suatu negara memiliki akumulasi kekayaan valuta asing, sehingga mempunyai saldo positif dalam investasi luar negeri. Sedangkan defisit dalam neraca transaksi sedang berjalan adalah jika impor lebih besar daripada impor sehingga terjadi pengurangan dinvestasi diluar negeri. Oleh karena itu transaksi yang sedang berjalan erat kaitannya dengan penghasilan nasional sebab ekspor dan impor merupakan komponen utama dalam pendapatan nasional.
Transaksi Modal
Yang termasuk dalam transaksi modal adalah :
transaksi modal jangka pendek, meliputi :
- kredit dari negara lain untuk perdagangan (transaksi kredit) atau kredit yang diberikan kepada penduduk negara lain (transaksi debit)
- deposito bank diluar negeri (transaksi debit) atau deposito bank didalam negeri milik penduduk negara lain (transaksi kredit).
- Pembelian surat berharga luar negeri jangka pendek (transaksi debit) atau penjualan surat berharga dalam negeri jangka pendek kepada penduduk negara lain (transaksi kredit).
transaksi modal jangka panjang, meliputi :
- investasi langsung diluar negeri (transaksi debit) atau investasi asing didalam negeri (transaksi kredit)
- pembelian surat berharga jangka panjang milik penduduk negara lain (transaksi debit), atau pembelian surat berharga jangka panjang dalam begeri oleh penduduk asing (transaksi kredit)
- pinjaman jangka panjang yang diberikan kepada penduduk negara lain (transaksi debit) atau pinjaman jangka panjang yang diterima dari penduduk negara lain (transaksi kredit).
Transaksi Satu Arah (unilateral transfer)
Transaksi satu arah adalah transaksi yang tidak menimbulkan kewajiban untuk melakukan pembayaran, misalnya hadiah (gift) dan bantuan (aid). Apabila suatu negara memberi hadiah atau bantuan kepada negara lain maka termasuk dalam transaksi debit, sedangkan jika suatu negara menerima bantuan atau hadiah dari negara lain maka termasuk dalam transaksi kredit.
Errors and Ommisions
Errors and ommisions atau selisih perhitungan adalah sebuah rekening yang digunakan sebagai penyeimbang apabila transaksi kredit tidak persis sama dengan nilai transaksi debit. Dengan adanya rekening selisih perhitungan ini maka jumlah total nilai sebelah kredit dan debit dari suatu neraca pembayaran internasional akan selalu sama (balance)
Beberapa Pengertian “balance” dalam suatu neraca pembayaran
Banyak sekali pengertian balande dalam neraca pembayaran namun setidaknya terdapat empat pengertian utama yaitu :
Basic balance
Basic balance terdiri dari balance dalam transaksi yang sedang berjalan (current account balance) ditambah dengan transaksi modal jangka panjang. Basic balance akan berubah –ubah apabila terjadi perubahan prinsipil dalam perekonomian seperti perubahan harga, kurs valuta asing dan pertumbuhan ekonomi. Basic balance memberikan informasi tentang akibat perubahan perkonomian terhadap neraca pembayaran, yitu berakibat pada pada aliran modal jangka pendek.
Balance transaksi “autonomous”
Balance ini terdiri dari basic balance ditambah dengan aliran modal jangka pendek. Dalam hal ini pemerintah seharusnya lebih memperhatikan balance transaksi autonomous daripada basic balance sebab kenyataanya aliran midal jangka pendek jarang sekali sama dengan nol. Defisit atau surplus suatu neraca pembayaran dilihat dari balance transaksi autonomous yang kemudian tercermin dalam transaksi accomodating yaitu aliran modal pemerintah jangka pendek.
Transaksi accomodating merupakan transaksi yang timbul sebagai akibat dari adanya transaksi lain sedangkan transaksi autonomous merupakan transaksi yang muncul dengan sendirinya tanpa dipengaruhi oleh transaksi lain. yang termasuk dalam transaksi autonomous adalah transaksi sedang berjalan, transaksi kapital dan transaksi satu arah.ketidakseimbangan antara transaksi autonomous debit dan kredit menimbulkan transaksi lalu lintas moneter seperti misalnya mutasi dalam hubungan dengan IMF, pasiva luar negeri serta aktiva luar negeri. Defisit atau surplus suatu neraca pembayaran dapat diketahui dari transaksi autonomous tersebut.
Liquidity balance
Konsep ini dikembangkan di Amerika Serikat untuk mengukur posisi neraca pembayarannya. Perbedaan dengan balance autonomous adalah perlakuan terhadap pemilikan kekayaan (assets) jangka pendek. Kekayaan asing (seperti surat berharga jangka pendek atau deposito bank) yang dimiliki oleh penduduk Amerika diperhitungkan sebagai faktor yang mempengaruhi ketidakseimbangan neraca pembayaran.
Balance transaksi pemerintah jangka pendek
Konsep ini juga berkembang di Amerika Serikat. Menurut konsep ini, neraca pembayaran terdiri dari penjumlahan basic balance, selisih yang diperhitungkan dan rekening modal jangka pendek (sesudah dikurangi dengan modal Amrika jangka pendek yang dimiliki oleh lembaga moneter negara lain). ketidak seimbangan yang timbul dalam neraca pembayaran diseimbangkan dengan cadangan modal pemerintah serta modal pemerintah jangka pendek yang dimiliki oleh lembaga moneter asing.
Masalah dalam Analisa Neraca Pembayaran
Kita sudah menegnal minimal empat konsep balance yang digunakan dalam menganalisa suatu neraca pembayaran. Namun kesulitan muncul ketika harus menentukan konsep balance yangmana yang paling relevan misalnya untuk pengambilan keputusan bagi pemerintah, analisa trend suatu perekonomian atau membuat suatu perkiraan tentang arah perkembangan ekonomi. Setiap konsep balance menunjukkan aspek yang berbeda. Tujuan analisa neraca pembayaran berbeda-beda dan perbedaan ini menentuakan pola analisanya. Kesulitan timbul dalam m\penentuan secara umum pola analisa tersebut.
Suatu Neraca Pembayaran Internasional Secara Pembukuan Selalu Seimbang
Setiap transaksi dalam neraca pembayaran selalu dicatat dalam rekening debit dan kredit sehingga selalu menghasilkan keseimbangan. Misalnya ketika suatu negara menerima ekspor kayu sebesar US$ X maka hasilnya semuanya digunakan untuk mengimpor mesin sebesar US$ X pula. Atau jika hasil ekspor kayu tersebut disimpan dibank diluar negeri maka terdapat deposito bank luar negeri dengan nilai US$ X yang sama.
Neraca Pembayaran Internasional, Neraca Perdagangan Internasional dan Neraca Harta Kekayaan dan Utang Piutang.
Jika neraca pembayaran internasional mencatat semua transaksi yang dilakukan oleh penduduk suatu negera adengan penduduk dari negara lain, maka neraca perdagangan internaasional hanya mencatat transaksi ekspor dan impor barang dan jasa saja (transaksi sedang berjalan). Sedangkan neraaca harta kekayaan dan utang pituang adalah suatu ikhtisar tentang seluruh harta kekayaan dan utang pituang dari penduduk suatu negara dinegara lain serta harta kekayaan dan utang piutang milik penduduk negara lain di negara itu. Karena yang dicatat bukan transaksi melainkan keadaan harta kekayaan dan utang pituang maka dasar penyusunannya adalah waktu tertentu.
Kesulitan dalam penyusunan neraca harta kekayaan dan utang pituang adalah :
pengumpulan data yang sulit karena pemerintah tidak memiliki administrasi yang baik dalam pencatatatn kekayaatn penduduknya yang ada diluar negeri dan penduduk sendiri yang secara diam-diam tidak melaporkan kekayaannya yang ada diluar negeri
kesulitan dalam menentuakan nilai kekayaan, misalnya perusahaan asing yang ada di Indonesia sangat sulit dihitung nilai bersihnya.
Materi Kuliah ke 2
UNIVERSITAS MUHAMMADIYAH MALANG
JURUSAN ILMU HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL
Mata Kuliah : Ekonomi Internasional
Semester : Genap/II
Pertemuan : IV
Tema : Kebijakan Ekonomi Internasional
Pengajar : Tonny D Effendi
Pendahuluan
Seperti dalam penjelasan mengenai makna dasar dari ekonomi internasional, yaitu tentang hubungan ekonomi antar negara, maka pembahasan hubungan ini tidak bisa dilepaskan dari pembahasan kebijakan ekonomi luar negeri atau ekonomi internasional suatu negara. Kebijakan ekonomi internasional suatu negara akan sangat berpengaruh terhadap pola interaksi yang dilakukan dalam menjalankan hubungan ekononi dengan negara lain.
Kebijakan ekonomi internasional suatu negara dapat kita amati dari dua sisi utama. Pertama kita bisa mengamati dari sisi yang mendasar yaitu sebagai alat untuk mencapai kepentingan nasional terutama dalam bidang ekonomi. Dalam bahasannya, poin ini lebih bersifat politis karena penuh dengan muatan-muatan kepentingan yang kadangkala tidak bersifat ekonomi, misalnya melakukan hubungan perdagangan dengan negara lain untuk mendekati atau untuk kepentingan politik tertentu. Sedangkan sisi yang kedua lebih bersifat praktis yaitu membahas kebijakan ekonomi internasional suatu negara dengan menggunakan unsur dalam ilmu ekonomi sebagai alat analisanya. Pada sisi inilah kita akan lebih menfokuskan pembahasan tentang kebijakan ekonomi internasional suatu negara.
Selanjutnya dari beberapa kebihakan ekonomi internasional yang diterapkan oleh berbagai negara maka kita dapat melihat bagaimana sebenarnya pola dalam perdagangan internasional yang dilakukan oleh banyak negara. Dalam bahasan ini kita bisa melihat sejarah perkembangan perdagangan internasional sejak lahirnya merkantilisme yang kemudian terbai menjadi dua pandangan yaitu pandangan Bullionist dan Merkantilisme Murni.
Dalam kaitannya dengan hal tersebut, maka kita juga akan mempelajari alasan suatu negara melakukan perdagangan internasional. Kegiatan ekonomi internasional dapat dilihat dari 2 sudut pandang yaitu Teori Murni Perdagangan Internasional dan Teori Moneter untuk Perdagangan Internasional. Teori murni digunakan sebagai dasar untuk melihat keseimbangan barang dagangan dan harga sedangkan teori moneter digunakan untuk melihat mekanisme dari neraca pembayaran, penentuan kurs devisa, mata uang yang berhubungan dengan kegiatan bisnis.
Selanjutnya sebegai pelengkap maka kita akan melakukan pembahasan tentang teori dan mekanisme yang berkembang dalam Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Hal ini penting karena salah satu mekanisme yang terjadi dalam ekonomi internasional adalah mekanisme investasi langsung atau FDI dengan segala permasalahan dan alasannya.
Kebijakan Ekonomi Internasional Suatu Negara
Terdapat dua tinjauan kebijakan ekonomi internasional, yaitu dalam arti luas dan dalam arti sempit.
kebijakan ekonomi internasional dalam arti luas meliputi semua kegiatan ekonomi pemerintah suatu negara yang secara langsung maupun tidak langung mempengaruhi komposisi, arah dan kegiatan ekspor impor barang dan jasa yang dilaksanakan oleh pemerintah tersebut. Karena itu, sekalipun suatu kebihakan ditujukan untuk mengatasi pemasalahan dalam negeri, tapi bila secara langsung atau tidak langusng berpengaruh terhadap ekspor dan impor maka dapat dimasukkan dalam kebijakan ekonomi internasional.
kebijakan ekonomi internasional dalam arti sempit yaitu hanya meliputi kebijakan yang langusng mempengaruhi ekspor dan impor. Kebijakann internasional dalam arti sempit ini berkaitan dnegan ekspor barang dan jasa, oleh karena itu cakupannya sangat luas mengingat bantaknya barang atau jasa yang diekspor maupun diimpor, mulai dari barang konsumsi, produksi sampai pada tenaga kerja.
Selanjutnya, setelah memahami arti kebijakan ekonomi internasional suatu negara, selanjutnya kita mempelajari tentang tujuan dari kebijakan ekonomi internasional tersebut. Besar kecilnya peran kebijakan ekonomi internasional suatu negara dapat kita lihat dalam beberapa indikator:
prosentasi besarnya sumbangan ekspor an impor sebagai bagian dari GDP
besarnya pengaruh harga barang di luar negeri terhadap harga barang di dalam negeri terutama berkaitan dengan kurs mata uang
besar kecilnya peranan modal asing, baik yang berupa investasi maupun yang berupa pinjaman terhadap investasi secara keseluruhan baik melalui badan pemerintah maupun swasta.
besar kecilnya international demonstration effect atau pengaruh pola hidup atau budaya asing terhadap pola hidup didalam negeri. Hal ini berkaitan dengan ketergantungan suatu negara terhadap negara lain.
Pokok-pokok tujuan kebijakan ekonomi internasional yaitu :
meningkatkan ekspor agar penerimaan devisa negara semakin besar
menstabilkan perkembangan ekspor, karena pean ekspor mennetukan pembangunan ekonomi suatu negara dalam artian stabilitas penghasilan ekspor maupun kecepatan pertumbuhannya sangat penting. Usaha yang dilakukan adalah :
menambah jumlah dan jenis barang yang diekspor sehingga bila satu atau beberapa jenis barang pasarannya sedang lesu atau mengalami saingan baru, maka dapat diganti dengan jenis barang uang lain.
merubah struktur barang ekspor dari bahan-bahan mentah dan hasil pertanian yang suply-nya in-elastis, mudah tergantung pada musim dan posisinya makin lemah, ke barang-barang industri yang produksinya mudah diatur.
memperbaiki kelemahan dibidahng transportasi sehingga sistem penentuan harga tidak lagi berdasarkan hitungan FOB (free on board), dalam artian menghitung harga jual hanya sampai pemuatan barang dikapal, tetapi mampu menjual atas perhitungan harga CIF (cost insurance and freight). Artinya kita menghitung harga termasuk ongkos angkutan dan biaya asuransi ke tempat importir.
berusaha memperluas spread effect (efek penyebaran) barang-barang ekspor, yaitu berusaha memperluas mata rantai produksi kebelakang maupun kedepan. Maksudnya mencari barang-barang yang mempunyai keterkaitan secara horizontal maupun vertikal dengan jenis usaha yang lain.
berusaha mengurangi ketergantungan ekonomi terhadap luar negeri. Hal ini sangat sulit karena setiap negara menjadi semakin terbuka terhadap proses globalisasi yang semakin cepat.
Pola Perdagangan Internasional
Lahirnya Merkantilisme
Perkembangan perdagangan internasional pada dsarnya diawali dengan perkembangan yang terjadi di Eropa saat beberapa kerajaan memiliki pusat perdagangan seperti London, Napoli, Paris dan Milan sebagai pusat industri rumah tangga. Perkembangan itu telah mendorong perubahan dalam masyarakat dari masyarakat yang feodal menuju masyarakat yang kapitalis. Muncul banyak pedagang yang kemudian melahirkan hubungan antara penguasa dan pedagang untuk memenangkan perdagangan. Tidak heran pada masa itu muncul hubungan khusus antara pedagang dengan jeluarga raja untuk mendapatkan proteksi.
Pasca masa pencerahan atau renaisance telah mendorong masyarakat Eropa untuk mencari daerah baru dan membuka daerah yang belum mereka tmui terutama di belahan dunia timur. Penemuan-penemuan baru pasca pencerahan telah membuat banyak kerajaan di Eropa yang melakukan penjelajahan yang diawali oleh Spanyol. Keberhasilan Spanyol kemudian diikuti oleh negara lain seperti Portugal, Inggris, Belanda dan Perancis. Mulai saat itulah mulai masuk bangsa Barat kenegara Timur yang kemudian kita kenal dengan Negara Dunia Ketiga.
Dalam masyarakat kemudian muncul kelompok-kelompok baru yaitu kelas pedagang atau kelas kapitalis yang menjadi agen pembangunan dan perubahan struktur ekonomi di negara Eropa. Muncul agen-agen perdagangan seperti The Merchant Adventures, The Eastland Company, The Muscovy Company, The East India Company dan VOC yang berusaha mengeruk keuntungan sebesar mungkin melalui monopoli dan kolonialisme. Hal ini mencapai puncak ketika kepentingan pedagang menjadi kepentingan negara yang kemudian dikenal dengan merkantilisme. Pada abad ke-17 kepentingan negarawan terpusat pada politik, tetapi merkantilisme merupakan tahap awal dari kebihajakan ekonomi yang dikenal dengan istilah the commercial or mercantile system dari Adam Smith, pendiri aliran klasik.
Kelompok Merkantilisme Murni dan Kelompok Bullionist
Merkantilisme akhirnya berkembang menjadi dua kelompok yaitu kelompok merkantilisme murni dan kelompok bullionist.
- tokoh utama kelompok bullionist adalah Gerald Malynes yang lebih mengutamakan kemakmuran suatu negra melalui pemilikian logam mulia. Gagasan untuk menumpuk logam mulia mendorong pendapat bahwa menjual barang ke negara lain lebih memberikan keuntungan daripada memberi barang dari negara lain, dan selalu mendorong digunakannya kebijaksanaan yang dapat menghasilkan surplus ekspor, karena surplus ekspor dibayar dengan logam mulia
- salah satu pendukung merkantilisme murni adalah Thomas Mun yang menganut sistem uang dan modal. Yang menonjol dari aliran ini adalah suku bunga yang dapat menguntungkan bagi pencari kredit. Karena itu merkantilisme murni menentang adanya riba. Kredit dengan suku bunga rendah mendorong kegiatan ekonomi apabila didukung dengan perkembangan harga dan banyaknya uang yang beredar dalam bentuk logam mulia dab cara yang paling mudah adalah melalui perdagangan internasional dibawah suatu kebijaksanaan pengawasan untuk mendorong pertumbuhan industri dan perdaganan, khususnya barang ekspor. Hadi terlihat sifat pokok merkantilisme yang menitikberatkan pada perdagangan antar negara, hasrat untuk mencapai kemakmuran dan mengembangkan kekuasaan dengan perdagangan maupun agama.
Berdasarkan dua pandangan diatas maka suatu negara dalam perdagangan internasional harus mencapai surplus ekspor karena akan dibayar dengan emas. Hal yang dilakukan untuk mendorong ekspor dan mngurangi impor adalah :
melarang ekspor logam mulia, memberi subsidi atas barang ekspor, melarang ekspor bahan mentah dan harganya didalam negeri agar tetap rendah, melarang ekspor barang modal, melarang emigrasi tenaga ahli dengan tujuan agar industru barang ekspor tida disaingi dengan tumbuhnya industri barang-brang tersebut duluar negeri.
pembatasan impor melalui penerapan tarif bea masuk, non taris barier, quota atau larangan impor terhadap barang yang dapat dihasilkan sendiri.
untuk mempertahankan harga barang ekspor yang rendah, upah tenaga kerja dibatasi sampai pada kebutuhan fisik minimum
monopoli perdagangan melalui daerah-daerah jajahan, melalui armada perdagangan, melalui armada perdagangan yang kemudian menjadi alat ekspansi untuk menaklukan dan menduduki daerah-daerah yang menjadi sumber logam mulia.
Setidaknya ada dua aliran perdagangan internasional pada masa merkantilisme yaitu :
- aliran Colbertisme yang dikemukakan oleh Thomas Mun dan Perdana Menteri Louis XIV Perancis, Colbert yang menyatakan penitikberatan pada perkembangan industri dalam negeri daripada internasional
- aliran Cameralisme yang dikemukakan oleh Von Hornig dari Jerman dan Becker dari Australia yang terbatas pada upaya untuk menumpuk logam mulia melalui kebijakan fiskal.
Alasan negara melakukan perdagangan internasional
masalah mobilitas faktor produksi. Faktor produksi terdiri dari tanah (land), tenaga kerja (labour), barang modal (capital) dan manajerial atau keterampilan (skill). Monilitas mengandung arti suatu pergerakan, sehingga yang dimaksud disini adalah pergerakan faktor produksi dari suatu negara kenegara lain. namun pada kenyataannya tidak semua faktor produksi dapat mobil secara internasional. Menurut Adam Smith, labour merupakan faktor produksi yang paling mobil.
masalah perbedaan sistem moneter. Setiap negara memiliki mata uang sendiri. Adanya perbedaan mata uang dari setiap negara, perbedaan kebijakan ekonomi moneter, pada gilirannya mempengaruhi sistem lalu lintas pembayaran internasional dan sistem lalu lintas modal.
masalah batas-batas negara yang berdaulat. Adanya batas-batas dari suatu negara dengan negara yang lain yang berdaulat menyebabkan perbedaan politik dalam perdagangan misalnya perlindungan tarif terhadap produk hasil industri didalam negero, larangan impor, quota dan blok perdagangan. Adanya kedaulatan mengakibatkan bea masuk (impor duty) dari suatu negara tidak sama dengan bea impor dari negara lain.
Masalah transport cost. Ongkos angkut dari pabrik kepasar atau kepelabuhan meninggikan harga asal pabrik. Ongkos pengangkutan barang ekspor harus dimasukkan dalam perhitungan biaya agar harga yang diperoleh untuk komoditi ekspor tersebut tepat.
Foreign Direct Investment
Berkaitan dengan permasalahan perdagangan internasional, kita juga tidak bisa mengabaikan alsan negara atau perusahaan multi nasional menanmkan modalnya di suatu negara. Terdapat sebuag argumen tentang location-specific advantages yang dapat menjelaskan beberapa hal penting dalam teori ini yaitu berkaitan dengan ekspor, lisensi dan investasi langsung. Argumen ini penting untuk menjelaskan relativitas keuntungan perusahaan atau negara mengambil kebijakan ekspor, kisensi atau investasi langsung. Teori ini menjelaskan keputusan untuk ekspor akan diambil jika biaya transportasi lebih rendah dan trade barrier tidak begitu besar. Hal ini akan lebih mempermudah negara atau perusahaan untuk melakukan ekspor karena biaya yang dikeluarkan tidak begitu besar dan komoditi yang akan diekspor bisa lebih besar mengingat pembatasan perdagangan tidak begitu ketat. Namun jika biaya transportasi dan trade barrier semakin meningkat maka kebijakan untuk melakukan ekspor akan merugikan, selanjutnya pilihan strategi bagi perusahaan atau negara adalah lisensi atau investasi langsung.
Teori FDI memandang bahwa kebijakan untuk investasi langsung akan lebih beresiko daripada lisensi, meskipun dalam beberapa kondisi tertentu tingkat resiko diantara kedua seimbang. Lisensi akan sulit dilakukan jika perusahaan multinasional memiliki beberapa kondisi sebagai berikut :
perusahaan memiliki know-how yang berharga dan hal ini tidak bisa dilindungi dalam kontrak
perusahaan membutuhkan kontrol ketat terhadap prosukdi luar negeri untuk memaksimalkan penguasaan pasar di negara yang bersangkutan
keahlian dan kemampuan perusahaan tidak dapat dimasukkan dalam lisensi
Pengambilan keputusan untuk melaksanakan lisensi bukanlah pilihan yang tepat bagi perusahaan dengan ciri sebagai berikut :
industri dengan teknologi tinggi, sehingga perlindungan terhadap keahlian spesifik dari perusahaan dalam lisensi mengandung resiko tinggi.
oligopoli global, dimana saling ketergantungan yang kompetitif, maka perusahaan akan cenderung melakukan kontrol yang ketat terhadap operasi asing sehingga mereka memiliki kemampuan untuk melakukan “serangan” yang terkoordinis terhadap pesaing global mereka.
industri dengan memusatkan perhatian pada penekanan biaya dan kontrol ketat terhadap operasi asing sehingga mereka akan menjajaki kemungkinan untuk melakukan operasi diseluruh dunia dimana mereka menemukan efisiensi berupa biaya yang rendah dan kompetitor yang membahayakan operasi mereka.
Terdapat tiga paradigma dalam teori FDI :
mengikuti para pesaing. Perusahaan mengadakan FDI karena mengikuti para pesaing yang telah melakukan kegiatan serupa sebelumnya. Paradigma ini diperkenalkan oleh FT Knicknbocker
daur hidup produk (product liffe cycle). Diperkenalkan oleh Raymond dan menjelaskan bahwa FDI dilakukan untuk mengadakan efisiensi terhadap siklus produksi produk mereka.
paradigma ecletic, merupakan gabungan diantara dua paradigma diatas.
Secara garis besar, proses penentuan kebijakan dari ekspor sampai kepada lisensi dan FDI digambarkan dalam skema berikut ini :
How high are transportation cost and tariffts?
Is know-how amenable to licensing?
THEN LICENSE
Can know-how be protected by licensing contract?
Is tight control over foreign operation required?
No
Yes
Hight
Yes
No
Yes
No
Low
EXPORT
FDI
FDI
FDI
JURUSAN ILMU HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL
Mata Kuliah : Ekonomi Internasional
Semester : Genap/II
Pertemuan : IV
Tema : Kebijakan Ekonomi Internasional
Pengajar : Tonny D Effendi
Pendahuluan
Seperti dalam penjelasan mengenai makna dasar dari ekonomi internasional, yaitu tentang hubungan ekonomi antar negara, maka pembahasan hubungan ini tidak bisa dilepaskan dari pembahasan kebijakan ekonomi luar negeri atau ekonomi internasional suatu negara. Kebijakan ekonomi internasional suatu negara akan sangat berpengaruh terhadap pola interaksi yang dilakukan dalam menjalankan hubungan ekononi dengan negara lain.
Kebijakan ekonomi internasional suatu negara dapat kita amati dari dua sisi utama. Pertama kita bisa mengamati dari sisi yang mendasar yaitu sebagai alat untuk mencapai kepentingan nasional terutama dalam bidang ekonomi. Dalam bahasannya, poin ini lebih bersifat politis karena penuh dengan muatan-muatan kepentingan yang kadangkala tidak bersifat ekonomi, misalnya melakukan hubungan perdagangan dengan negara lain untuk mendekati atau untuk kepentingan politik tertentu. Sedangkan sisi yang kedua lebih bersifat praktis yaitu membahas kebijakan ekonomi internasional suatu negara dengan menggunakan unsur dalam ilmu ekonomi sebagai alat analisanya. Pada sisi inilah kita akan lebih menfokuskan pembahasan tentang kebijakan ekonomi internasional suatu negara.
Selanjutnya dari beberapa kebihakan ekonomi internasional yang diterapkan oleh berbagai negara maka kita dapat melihat bagaimana sebenarnya pola dalam perdagangan internasional yang dilakukan oleh banyak negara. Dalam bahasan ini kita bisa melihat sejarah perkembangan perdagangan internasional sejak lahirnya merkantilisme yang kemudian terbai menjadi dua pandangan yaitu pandangan Bullionist dan Merkantilisme Murni.
Dalam kaitannya dengan hal tersebut, maka kita juga akan mempelajari alasan suatu negara melakukan perdagangan internasional. Kegiatan ekonomi internasional dapat dilihat dari 2 sudut pandang yaitu Teori Murni Perdagangan Internasional dan Teori Moneter untuk Perdagangan Internasional. Teori murni digunakan sebagai dasar untuk melihat keseimbangan barang dagangan dan harga sedangkan teori moneter digunakan untuk melihat mekanisme dari neraca pembayaran, penentuan kurs devisa, mata uang yang berhubungan dengan kegiatan bisnis.
Selanjutnya sebegai pelengkap maka kita akan melakukan pembahasan tentang teori dan mekanisme yang berkembang dalam Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Hal ini penting karena salah satu mekanisme yang terjadi dalam ekonomi internasional adalah mekanisme investasi langsung atau FDI dengan segala permasalahan dan alasannya.
Kebijakan Ekonomi Internasional Suatu Negara
Terdapat dua tinjauan kebijakan ekonomi internasional, yaitu dalam arti luas dan dalam arti sempit.
kebijakan ekonomi internasional dalam arti luas meliputi semua kegiatan ekonomi pemerintah suatu negara yang secara langsung maupun tidak langung mempengaruhi komposisi, arah dan kegiatan ekspor impor barang dan jasa yang dilaksanakan oleh pemerintah tersebut. Karena itu, sekalipun suatu kebihakan ditujukan untuk mengatasi pemasalahan dalam negeri, tapi bila secara langsung atau tidak langusng berpengaruh terhadap ekspor dan impor maka dapat dimasukkan dalam kebijakan ekonomi internasional.
kebijakan ekonomi internasional dalam arti sempit yaitu hanya meliputi kebijakan yang langusng mempengaruhi ekspor dan impor. Kebijakann internasional dalam arti sempit ini berkaitan dnegan ekspor barang dan jasa, oleh karena itu cakupannya sangat luas mengingat bantaknya barang atau jasa yang diekspor maupun diimpor, mulai dari barang konsumsi, produksi sampai pada tenaga kerja.
Selanjutnya, setelah memahami arti kebijakan ekonomi internasional suatu negara, selanjutnya kita mempelajari tentang tujuan dari kebijakan ekonomi internasional tersebut. Besar kecilnya peran kebijakan ekonomi internasional suatu negara dapat kita lihat dalam beberapa indikator:
prosentasi besarnya sumbangan ekspor an impor sebagai bagian dari GDP
besarnya pengaruh harga barang di luar negeri terhadap harga barang di dalam negeri terutama berkaitan dengan kurs mata uang
besar kecilnya peranan modal asing, baik yang berupa investasi maupun yang berupa pinjaman terhadap investasi secara keseluruhan baik melalui badan pemerintah maupun swasta.
besar kecilnya international demonstration effect atau pengaruh pola hidup atau budaya asing terhadap pola hidup didalam negeri. Hal ini berkaitan dengan ketergantungan suatu negara terhadap negara lain.
Pokok-pokok tujuan kebijakan ekonomi internasional yaitu :
meningkatkan ekspor agar penerimaan devisa negara semakin besar
menstabilkan perkembangan ekspor, karena pean ekspor mennetukan pembangunan ekonomi suatu negara dalam artian stabilitas penghasilan ekspor maupun kecepatan pertumbuhannya sangat penting. Usaha yang dilakukan adalah :
menambah jumlah dan jenis barang yang diekspor sehingga bila satu atau beberapa jenis barang pasarannya sedang lesu atau mengalami saingan baru, maka dapat diganti dengan jenis barang uang lain.
merubah struktur barang ekspor dari bahan-bahan mentah dan hasil pertanian yang suply-nya in-elastis, mudah tergantung pada musim dan posisinya makin lemah, ke barang-barang industri yang produksinya mudah diatur.
memperbaiki kelemahan dibidahng transportasi sehingga sistem penentuan harga tidak lagi berdasarkan hitungan FOB (free on board), dalam artian menghitung harga jual hanya sampai pemuatan barang dikapal, tetapi mampu menjual atas perhitungan harga CIF (cost insurance and freight). Artinya kita menghitung harga termasuk ongkos angkutan dan biaya asuransi ke tempat importir.
berusaha memperluas spread effect (efek penyebaran) barang-barang ekspor, yaitu berusaha memperluas mata rantai produksi kebelakang maupun kedepan. Maksudnya mencari barang-barang yang mempunyai keterkaitan secara horizontal maupun vertikal dengan jenis usaha yang lain.
berusaha mengurangi ketergantungan ekonomi terhadap luar negeri. Hal ini sangat sulit karena setiap negara menjadi semakin terbuka terhadap proses globalisasi yang semakin cepat.
Pola Perdagangan Internasional
Lahirnya Merkantilisme
Perkembangan perdagangan internasional pada dsarnya diawali dengan perkembangan yang terjadi di Eropa saat beberapa kerajaan memiliki pusat perdagangan seperti London, Napoli, Paris dan Milan sebagai pusat industri rumah tangga. Perkembangan itu telah mendorong perubahan dalam masyarakat dari masyarakat yang feodal menuju masyarakat yang kapitalis. Muncul banyak pedagang yang kemudian melahirkan hubungan antara penguasa dan pedagang untuk memenangkan perdagangan. Tidak heran pada masa itu muncul hubungan khusus antara pedagang dengan jeluarga raja untuk mendapatkan proteksi.
Pasca masa pencerahan atau renaisance telah mendorong masyarakat Eropa untuk mencari daerah baru dan membuka daerah yang belum mereka tmui terutama di belahan dunia timur. Penemuan-penemuan baru pasca pencerahan telah membuat banyak kerajaan di Eropa yang melakukan penjelajahan yang diawali oleh Spanyol. Keberhasilan Spanyol kemudian diikuti oleh negara lain seperti Portugal, Inggris, Belanda dan Perancis. Mulai saat itulah mulai masuk bangsa Barat kenegara Timur yang kemudian kita kenal dengan Negara Dunia Ketiga.
Dalam masyarakat kemudian muncul kelompok-kelompok baru yaitu kelas pedagang atau kelas kapitalis yang menjadi agen pembangunan dan perubahan struktur ekonomi di negara Eropa. Muncul agen-agen perdagangan seperti The Merchant Adventures, The Eastland Company, The Muscovy Company, The East India Company dan VOC yang berusaha mengeruk keuntungan sebesar mungkin melalui monopoli dan kolonialisme. Hal ini mencapai puncak ketika kepentingan pedagang menjadi kepentingan negara yang kemudian dikenal dengan merkantilisme. Pada abad ke-17 kepentingan negarawan terpusat pada politik, tetapi merkantilisme merupakan tahap awal dari kebihajakan ekonomi yang dikenal dengan istilah the commercial or mercantile system dari Adam Smith, pendiri aliran klasik.
Kelompok Merkantilisme Murni dan Kelompok Bullionist
Merkantilisme akhirnya berkembang menjadi dua kelompok yaitu kelompok merkantilisme murni dan kelompok bullionist.
- tokoh utama kelompok bullionist adalah Gerald Malynes yang lebih mengutamakan kemakmuran suatu negra melalui pemilikian logam mulia. Gagasan untuk menumpuk logam mulia mendorong pendapat bahwa menjual barang ke negara lain lebih memberikan keuntungan daripada memberi barang dari negara lain, dan selalu mendorong digunakannya kebijaksanaan yang dapat menghasilkan surplus ekspor, karena surplus ekspor dibayar dengan logam mulia
- salah satu pendukung merkantilisme murni adalah Thomas Mun yang menganut sistem uang dan modal. Yang menonjol dari aliran ini adalah suku bunga yang dapat menguntungkan bagi pencari kredit. Karena itu merkantilisme murni menentang adanya riba. Kredit dengan suku bunga rendah mendorong kegiatan ekonomi apabila didukung dengan perkembangan harga dan banyaknya uang yang beredar dalam bentuk logam mulia dab cara yang paling mudah adalah melalui perdagangan internasional dibawah suatu kebijaksanaan pengawasan untuk mendorong pertumbuhan industri dan perdaganan, khususnya barang ekspor. Hadi terlihat sifat pokok merkantilisme yang menitikberatkan pada perdagangan antar negara, hasrat untuk mencapai kemakmuran dan mengembangkan kekuasaan dengan perdagangan maupun agama.
Berdasarkan dua pandangan diatas maka suatu negara dalam perdagangan internasional harus mencapai surplus ekspor karena akan dibayar dengan emas. Hal yang dilakukan untuk mendorong ekspor dan mngurangi impor adalah :
melarang ekspor logam mulia, memberi subsidi atas barang ekspor, melarang ekspor bahan mentah dan harganya didalam negeri agar tetap rendah, melarang ekspor barang modal, melarang emigrasi tenaga ahli dengan tujuan agar industru barang ekspor tida disaingi dengan tumbuhnya industri barang-brang tersebut duluar negeri.
pembatasan impor melalui penerapan tarif bea masuk, non taris barier, quota atau larangan impor terhadap barang yang dapat dihasilkan sendiri.
untuk mempertahankan harga barang ekspor yang rendah, upah tenaga kerja dibatasi sampai pada kebutuhan fisik minimum
monopoli perdagangan melalui daerah-daerah jajahan, melalui armada perdagangan, melalui armada perdagangan yang kemudian menjadi alat ekspansi untuk menaklukan dan menduduki daerah-daerah yang menjadi sumber logam mulia.
Setidaknya ada dua aliran perdagangan internasional pada masa merkantilisme yaitu :
- aliran Colbertisme yang dikemukakan oleh Thomas Mun dan Perdana Menteri Louis XIV Perancis, Colbert yang menyatakan penitikberatan pada perkembangan industri dalam negeri daripada internasional
- aliran Cameralisme yang dikemukakan oleh Von Hornig dari Jerman dan Becker dari Australia yang terbatas pada upaya untuk menumpuk logam mulia melalui kebijakan fiskal.
Alasan negara melakukan perdagangan internasional
masalah mobilitas faktor produksi. Faktor produksi terdiri dari tanah (land), tenaga kerja (labour), barang modal (capital) dan manajerial atau keterampilan (skill). Monilitas mengandung arti suatu pergerakan, sehingga yang dimaksud disini adalah pergerakan faktor produksi dari suatu negara kenegara lain. namun pada kenyataannya tidak semua faktor produksi dapat mobil secara internasional. Menurut Adam Smith, labour merupakan faktor produksi yang paling mobil.
masalah perbedaan sistem moneter. Setiap negara memiliki mata uang sendiri. Adanya perbedaan mata uang dari setiap negara, perbedaan kebijakan ekonomi moneter, pada gilirannya mempengaruhi sistem lalu lintas pembayaran internasional dan sistem lalu lintas modal.
masalah batas-batas negara yang berdaulat. Adanya batas-batas dari suatu negara dengan negara yang lain yang berdaulat menyebabkan perbedaan politik dalam perdagangan misalnya perlindungan tarif terhadap produk hasil industri didalam negero, larangan impor, quota dan blok perdagangan. Adanya kedaulatan mengakibatkan bea masuk (impor duty) dari suatu negara tidak sama dengan bea impor dari negara lain.
Masalah transport cost. Ongkos angkut dari pabrik kepasar atau kepelabuhan meninggikan harga asal pabrik. Ongkos pengangkutan barang ekspor harus dimasukkan dalam perhitungan biaya agar harga yang diperoleh untuk komoditi ekspor tersebut tepat.
Foreign Direct Investment
Berkaitan dengan permasalahan perdagangan internasional, kita juga tidak bisa mengabaikan alsan negara atau perusahaan multi nasional menanmkan modalnya di suatu negara. Terdapat sebuag argumen tentang location-specific advantages yang dapat menjelaskan beberapa hal penting dalam teori ini yaitu berkaitan dengan ekspor, lisensi dan investasi langsung. Argumen ini penting untuk menjelaskan relativitas keuntungan perusahaan atau negara mengambil kebijakan ekspor, kisensi atau investasi langsung. Teori ini menjelaskan keputusan untuk ekspor akan diambil jika biaya transportasi lebih rendah dan trade barrier tidak begitu besar. Hal ini akan lebih mempermudah negara atau perusahaan untuk melakukan ekspor karena biaya yang dikeluarkan tidak begitu besar dan komoditi yang akan diekspor bisa lebih besar mengingat pembatasan perdagangan tidak begitu ketat. Namun jika biaya transportasi dan trade barrier semakin meningkat maka kebijakan untuk melakukan ekspor akan merugikan, selanjutnya pilihan strategi bagi perusahaan atau negara adalah lisensi atau investasi langsung.
Teori FDI memandang bahwa kebijakan untuk investasi langsung akan lebih beresiko daripada lisensi, meskipun dalam beberapa kondisi tertentu tingkat resiko diantara kedua seimbang. Lisensi akan sulit dilakukan jika perusahaan multinasional memiliki beberapa kondisi sebagai berikut :
perusahaan memiliki know-how yang berharga dan hal ini tidak bisa dilindungi dalam kontrak
perusahaan membutuhkan kontrol ketat terhadap prosukdi luar negeri untuk memaksimalkan penguasaan pasar di negara yang bersangkutan
keahlian dan kemampuan perusahaan tidak dapat dimasukkan dalam lisensi
Pengambilan keputusan untuk melaksanakan lisensi bukanlah pilihan yang tepat bagi perusahaan dengan ciri sebagai berikut :
industri dengan teknologi tinggi, sehingga perlindungan terhadap keahlian spesifik dari perusahaan dalam lisensi mengandung resiko tinggi.
oligopoli global, dimana saling ketergantungan yang kompetitif, maka perusahaan akan cenderung melakukan kontrol yang ketat terhadap operasi asing sehingga mereka memiliki kemampuan untuk melakukan “serangan” yang terkoordinis terhadap pesaing global mereka.
industri dengan memusatkan perhatian pada penekanan biaya dan kontrol ketat terhadap operasi asing sehingga mereka akan menjajaki kemungkinan untuk melakukan operasi diseluruh dunia dimana mereka menemukan efisiensi berupa biaya yang rendah dan kompetitor yang membahayakan operasi mereka.
Terdapat tiga paradigma dalam teori FDI :
mengikuti para pesaing. Perusahaan mengadakan FDI karena mengikuti para pesaing yang telah melakukan kegiatan serupa sebelumnya. Paradigma ini diperkenalkan oleh FT Knicknbocker
daur hidup produk (product liffe cycle). Diperkenalkan oleh Raymond dan menjelaskan bahwa FDI dilakukan untuk mengadakan efisiensi terhadap siklus produksi produk mereka.
paradigma ecletic, merupakan gabungan diantara dua paradigma diatas.
Secara garis besar, proses penentuan kebijakan dari ekspor sampai kepada lisensi dan FDI digambarkan dalam skema berikut ini :
How high are transportation cost and tariffts?
Is know-how amenable to licensing?
THEN LICENSE
Can know-how be protected by licensing contract?
Is tight control over foreign operation required?
No
Yes
Hight
Yes
No
Yes
No
Low
EXPORT
FDI
FDI
FDI
Saturday, March 31, 2007
Pencuri Mimpi
PENCURI IMPIAN
Ada seorang gadis muda yang sangat suka menari. Kepandaiannya menari sangat menonjol dibanding dengan rekan-2nya, sehingga dia seringkali menjadi juara di berbagai perlombaan yang diadakan. Dia berpikir, dengan apa yang dimilikinya saat ini, suatu saat apabila dewasa nanti dia ingin menjadi penari kelas dunia. Dia membayangkan dirinya menari di Rusia, Cina, Amerika, Jepang, serta ditonton oleh ribuan orang yang memberi tepukan kepadanya.Suatu hari, dikotanya dikunjungi oleh seorang pakar tari yang berasal dari luar negeri. Pakar ini sangatlah hebat,dan dari tangan dinginnya telah banyak dilahirkan penari-penari kelas dunia. Gadis muda ini ingin sekali menari dan menunjukkan kebolehannya di depan sang pakar tersebut, bahkan jika mungkin memperoleh kesempatan menjadi muridnya. Akhirnya kesempatan itu datang juga. Si gadis muda berhasil menjumpai sang pakar di belakang panggung, seusai sebuah pagelaran tari. Si gadis muda bertanya"Pak, saya ingin sekali menjadi penari kelas dunia. Apakah anda punya waktu sejenak, untuk menilai saya menari ? Saya ingin tahu pendapat anda tentang tarian saya"."Oke, menarilah di depan saya selama 10 menit",jawab sang pakar.Belum lagi 10 menit berlalu, sang pakar berdiri dari kursinya, lalu berlalu meninggalkan si gadis muda begitu saja, tanpa mengucapkan sepatah katapun.Betapa hancur si gadis muda melihat sikap sang pakar.Si gadis langsung berlari keluar. Pulang kerumah, dia langsung menangis tersedu-sedu.
Dia menjadi benci terhadap dirinya sendiri. Ternyata tarian yang selama ini dia bangga-banggakan tidak ada apa-apanya di hadapan sang pakar. Kemudian dia ambil sepatu tarinya, dan dia lemparkan ke dalam gudang. Sejak saat itu, dia bersumpah tidak pernah akan menari lagi.Puluhan tahun berlalu. Sang gadis muda kini telah menjadi ibu dengan tiga orang anak. Suaminya telah meninggal. Dan untuk menghidupi keluarganya, dia bekerja menjadi pelayan dari sebuah toko di sudut jalan.Suatu hari, ada sebuah pagelaran tari yang diadakan di kota itu. Nampak sang pakar berada di antara para menari muda di belakang panggung. Sang pakar nampak tua, dengan rambutnya yang sudah putih. Si ibu muda dengan tiga anaknya juga datang ke pagelaran tari tersebut. Seusai acara, ibu ini membawa ketiga anaknya ke belakang panggung, mencari sang pakar, dan memperkenalkan ketiga anaknya kepada sang pakar. Sang pakar masih mengenali ibu muda ini, dan kemudian mereka bercerita secara akrab.
Si ibu bertanya, "Pak, ada satu pertanyaan yang mengganjal di hati saya. Ini tentang penampilan saya sewaktu menari di hadapan anda bertahun-tahun yang silam. Sebegitu jelekkah penampilan saya saat itu, sehingga anda langsung pergi meninggalkan saya begitu saja, tanpa mengatakan sepatah katapun?""Oh ya, saya ingat peristiwanya. Terus terang, saya belum pernah melihat tarian seindah yang kamu lakukan waktu itu. Saya rasa kamu akan menjadi penari kelas dunia. Saya tidak mengerti mengapa kamu tiba-2 berhenti dari dunia tari", jawab sang pakar.Si ibu muda sangat terkejut mendengar jawaban sang pakar."Ini tidak adil", seru si ibu muda. "Sikap anda telah mencuri semua impian saya. Kalau memang tarian saya bagus, mengapa anda meninggalkan saya begitu saja ketika saya baru menari beberapa menit. Anda seharusnya memuji saya, dan bukan mengacuhkan saya begitu saja. Mestinya saya bisa menjadi penari kelas dunia. Bukan hanya menjadi pelayan toko!"Si pakar menjawab lagi dengan tenang "Tidak .... Tidak, saya rasa saya telah berbuat dengan benar. Anda tidak harus minum anggur satu barel untuk membuktikan anggur itu enak. Demikian juga saya. Saya tidak harus menonton anda 10 menit untuk membuktikan tarian anda bagus. Malam itu saya juga sangat lelah setelah pertunjukkan. Maka sejenak saya tinggalkan anda, untuk mengambil kartu nama saya, dan berharap anda mau menghubungi saya lagi keesokan hari. Tapi anda sudah pergi ketika saya keluar. Dan satu hal yang perlu anda camkan, bahwa Anda Mestinya forkus pada impian Anda, bukan pada ucapan atau tindakan saya.Lalu pujian? Kamu mengharapkan pujian? Ah, waktu itu kamu sedang bertumbuh.
Pujian itu seperti pedang bermata dua. Ada kalanya Memotivasimu, bisa pula Melemahkanmu.
Dan faktanya saya melihat bahwa sebagian besar Pujian yang diberikan pada saat seseorang sedang bertumbuh, hanya akan membuat dirinya puas dan pertumbuhannya berhenti. Saya justru lebih suka mengacuhkanmu, agar hal itu bisa melecutmu bertumbuh lebih cepat lagi.
Lagipula, pujian itu sepantasnya datang dari keinginan saya sendiri. Tidak pantas Anda meminta pujian dari orang lain"."Anda lihat, ini sebenarnya hanyalah masalah sepele. Seandainya anda padawaktu itu tidak menghiraukan apa yang terjadi dan tetap menari, mungkin hari ini anda sudah menjadi penari kelas dunia.Mungkin Anda sakit hati pada waktu itu, tapi sakit hati Anda akan cepat hilang begitu Anda berlatih kembali. Tapi sakit hati karena penyesalan Anda hari ini tidak akan pernah bisa hilang selama-lamanya… ".
Ada seorang gadis muda yang sangat suka menari. Kepandaiannya menari sangat menonjol dibanding dengan rekan-2nya, sehingga dia seringkali menjadi juara di berbagai perlombaan yang diadakan. Dia berpikir, dengan apa yang dimilikinya saat ini, suatu saat apabila dewasa nanti dia ingin menjadi penari kelas dunia. Dia membayangkan dirinya menari di Rusia, Cina, Amerika, Jepang, serta ditonton oleh ribuan orang yang memberi tepukan kepadanya.Suatu hari, dikotanya dikunjungi oleh seorang pakar tari yang berasal dari luar negeri. Pakar ini sangatlah hebat,dan dari tangan dinginnya telah banyak dilahirkan penari-penari kelas dunia. Gadis muda ini ingin sekali menari dan menunjukkan kebolehannya di depan sang pakar tersebut, bahkan jika mungkin memperoleh kesempatan menjadi muridnya. Akhirnya kesempatan itu datang juga. Si gadis muda berhasil menjumpai sang pakar di belakang panggung, seusai sebuah pagelaran tari. Si gadis muda bertanya"Pak, saya ingin sekali menjadi penari kelas dunia. Apakah anda punya waktu sejenak, untuk menilai saya menari ? Saya ingin tahu pendapat anda tentang tarian saya"."Oke, menarilah di depan saya selama 10 menit",jawab sang pakar.Belum lagi 10 menit berlalu, sang pakar berdiri dari kursinya, lalu berlalu meninggalkan si gadis muda begitu saja, tanpa mengucapkan sepatah katapun.Betapa hancur si gadis muda melihat sikap sang pakar.Si gadis langsung berlari keluar. Pulang kerumah, dia langsung menangis tersedu-sedu.
Dia menjadi benci terhadap dirinya sendiri. Ternyata tarian yang selama ini dia bangga-banggakan tidak ada apa-apanya di hadapan sang pakar. Kemudian dia ambil sepatu tarinya, dan dia lemparkan ke dalam gudang. Sejak saat itu, dia bersumpah tidak pernah akan menari lagi.Puluhan tahun berlalu. Sang gadis muda kini telah menjadi ibu dengan tiga orang anak. Suaminya telah meninggal. Dan untuk menghidupi keluarganya, dia bekerja menjadi pelayan dari sebuah toko di sudut jalan.Suatu hari, ada sebuah pagelaran tari yang diadakan di kota itu. Nampak sang pakar berada di antara para menari muda di belakang panggung. Sang pakar nampak tua, dengan rambutnya yang sudah putih. Si ibu muda dengan tiga anaknya juga datang ke pagelaran tari tersebut. Seusai acara, ibu ini membawa ketiga anaknya ke belakang panggung, mencari sang pakar, dan memperkenalkan ketiga anaknya kepada sang pakar. Sang pakar masih mengenali ibu muda ini, dan kemudian mereka bercerita secara akrab.
Si ibu bertanya, "Pak, ada satu pertanyaan yang mengganjal di hati saya. Ini tentang penampilan saya sewaktu menari di hadapan anda bertahun-tahun yang silam. Sebegitu jelekkah penampilan saya saat itu, sehingga anda langsung pergi meninggalkan saya begitu saja, tanpa mengatakan sepatah katapun?""Oh ya, saya ingat peristiwanya. Terus terang, saya belum pernah melihat tarian seindah yang kamu lakukan waktu itu. Saya rasa kamu akan menjadi penari kelas dunia. Saya tidak mengerti mengapa kamu tiba-2 berhenti dari dunia tari", jawab sang pakar.Si ibu muda sangat terkejut mendengar jawaban sang pakar."Ini tidak adil", seru si ibu muda. "Sikap anda telah mencuri semua impian saya. Kalau memang tarian saya bagus, mengapa anda meninggalkan saya begitu saja ketika saya baru menari beberapa menit. Anda seharusnya memuji saya, dan bukan mengacuhkan saya begitu saja. Mestinya saya bisa menjadi penari kelas dunia. Bukan hanya menjadi pelayan toko!"Si pakar menjawab lagi dengan tenang "Tidak .... Tidak, saya rasa saya telah berbuat dengan benar. Anda tidak harus minum anggur satu barel untuk membuktikan anggur itu enak. Demikian juga saya. Saya tidak harus menonton anda 10 menit untuk membuktikan tarian anda bagus. Malam itu saya juga sangat lelah setelah pertunjukkan. Maka sejenak saya tinggalkan anda, untuk mengambil kartu nama saya, dan berharap anda mau menghubungi saya lagi keesokan hari. Tapi anda sudah pergi ketika saya keluar. Dan satu hal yang perlu anda camkan, bahwa Anda Mestinya forkus pada impian Anda, bukan pada ucapan atau tindakan saya.Lalu pujian? Kamu mengharapkan pujian? Ah, waktu itu kamu sedang bertumbuh.
Pujian itu seperti pedang bermata dua. Ada kalanya Memotivasimu, bisa pula Melemahkanmu.
Dan faktanya saya melihat bahwa sebagian besar Pujian yang diberikan pada saat seseorang sedang bertumbuh, hanya akan membuat dirinya puas dan pertumbuhannya berhenti. Saya justru lebih suka mengacuhkanmu, agar hal itu bisa melecutmu bertumbuh lebih cepat lagi.
Lagipula, pujian itu sepantasnya datang dari keinginan saya sendiri. Tidak pantas Anda meminta pujian dari orang lain"."Anda lihat, ini sebenarnya hanyalah masalah sepele. Seandainya anda padawaktu itu tidak menghiraukan apa yang terjadi dan tetap menari, mungkin hari ini anda sudah menjadi penari kelas dunia.Mungkin Anda sakit hati pada waktu itu, tapi sakit hati Anda akan cepat hilang begitu Anda berlatih kembali. Tapi sakit hati karena penyesalan Anda hari ini tidak akan pernah bisa hilang selama-lamanya… ".
Tugas Pribadi
Tugas Pribadi diberiakn untuk mendukung nilai Midle dengan beberapa catatan :
1. Diketik 1,5 spasi
2. Font Time New ROmans, 12
3. Kertas A4
4. Minimal 6 halaman (tanpa cover)
5. harus dilengkapi dengan referensi, bisa menggunakan footnote atau in note
6. Literatur mutlak diperlukan
7. Dikumpulkan paling lambat pada minggu ketiga bulan April
8. Mohon dicantumkan Nama, NIM dan Kelas dibawah judul review dan diberikan informasi tentang sumber artikel yang di-review
9. Sumber review bisa artikel ilmiah jurnal dan juga berita yang terkait dengan permasalahan ekonomi internasional.
10. informasi bisa ditanyakan di kuliah atau kirim email ke tonny_dian@yahoo.com dan 08885908560
11. tugas dikirim via email di : tonny_dian@yahoo.com
1. Diketik 1,5 spasi
2. Font Time New ROmans, 12
3. Kertas A4
4. Minimal 6 halaman (tanpa cover)
5. harus dilengkapi dengan referensi, bisa menggunakan footnote atau in note
6. Literatur mutlak diperlukan
7. Dikumpulkan paling lambat pada minggu ketiga bulan April
8. Mohon dicantumkan Nama, NIM dan Kelas dibawah judul review dan diberikan informasi tentang sumber artikel yang di-review
9. Sumber review bisa artikel ilmiah jurnal dan juga berita yang terkait dengan permasalahan ekonomi internasional.
10. informasi bisa ditanyakan di kuliah atau kirim email ke tonny_dian@yahoo.com dan 08885908560
11. tugas dikirim via email di : tonny_dian@yahoo.com
Understanding South Korea and Japan’s Spectacular Broadband
Understanding South Korea and Japan’s Spectacular Broadband
Development: Strategic Liberalization of the Telecommunications
Sectors
BRIE Working Paper 175
June 29, 2006
© Copyright 2006 by the Authors
Kenji Kushida and Seung-Youn OH*
PhD Students
Travers Department of Political Science and BRIE
UC Berkeley
kkushida@berkeley.edu
ohusky@berkeley.edu
* The authors would like to thank members of the ICT Competition Policy Research group, Professor Toshihiko
Hayashi, Ichiya Nakamura, UC Berkeley Kinyukai members, the Berkeley Political Science Graduate Student
Association Conference participants, Steven Vogel, and John Zysman, and Cynthia Okita for feedback on earlier
drafts of this ongoing research project.
1
Abstract
The ICT sectors of both South Korea and Japan developed rapidly, especially in
developing high-speed, low priced broadband services. These networks can potentially provide
both economies with new playgrounds for experimentation and innovation. Existing explanations
of how these broadband networks and services were created tend to be confused and
contradictory regarding 1) the roles played by the states, 2) the exact mechanisms of interaction
between governments policies and programs, regulatory frameworks, and market dynamics, and
3) the politics driving each of the state-market interactions.
We find that differences in the institutional configurations of the two countries since the
inception of their ICT sectors created a distinct set of political dynamics in each country. The
initial telecom policy regimes of the two countries in their initial stages of liberalization were
strikingly similar. However, the contrasting political dynamics drove Japan and Korea’s policy
regimes along different trajectories. Driven by politicized conflicts and a series of negotiated
compromises between the former incumbent and lead bureaucracy, Japan’s ICT sector
underwent a regime shift, from which the market dynamics giving rise to broadband services
developed. By contrast, Korea’s managed competition policy regime, once established, was
stable and hierarchical, with a strong lead bureaucracy managing the sector and former
incumbent, without significant political battles. The market dynamics in Korea, from which its
broadband services developed, occurred within its existing policy regime without a shift
comparable to that in Japan. Differences in the politics, stemming from initial institutional
configurations and subsequent political bargains at key junctures drove the two regimes along
different trajectories.
2
Introduction
The rapid economic development of both Japan and South Korea (hereon, Korea) partly
hinged on their success in developing lead sectors that became globally competitive. Light
industries such as textiles were followed by heavy industries such as steel, autos, and then
electronics and semiconductors. Much ink has been spilled in attempting to explain the two
countries’ rapid growth, especially regarding the governments’ roles, their capacities, and their
relationships to markets.1 Our inquiry is aimed at understanding the two countries’ rapid
development of the latest lead sector – Information, Communications and Technology (ICT).
In fact, ICT has been recognized worldwide as not only a lead sector, but a broadly
transformative sector capable of driving productivity, innovation, and growth in a wide range of
industries.2 While most advanced industrial countries have attempted to nurture their domestic
ICT sectors, Japan and Korea are notable in their rapid and extensive deployment of broadband
services. As we describe in the next section, neither country had broadband markets before
1999,3 but by 2002, they were at the forefront of global price-performance and leaders in
population penetration. Although the full potential contributions of broadband networks to the
two countries’ international competitiveness have yet to be discovered, few countries would
regard their rapid broadband penetration with anything less than envy.
We find an analytical comparison between Japan and Korea’s broadband development
especially useful because they are often considered to have shared key patterns of state-market
interaction in their overall economic growth, at least for a significant time period, and regardless
1 For excellent overviews of the scholarship, see Noble (1989), Onis (1991), Wade (1992), and Woo-Cumings
(1999).
2 Cohen, et al. (2000).
3 A variety of definitions for “broadband” exist, but we follow the OECD in refering to services that offer more than
256Kbps downstream access. We also exclude ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network), an alternative, slower
technology than DSL, despite requiring fiber optic cables to the home. See OECD (2002), p.6.
3
of the precise conception the analyst chooses to use.4 Thus, in this paper we seek to understand
and compare the exact manner in which the two governments interacted with their respective
markets in the course of developing broadband networks and services, with special attention to
the politics driving those interactions.
Korea and Japan’s Rapid Development of Broadband
From the late 1990s, the ICT sectors of Korea and Japan developed rapidly, propelling
them to the forefront of advanced industrial nations in terms of high-speed landline and wireless
Internet connectivity. Since the market dynamics, policies, and politics behind the landline and
wireless segments of the sector differ considerably, despite their increasing convergence, in this
paper we limit our focus to the area with perhaps the most spectacular, if not sudden growth –
broadband services.
As Martin Fransman points out, no existing measures of national performance in
broadband are perfect. Of the most common measures, Korea far exceeds all other nations in
terms of penetration, and Japan leads the world in terms of speed and price. 5
Korea moved first, with the rapid growth of DSL (Digital Subscriber Line), a technology
involving sending high frequency signals over existing copper telecommunications infrastructure.
With consumers enjoying the cheapest prices in the world, Korea’s broadband penetration
became the highest worldwide by 2001, where it has remained through the date of this
publication. Considering that there was no market for broadband before 1998, the fact that 70 out
of 100 households sported broadband subscriptions by 2002 is nothing short of astonishing (See
4 In addition to citations in footnote 1, see Cumings (1984). Conceptions include economic perspectives stressing
export-led growth, import substitution with credible threats of removing protections, political economic conceptions
of “developmental,” “non-liberal,” “coordinated market economies,” “network states,” et cetera.
5 Fransman points to 1) availability, 2) penetration, 3) capacity/speed, 4) price, and he calls for the adoption of 5)
quality of access, and 6) goodness of fit with the needs of users. (Fransman 2006: 7)
4
table 1, which shows penetration rate per 100 inhabitants, rather than households, due to data
limitations).6 In the one year between 1999 and 2001, the number of DSL subscriptions in Korea
rose from 97 thousand to 2.7 million, and cable modem subscriptions increased from 17
thousand to 1.5 million.7
Table 1: Broadband Penetration Rate per 100 Inhabitants
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 6/2005
Korea 9.2 17.2 21.8 24.2 24.9 25.5
Japan 0.2 2.2 6.1 10.7 15 16.4
USA 2.3 4.5 6.9 9.7 13 14.5
OECD
average 1.27 2.9 4.9 7.3 10.3 11.8
Source: OECD
Table 2: Broadband Subscriptions, Japan 1999-2005 (millions)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total
broadband - 0.63 2.83 7.81 13.64 18.66 22.37
Cable
Internet 0.15 0.63 1.3 1.95 2.48 2.87 3.23
DSL Lines <.01 0.01 1.52 5.65 10.27 13.33 14.48
FTTH - - 0.07 0.42 1.45 2.43 4.64
Note: for FTTH, 2001-2003 indicate end of FY rather than calendar year
Sources: 1999-2003: OECD 2005, 2004-2005: MIC
Table 3: Broadband Subscriptions, Korea 1999-2005 (millions)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total
broadband - 3.92 8.14 10.4 11.61 12.17 12.46
Cable
Internet 0.17 1.56 2.94 3.55 3.94 4.24 4.15
DSL Lines 0.97 2.35 5.18 5.66 6.57 6.72 6.42
other - 0.01 0.03 1.18 1.09 1.21 1.88
Note: number for 2004 is one month after end FY 2004, 2005 is end of FY 2005
Sources: 1999-2003: OECD 2005, 2004: MIC, 2005: NCA
Japan followed suit in the early 2000s. In 1999, when DSL was first introduced, Japan
was one of the most expensive OECD counties for Internet access. However, penetration grew
6 NCA (2004:15)
7 OECD (2002b) p.13.
5
rapidly after 2000, with DSL subscriptions between the end of December 2000 and June 2001
increasing by over 4000 percent.8 By 2002, Japan had the lowest prices for DSL in the world, as
well as a market for FTTH (Fiber-to-the Home) services, high-speed fiber optic lines connected
directly to households. FTTH services, offering transmission speeds of up to 100 Mbps (several
times that of DSL) gave Japan the fastest household broadband networks worldwide. 9 By the
end of 2005, over 44 percent of households had broadband access, and at the end of 2004, the
ITU ranked Japan third in the number of total broadband subscribers.10 Thus, by 2004, after a
period of extremely rapid growth, Korea and Japan’s broadband networks were at the forefront
of broadband price-performance (see table 2). 11
Table 4: Comparison of Prices per 100kbps, as of July 2003
Country US$
Japan 0.09
Korea 0.25
Belgium 1.15
Hong Kong 1.27
Singapore 2.21
New Zealand 2.71
China 3.07
Canada 3.25
Netherlands 3.36
US 3.53
Germany 4.42
Source: MIC 2004
8 OECD (2002b: 14)
9 DSL services in Japan ranged from 1 to 8 mbps in 2001, though they increased to 50 by 2003. See IICP (2005) for
details on transmission speed increases. The OECD figures on penetration per 100 inhabitants do not capture the
rapid increases in speed, which are a critical characteristic differentiating the Japan from the US, with roughly
similar penetration proportions.
10 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan. Information and Communication Economy Office,
Information and Communications Policy Bureau. Main Data on Information and Communications in Japan.
Accessed 6/2/2006
11 In addition, by 2004, Japan and Korea had the cheapest cost for 100kbit/s as a percentage of monthly income.
(ITU 2004: 25)
6
Governments, Markets, and Development in Korea and Japan – Expectations
Our interest in understanding how and why Korea and Japan’s broadband networks
developed so rapidly thrusts us into an ongoing theoretical debate regarding the role of
governments and markets. Given that the rapid developments occurred after Korea’s financial
crisis and Japan’s decade-long stagnation, how exactly did the governments and markets interact
to produce these outcomes? How similar were Japan and Korea’s roles of the governments and
markets in their development of broadband? What were the politics driving each of the
governments, and how do they compare to one another?
Theoretical debates over whether Japan and Korea’s overall economic development were
primarily due to market-led or state-led forces have been hashed out extensively. In applying
these theoretical positions to broadband development, let it suffice to say that support can be
found for both expectations – markets and technological developments affecting policy choices,
as well as government actions shaping markets.12 Our position is that both Japan and Korea’s
government were strategic in their liberalization of markets surrounding broadband.13 By
strategic, we mean that they had concrete goals in mind, and were capable of channeling policy
and institutional change towards those goals. However, we are careful to recognize that the
governments were far from omniscient nor monolithic; they were sometimes taken by surprise
12 See Appendix for a more detailed treatment of the market-led and state-led expectations that grow out of these
debates.
13 The intellectual antecedents of our study are the following works of scholarship. Following Karl Polanyi, who
recognized that markets must be created and sustained by continuous government intervention, we expect the
government to play a strong role in shaping the actors and terms of competition (Polanyi 1944). Taking after Steven
Vogel’s analysis of liberalization in advanced industrial democracies, we also expect that liberalization, an increase
in the level of competition, can be accomplished through both deregulation, a relaxing of rules, as well as reregulation,
a strengthening of rules (Vogel 1996). Influenced by Suzanne Berger, who pointed out that institutions
can shape politics, and John Zysman, who argued that the strategies available to governments were influenced by the
architecture of their financial systems, we expect the interaction of institutions and politics in the ICT sector to
influence the strategies taken by governments. Berger (1972) esp 145-177, Zysman (1983).
7
by actual market developments, and political processes interacted with bureaucratic
policymaking.
Existing analyses of the two countries’ broadband development provide a confusing and
contradictory picture, since they tend to contain the logic of either the market-led or governmentled
analysis, which essentially predict the opposite role of the state – withdrawing from markets,
or actively intervening in them. Worse yet, some embed both within a single explanation.14
Empirically, the market-led explanations tend to ignore bountiful examples of re-regulation,
while state-led explanations tend to list government programs and outcomes with little regard for
market dynamics. Both tend to downplay the political dynamics driving policies and regulatory
regimes, an aspect we view as critical to understanding changes in policies, and the trajectories
of such change. Therefore, neither can understand the precise nature of interaction between the
governments and markets over time, nor can they accurately characterize the similarities and
differences between Korea and Japan’s broadband development.
In this paper, we closely examine the interaction between the governments and markets in
the development of Korea and Japan’s broadband services markets, focusing on the politics and
institutional configurations that drive government policies and institutional change.
The Argument in Brief
We find that differences in the institutional configuration of the two countries since the
inception of their ICT sectors created a distinct set of political dynamics in each country.15 The
initial telecom policy regimes – the set of institutions and policies that provide incentives and
14 Tcha et al (2000), Lee (2002), Choudrie and Lee (2004), OECD (2000), are the most clear examples of this
conflation. Fransman (2006), which appeared in print after we finished this manuscript, is perhaps the most evenhanded
account we have seen, splitting the credit between market and governmental factors. Chung (2006) in
Fransman’s volume, lists all possible contributory factors for Korea without a clear causal argument.
15 In this paper we take a relatively narrow definition of institutions, referring to formal government organizations.
8
constraints for firms in determining their strategies – of the two countries in their initial stages of
liberalization were strikingly similar, with a lead bureaucracy in each country closely
micromanaging the telecom markets. However, the contrasting political dynamics drove Japan
and Korea’s policy regimes along different trajectories. Driven by politicized conflicts and a
series of negotiated compromises between the former incumbent and lead bureaucracy, Japan’s
ICT sector underwent a “regime shift,” from which the market dynamics giving rise to
broadband services developed. By contrast, Korea’s “managed competition” policy regime, once
established, was stable and hierarchical, with a strong lead bureaucracy managing the sector and
former incumbent, without significant political battles. The market dynamics in Korea, from
which its broadband services developed, occurred within its existing policy regime without a
shift comparable to that of Japan. Differences in the politics, stemming from initial institutional
configurations and subsequent political bargains at key junctures drove the two regimes along
different trajectories.
In both cases, however, we find that the market-led and state-led expectations are not
entirely wrong, but are limited in their applicability to the entire sector. We argue that both
governments engaged in deregulation as well as re-regulation in particular segments of the
sector, in a strategic attempt to facilitate broadband networks. Japan did so in the context of a
regime shift, while Korea did so within its existing policy regime.
Institutional Origins and Political Dynamics: Privatization and Liberalization
The telecom sectors of both Japan and Korea began under the auspices of direct
government ownership and operation. The next step for both countries was to set up a monopoly
9
corporation as the state-owned carrier – NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone) for Japan and
KTA (Korea Telecommunication Authority) for Korea – a typical step for many industrialized
countries other than the US.16 Then, a combination of international, domestic, and technological
developments sparked Japan and Korea’s political process of privatizing their monopoly carriers
and liberalizing the sector. International events included the privatization and breakup of AT&T
in the US and the wave of liberalization and privatization across the world in the 1980s.
Domestic developments included the completion of their respective national telephony
infrastructures, and technological developments included value-added networks linking
computers via telecom infrastructure.
The political dynamics of privatization and liberalization differed between the two
countries. Japan’s privatization of NTT, coinciding with liberalization measures, was a
politically messy affair involving a reconfiguration of power between institutional actors. In
contrast, Korea’s privatization was a relatively smooth process, followed by a politically driven
initiative to strengthen the lead bureaucracy. These differences were driven by the initial
institutional configurations of the telecom sectors in the two countries, and the ensuing political
dynamics that developed.
Japan: the Political Battle Creating MPT as a “Policy Bureaucracy”
In Japan, the political battle over privatizing NTT and beginning to liberalize the sector
was complex and contentious, involving a dramatic power grab by the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications (MPT).
16 For most countries, the massive, coordinated infrastructure investment requirement made direct state ownership
attractive, and the economies of scale in the business made a monopoly structure the logical choice.
10
In 1889, the Japanese government established the Ministry of Communications (MoC) as
the owner and operator of Japan’s telecommunications networks. Due to its involvement in
propaganda during the war, the MoC was disbanded by the Allied Occupation government. In
1952, after political wrangling over the form it would take, the telecom functions of MoC were
transferred to NTT, newly established as a public corporation. NTT then proceeded to become
the dominant actor in telecom sector until the 1980s.17 For example, though formally under the
jurisdiction of MPT, NTT was able to essentially regulate itself for a number of reasons. First,
MPT, which had been created from the Ministry of Postal Affairs, lacked expertise to effectively
regulate NTT. Since NTT had been the prewar Ministry of Communications, MPT often lacked
the staff with proper expertise in communications technology, leading to a situation in which
NTT personnel sent to MPT were in charge of approving NTT’s requests.18 NTT also received
budget allocations from the Diet, and MPT did not have the array of policy tools related to
funding allocations enjoyed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) or Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI). NTT also used its substantial R&D budget to keep a set of equipment
suppliers, the “NTT family,” including firms such as NEC, Fujitsu, and Oki, to supply equipment
tailored to its specifications.19
The battle over NTT’s privatization was fought among actors including the Second
Administrative Reform Commission (Rincho), MPT, NTT, the Ministry of Finance, NTT
“family” firms, retired NTT executives, NTT’s union (Zendentsu), and several key LDP (Liberal
Democratic Party) politicians. This battle was closely intertwined with a bureaucratic turf war
between MITI and MPT over jurisdiction of the rapidly expanding telecom sector. This turf war
17 For details on the early political and market dynamics of Japan’s telecom sector, see Vogel (1996), esp. pp 137-
145, Johnson (1989), Anchordoguy (2001), and Fransman (1995).
18 Johnson (1989), p.190
19 For details on the dynamics between NTT “family” firms and NTT, see Anchordoguy (2001), Fransman (1995).
11
involved many of the same political actors, with MPT leaning heavily on policy specialist
politicians from the ruling LDP party (known as zoku politicians), with MITI attempting to bring
the US into the policy debate on its side through American trade policy interests. Details of the
battle have been documented elsewhere, but in short, the outcome was a dramatic gain in
regulatory authority and policymaking power by MPT.20
MPT succeeded in rising from a “regulatory” bureaucracy with largely nominal power, to
a full-fledged “policy” bureaucracy capable of MITI-style industrial policy. In a regulatory
regime labeled by Vogel as “controlled competition,” MPT compartmentalized the sector,
orchestrated competitors, and used extensive licensing authority over matters such as pricing to
micromanage competition.
Put simply, the outcomes of privatization and initial liberalization were somewhat of a
reversal in MPT and NTT’s power relations. NTT had escaped the fate of AT&T, which had
been completely broken apart, but much of the regulatory oversight was transferred from the
Diet to MPT. This outcome set up the political dynamics that drove Japan’s telecom
policymaking thereafter. MPT, as the lead bureaucracy, attempted to exert its will over NTT
through different sets of policies, and unambiguously calling for a complete breakup of NTT
when the issue arose in 1990, and again in 1996. NTT resisted, at times mustering political
support within the LDP to compromise with MPT and soften its proposed measures.21
20 For detailed accounts of the political battles, see Vogel (1994), Johnson (1989), Takano (1992), and for a longer
overview, see Kushida (2005).
21 For details on such policy battles, see Kawabata (2004), esp pp. 32-34.
12
Chart 1: The Evolution of Japan’s Lead Bureaucracy and Incumbent
Prewar Postwar - 1985 1985 - Present (2006)
Ministry of
Communications (MOC)
􀃆 NTT Public corp 􀃆 NTT (NTT Holding Company after 1999)
Ministry of Postal Affairs 􀃆 MPT (administrative
bureaucracy)
􀃆 MPT (policy bureaucracy)
Korea: Hierarchy and The Creation of a Strong Lead Bureaucracy
In Korea, the Ministry of Communications (MOC) was the bureaucracy that directly
operated telecom services from 1948 until 1981. In 1981, as in Japan, telecom services were
spun out into a state-owned monopoly carrier, KTA. However, unlike the case of Japan, KTA
did not have the type of policymaking clout or supplier relations that NTT had enjoyed. MOC
had real power and oversight over KTA, which facilitated a smooth privatization process.
The government decided to privatize KTA in July 1987 with little political resistence, and
spent a decade slowly divesting itself from the company while it introduced competition into the
sector. Along the way, key political actors supported increasing privatization and liberalization,
including Presidents Roh Taewoo (1987-1993) and Kim Young-Sam (1993-1998), the Economic
Planning Board (EPB), the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MoFE), and the industrial
conglomerates, chaebol, made the process relatively free of conflict. The main political bargain
during the privatization process was between the government and KTA’s labor union, which
agreed to the privatization on the condition that KTA would not be sold to chaebol or foreign
interests, in order to assure stable employment.22 In 1997, the government abolished the KT law
that had governed KTA’s activities, and they renamed it Korea Telecom (KT). By 2000, they had
fully privatized the company.
22 For each actor’s preferences and strategies in privatizing KTA, see Bae and Chu (2003) and Sung et al. (2005).
13
Although the privatization process was relatively smooth, some conflict between
bureaucracies did occur over the issue of liberalization, regarding how to introduce competition
into the sector. Though not as extreme as the politicized turf war between Japan’s MPT and
MITI, there was some cleavage in the early 1980s between bureaucrats who preferred market-led
liberalization and those who envisioned state leadership in high-tech industries. The cleavage
developed into bureaucratic conflicts between the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy
(MoTIE), and Korea’s MoC, with further policy coordination difficulties caused by software
industrial policy being under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Science and Technology
(MST).23
In 1994, a politically driven focus on IT development by the Korean political leadership
strengthened the lead bureaucracy for telecom policymaking.24 In an administrative reform drive
to coordinate high-tech policy, the Kim Young-Sam administration expanded the power,
jurisdiction, and functions of MOC, creating the Ministry of Information and Communications
(MIC). MIC was given sole responsibility for the IT sector, absorbing the industrial policy
functions from MoTIE and MST. A series of politically driven policies – the “Framework Act on
Informatization Promotion” in 1995, and an “Information Promotion Fund” in 1996 –
strengthened MIC’s legal and financial tools to guide IT policy. Another difference between
Japan’s MPT and Korea’s MIC was that the Minister of MIC, appointed by the president, were
always distinguished experts in IT, facilitating decisive policymaking and strengthening the
legitimacy of MIC’s policies. The contrast with Japan is clear, since the Ministers of Japan’s
23 For details, see Hong (1998).
24 For details on the bureaucratic conflicts and establishment of MIC, see Hong (1998).
14
MPT tended to be politicians serving their rotation in Cabinet positions, with the real power
often residing in the top bureaucrats.25
Thus, the initial institutional arrangements differed between the two countries, which
shaped the actors responsible for driving political dynamics at key junctures. Despite these
differences in the politics of telecom policymaking, however, the policy regimes that each
country developed during the course of their liberalization converged to a remarkable degree.
Chart 2: The Evolution of Korea’s Lead Bureaucracy and Incumbent
􀃆 MOC (1981 - 1994) 􀃆 MIC (1994 - Present ) Ministry of Communications
(MOC)
(1948-1981)
􀃆
KTA (1981 - 1997)
􀃆
KT (1997 - Present)
The Regulatory Frameworks: “Managed Competition” Regimes
The regulatory regimes of Japan and Korea resembled each other quite closely in the first
phases of liberalization. We conceptualize regulatory regimes as the policies, regulations, and
institutions that shape the terms of market competition and private actors’ incentives and
constraints. Both had a strong lead bureaucracy that compartmentalized the sector, orchestrated
new competitors, and micromanaged the terms of competition. In short, the regulatory regimes of
both countries were geared towards “managing” competition.
25 The first minister of MIC in 1994 was Mr. Sang-Hyon Kyong. He received a B.A. from Seoul National
University, a B.S. from University of Rhode Island and a Ph.D. from Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
all in engineering. Between 1965 and 1975, he was on the technical staff at Argonne National Laboratory, Bell
Laboratories, and at Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) of Korea. Before serving
as the minister, he was a Vice President of Korea Telecom, the President of ETRI and National
Computerization Agency (NCA), and vice minister of MOC .
The most recent minister was Mr. Dae-Je Chin who earned a B.A./ M.A. at Seoul National University, another
M.A. at the University of Massachusetts, and a Ph. D at Stanford, all in electronic engineering. He began as an
engineer at Hewlett- Packard 's lab and IBM's Watson Research Center. Prior to being named to head the
Ministry, he served as the President and CEO of Samsung Electronics' Digital Media Network Business. In his
long career at Samsung, he served in a series of increasingly important positions in several Samsung business
units including: vice president of Memory Business; senior vice president of Semiconductor Business;
executive vice president of System LSI Business; president & CTO of Corporate R&D Center; and president
of Digital Media Network Business. In recognition of his many achievements in industry, he was named the
Techno CEO of 2002 by the Ministry of Science & Technology. He has 6 overseas patents and 15 domestic
patents.
15
In Japan, the Telecommunications Business Law governing the sector allowed MPT to
divide carriers into three types based on whether they owned or leased infrastructure, and to
exercise more control over carriers possessing infrastructure.26 MPT also used administrative
guidance to limit the scope of businesses to long distance, local, or international.27 MPT
exercised discretionary authority in allowing new competitors into the sector through a “Supply
Demand Adjustment” clause in the Telecommunications Business Law. The clause enabled them
to deny market entry to firms by citing excess supply or insufficient potential demand, without
offering specific criteria. Interconnection rates charged to competitors for accessing NTT’s
infrastructure were arbitrated by MPT behind closed door negotiations in contentious annual
negotiations between NTT and its competitors. MPT also managed prices set by carriers through
its licensing authority, carefully weighing the expected effect of price change proposals by
competitors and NTT on the competitive landscape before giving approval. Prices therefore
came down gradually, and in lock-step, with competitors lowing their prices incrementally,
followed closely by NTT.28
Korea’s regulatory regime from the late 1980s was extremely similar. It also had a
Telecommunications Business Law, and in 1990, the government compartmentalized the sector
by dividing services into “facilities-bases” and “value-added” services, and creating a number of
categories for service providers. 29 They also divided the sector along the lines of international,
26 “Type I” carriers owned infrastructure and consisted of NTT and the NCCs. “Type II” carriers leased facilities
from Type I carriers. “Special Type II” carriers could provide services across prefectures, while General Type II
carriers limited their operations to local areas.
27 Fuke (2000)
28 For details, see Kushida (2005), (2006), Fuke (2000), Vogel (1996).
29 The government re-categorized the service provides three times over the course of the 1990s. See Lee and Lie
(2000) for details on how the categories for service providers shifted from “General,” “Specific,” and “Value-added”
in 1990 to “Facility-based” and “Value-added, in 1994, and “Facility-based,” “Special” and “Value-added” in 1997.
16
long-distance, and domestic, progressively licensing competitors in each sector over time.30
Between 1990 and 1994, the government generally permitted only services that it had approved
(a “positive listing” system), and in issuing new licenses, until 1997 it only accepted applications
during a particular window of time allotted by the government (a “request for proposal”
system).31
In sum, let us note that the liberalization processes of both countries entailed increasing
the level of competition not simply by deregulation, but re-regulation – the creation of new rules
and institutions. Both governments used their policy tools to actively manage the dynamics of
market competition in their telecom sectors.
The Interaction Between Markets and Regulatory Regimes in Emerging Broadband
Markets
So far, we have seen how the political dynamics of privatization between the two
countries differed, though their regulatory regimes during the process of liberalization were quite
similar. Here we closely examine the interactions between politics, regulatory regimes, and
market dynamics during the advent of broadband markets. We examine Korea first, since it was
first in developing broadband markets, and we find that broadband developed within its existing
“managed competition” regulatory regime. We then examine the case of Japan, which reveals
that in contrast to Korea, it underwent a “regime shift,” and that broadband markets grew out of
this process. We argue that differences in politics driving telecom policymaking are likely to be
the root of the divergence in their regulatory regimes.
30 In 1990, the government licensed DACOM (Datacommunications company of Korea) to International service, and
in 1995 for long distance. In 1996, they licensed addition competition for international services, which Onsei took
advantage of, doing likewise for long distance in 1997. In 1996, the government licensed a competitor to domestic
telephony, Hanaro.
31 For details, see Lee and Lie (2000).
17
Broadband in Korea: From the Managed Competition Regime
The Korean government did not orchestrate broadband deployment from a master
blueprint to reshape its IT infrastructure. However, its policies strongly shaped the strategies
taken by service providers and the service providers themselves. The “facilities-based”
competition, in which different service providers competed with one another using separate sets
of infrastructure, was the government’s desire from the beginning.
In order to foster network infrastructure buildouts, MIC began using its newly acquired
resources and policy tools. In 1995, it began the Korea Information Korea Information
Infrastructure Initiative (KII; 1995-2005), which included in a variety of backbone building and
R&D facilitation programs.32 In order to directly foster facilities-based competition, MIC offered
financial support, granting preferential tax treatment and directly underwrote loans to service
providers building their networks.33
Broadband service began in Korea in 1998, when Thrunet introduced broadband services
over its cable infrastructure. After the government announced that it would issue a license to one
firm to lease out cable infrastructure, Thrunet was created in 1996 as a consortium of over one
hundred companies, under the auspices of Dacom (Datacommmunications company of Korea),
the long distance competitor to KT which had entered the market in 1995. The principal
shareholder turned out to be state-owned energy company KEPCO (Korea Electric Power
Company), and when Thrunet began its service, it used its own service and leased additional
32 KII consisted of three parts: “KII-Government” built a nationwide backbone for broadband, “KII-Testbed”
supported R&D to bring technologies to market, and “KII-Private” aimed to facilitate market competition in
such a way that it would bring broadband networks to large buildings and households through private sector
investment. See Lee and Chan-Olmsted (2004), pp. 658-659.
33 Other financial support went to R&D, technology demonstration projects, pilot programs and community
champions. For details, see Lee et al. (2004).
18
infrastructure from KEPCO. Incidentally, KEPCO had made a bold gamble to build its own fiber
optic infrastructure without explicit government permission.34 The broadband service became
quite popular among the Korean public, impatient with the slow connection speed of dial-up
services.
The entrance of a startup firm, Hanaro, into the broadband market is usually considered
the beginning of Korea’s broadband explosion. Hanaro was formed in 1997, after MIC’s
announcement in 1996 that it would license exactly one competitor into the local telephony
market. Dacom, KEPCO, and chaebol such as Samsung, LG, and Daewoo were initial investors,
and Shin Yun-Shik, former vice minister of MPT and top management of Dacom, was one of the
initial leaders. In an attempt to create a relatively even playing field, MIC created a new set of
regulations that prohibited KT from subsidizing its local service with profits derived from its
long distance or international operations.35
Upon entering the local telephony services market, however, Hanaro quickly found that
competing against KT was tantamount to taking on Goliath bare-handed. KT was able to offer
high quality services for competitive prices, and the lack of number portability caused Hanaro to
face network effects (consumers facing switching costs, keeping them in KT’s service). Driven
34 According to the following account by prominent government official, the story behind KEPCO’s ownership
of an extensive high-speed communications infrastructure serves as a check against the temptation to assign
too much foresight and omnipotence to the Korean government in its creation of the market environment from
which broadband developed. In around 1980, KEPCO installed fiber optic cables throughout its network,
gambling that once it had the infrastructure, the government would have no choice but to allow KEPCO to use
it more productively. This was interesting, given that KEPCO was fully government-owned and under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI). In the meantime, KT had its own incentive to
create fiber optic networks, and the government supported their build-out, partly through financial incentives.
A dispute ensued when both KEPCO and KT applied for a license to lease fiber to telecom carriers. From a
capacity standpoint, according to the government official, KT’s infrastructure was sufficient, and KEPCO’s
was redundant. However, both KT and KEPCO were fully government owned at the time, and although MOC
was pitted against MCI, they could not engage in a public battle, since public disclosure would have revealed
that MCI had allowed KEPCO to take matters into its own hands with taxpayers’ money.
35 Although the revenue often flows the opposite direction, with local service subsidizing long distance when
incumbents face competition in long distance services, a former top government official asserts that the
government wanted to ensure that flow of revenue within KT would be segmented in each market. Interview
with former top MIC official (November 4, 2005).
19
to desperation, Hanaro noted that its customer surveys revealed that KT’s data service
subscribers (including Internet services based on dial-up and ISDN – Integrated Services Digital
Network) lodged many complaints, mainly that access was slow and access fees were charged by
the minute. DSL technology, which utilized existing copper infrastructure, delivered higher
speed, and could be offered at flat rate fees, provided an opportunity Hanaro could not pass up.
The regulatory framework supported Hanaro’s strategy to begin offering DSL, since
Internet service provision was in a relatively unregulated segment of the market, requiring
neither permission nor licensing.36 Furthermore, in 1997 the government had switched from a
“positive list” system, allowing only government-specified activities by service providers, to a
“negative list” system, in which service providers could provide any service except governmentprohibited
ones.
Thus, in April 1999 Hanaro began offering broadband services utilizing both DSL and
cable, using its own DSL network, and leasing cable capacity from a subsidiary of KEPCO
(called Powercomm) and KT.37 With its entry into broadband service, Hanaro sparked intense
competition and created a price shock by providing the broadband service as a free addition to its
basic telephone subscription which amounted to $40 with free installation. This price shock
aided Hanaro in successfully gaining more than a million subscribers within 18 months of
introducing its DSL service.
36 It was classified as a value-added service, for Facilities-based Service Providers (FSPs).
37 In cable service, the Korean government required structural separation of conduit and content, the two stateowned
cable infrastructure owners of Powercomm and KT were not permitted to offer services, but instead
leased capacity to programmers. Therefore, new entrants to the broadband market, such as Thrunet in 1998 and
Hanaro in 1999, initially leased cable capacity to reach their earliest customers. This structural separation rules
in cable were relaxed in 2000 when KT sold its cable infrastructure to cable service providers.
20
Hanaro’s jaw-dropping DSL success profoundly influenced the strategy of KT, the
dominant incumbent carrier.38 Unlike NTT, KT had only begun investing in ISDN. It quickly
scrapped plans for further investments in ISDN and put its weight behind DSL, since users
clearly preferred its higher speed, flat-rate low subscription price, and always-on Internet
access.39 Fearing that it would be permanently left behind if it did not commence broadband
service, KT started ADSL service in June 1999. Competition further heated up when other firms,
including SK Telecom in 1999 and Onse Telecom in 2000, also entered the market.
Once it entered the market, however, KT’s status as the incumbent with nationwide
telephony infrastructure allowed it to quickly offer DSL service throughout the nation (Hanaro
was limited in its geographic reach). KT’s competitive pricing and rising demand for broadband
enabled it to quickly catch up and surpass Hanaro’s market share by June 2000, retaining a
dominant market share since. Tables 4 and 5 shows its dramatic gain in market share – from 5
percent in 1999 to 44 percent in 2000. With DSL being in a relatively unregulated market
segment, KT did not face policies designed to aid competitors at its expense. The smaller service
providers never had a chance.
Table 5: Total Subscribers of Broadband Carriers
Year 1999 2000 2001
Thrunet 142,168 760,999 1,317,624
Hanaro 84,249 1,056,724 2,070,552
KT 12,903 1,730,977 3,874,442
Others 13,662 394,300 580,382
Total 252,982 3,943,000 7,843,000
Adapted from Lee (2003)
38 We refer KTA as KT (Korea Telecom), because KTA was renamed as KT in December 2001.
39 As a clear indication of consumer preference, in 1999, there were about 175 thousand ISDN subscribers, with 97
thousand DSL subscribers in Korea. However, in 2000, the number of ISDN subscribers had shrunk to 100 thousand,
while DSL grew to over two million. (OECD 2005)
21
Table 6: Market Shares of Broadband Carriers (%)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Thrunet 56 19 17 13 12 10
Hanaro 33 27 26 28 25 23
KT 5 44 49 47 50 55
Others 5 10 7 13 14 11
Source: Lee (2003) and MIC (2005)
Industrial Policy with a Twist
Notable about Korea’s industrial policies towards broadband, within its strategic
liberalization drive, is its attempt to not only enhance supply-side investment in networks, but to
promote demand for their use as well. In its classical developmental strategy, Korea is usually
considered to have been producer rather than consumer-oriented, channeling peoples’ income
into relatively centralized banking systems by keeping individual access to other avenues of
investment such as securities or offshore markets relatively difficult, and then channeling those
savings into strategic sectors. The KII strategies fall in the line of this classical industrial policy.
However, in promoting broadband and the Internet, the Korean government enacted a
series of demand magnification programs. Several programs were designed to facilitate Internet
education, computer use in schools, homes, to offer computer purchase assistance, and even to
educate housewives, who tend to control household finances.40 Perhaps the most clever demand
magnification policy to was to deeply embed computer literacy in Korea’s ultra-competitive
40 Programs include the “Ten Million People Internet Education Project (2000-2002)” to provide Internet education
to approximately a fourth of citizens and “One Million Housewife Digital Literacy Education Project.” In terms of
Internet access to schools, the government offered discounts for the provision of Internet access in primary and
secondary schools under a special agreement with KT, leading to 100% penetration of schools with broadband by
the end of 2000, though of course how it is used is another matter. (Choudrie and Lee (2004), p. 107.) In terms of
PC diffusion promotion, from October 1999, the “PC for everyone” program aimed to provide PCs at low-prices,
partly through a PC purchase installment saving system using the postal savings system. The Korean government
also provided subsidies for purchase of PC by low-income citizens. In 2000, the government itself purchased 50,000
PCs as a four-year lease, providing it to low-income families with full support for broadband fee for five years. MIC
(2001). With respect to housewives, government subsidies were granted to around 1,000 private training institutes
over the nation for the purpose of education housewives, in order to create demand in households. MIC (2001).
22
university entrance exams, making a home PC a prerequisite for any serious education-minded
parent, of which there is no shortage as evidenced by the extensive cram school industry.
Broadband access became part of the package of computer literacy, driving sales for households
with school-age children.41 While the effectiveness of these programs and policies in promoting
broadband cannot be determined decisively, it is noteworthy that the government adopted a range
of demand magnification industrial policies in addition to the usual supply-side facilitation
measures.
Re-Regulation: Managed Competition, Continued
If there was any doubt whether market developments in Korea’s broadband services were
an indication of government retreat, re-regulation by MIC in 2004 is strong evidence that the
government sees its role primarily as facilitating competition, keeping the existing regulatory
framework intact.
After the initial burst of growth, and after KT entered the broadband market, competing
broadband providers began to run into financial difficulties. In 2002, Thrunet declared
bankruptcy, and Hanaro found it increasingly difficult to sustain profitability.42 Seeing this
situation and deeming KT’s dominance as a barrier to competition, in 2004 MIC stepped in to
strengthen regulations in the broadband market. By shifting the categorization of broadband
service providers from a less regulated segment (“value-added”) to a more regulated segment
41 Aizu (2002) provides a nice overview of how computer literacy as an investment in education plugged into the
“education fever” caused by the rigorous entrance examination system. As the highly developed markets for cram
schools indicates, family culture focusing on facilitating the success of children in school. Specifically, to go beyond
Aizu’s analysis, the computer literacy certification could be converted to additional points which counted towards
university entrance exam scores.
42 In early 2005, Hanaro absorbed Thrunet, but still had difficulty competing with KT, even contemplating receiving
foreign funds to stay afloat (Fransman 2006:32)
23
(“facility-based”), the government designated KT as the dominant service provider in broadband,
making it subject to stricter regulations in terms of service and pricing.
Broadband in Japan: An Outgrowth of the Regime Shift
The Policy Drivers
In stark contrast to Korea’s development of broadband, which occurred within the
“managed competition” regulatory regime, Japan’s broadband markets grew out of a transition in
its regulatory regime away from “managed competition.” The regime shift was driven by
political dynamics in which MPT (reorganized in 1999 and renamed Ministry of Internal Affairs
and Communications – MIC) continually battled NTT, and Japan’s strengthened Cabinet Office
entered telecom policymaking in a strategic push to develop IT. The shift entailed the
government giving up many of the policy tools to manage competition, but adding new
institutions and regulations in a transition from ex ante regulation through licenses and approval,
towards an ex post mode of regulation relying on a dispute resolution commission and other
institutions.
Japan’s regulatory regime began a gradual transformation in the late 1990s.43 In 1996, the
battle between MPT and NTT over the divestiture of NTT – whether to break it up partially,
completely, or not at all – ongoing since the early 1980s, was finally settled. Political
compromises between a broad range of interested parties had been forged in 1983 and 1990, and
resolved in 1996. To give a flavor of the complexity of negotiations in these political
compromises, let it suffice to say that actors with often disagreeing interests included the MPT,
NTT, the LDP, the Prime Minister (Hashimoto), the NTT labor union, the Social Democratic
43 For gradual transformative institutional change and slow-moving causes and outcomes of change, see Streeck and
Thelen (2006), Pierson (2003).
24
Party, the Fair Trade Commission, the Ministry of Finance, Keidanren, MITI, NTT’s competitor
carriers, and numerous policy research and deliberation councils.44
The outcome in 1996 was a surprise agreement between MPT and NTT, which allowed
NTT to remain a single corporate entity united under a holding company. The tortured nature of
this political compromise may be inferred by the fact that it required the lifting of the post-war
ban on holding companies, one of the key tenets of the Allied Occupation in breaking up the
prewar zaibatsu. Members of the Telecommunications Deliberation Council learned of this
compromise in the newspapers after they thought they had secured an agreement to completely
break up NTT.45
With the battle over NTT divestiture settled, MPT began to take measures to further
liberalize the telecom market, through both deregulation and reregulation. In 1997, Japan signed
the WTO Telecom Agreement, which removed many of the restrictions on inward FDI,
especially regarding foreign ownership of infrastructure. 46 These new rules took effect in 1998,
and in the same year MPT relaxed many of its licensing requirements.47 MPT’s deregulation
measures were accomplished by altering the Telecommunications Business Law, a task made
easier by broad political support in the form of the “Three Year Action Plan for Deregulation”
spearheaded by the Cabinet Office in 1994.48
Interconnection to NTT’s infrastructure, a necessity for most competitors, since NTT
controlled the last-one-mile of infrastructure, had been a contentious political issue from the
44 See Bolin (1997), Vogel (2000) for an excellent overviews.
45 Interview, Toshihiko Hayashi, Professor at the University of the Air, former member of the Telecommunications
Deliberation Council. (5/2001) Nakamura Ichiya, former MPT official, contends that the sudden compromise was
the result of MPT shifting its focus from battling NTT to battling NHK, the national broadcaster under its
jurisdiction. (5/2001)
46 For details, see Kushida (2006)
47 For Type I carriers, most price changes and market entry only required notification, whereas they had required
approval prior to this. See Fuke (2000) for details.
48 For details, see Suda (2005).
25
introduction of competition in 1985. MPT’s basic stance was to force NTT to lower its
interconnection rates, and the US periodically got involved in trade initiatives to pressure the
Japanese government to force NTT to lower its interconnection rates. In 1998, MPT established
clear rules for interconnection based on a specific formula.49 In 2000, this formula was revised to
further favor competitors.
Market Interactions in Early DSL Markets
The interaction between new market entrants attempting to offer DSL, several
government actors, and a political drive to catch-up in IT not only to the West, but also to Korea,
drove the next phase of the regime shift. In this phase, the liberalization was strategic, in that the
government, while reacting to market developments, was clearly pushing for infrastructure and
service development towards broadband diffusion.
In 1999, startup firm Tokyo Metallic, followed by others such as Fusion Communications,
began offering DSL service. However, in order to do so, they required access to NTT’s switching
facilities to place their equipment within – a process known as collocation.50 Unlike Korea’s
Hanaro, these startup firms did not own their infrastructure, since they had not entered local
telephony markets. Unfortunately for these startup companies, the interconnection rules
established in 1998 did not cover collocation, and were essentially operating in unregulated
territory. Therefore, predictably, they were at the mercy of NTT, which delayed access and
49 Kushida (2006), Fuke (2000) pp 43-45, Vogel (2000). The formula was know as LRIC (Long Run Incremental
Cost), though the US immediately began arguing that Japan’s LRIC calculations were flawed.
50 DSL sends high frequency signals over conventional copper lines, requiring equipment on both the user’s side (the
box at home), and inside the carrier’s facilities (NTT switching stations).
26
charged high fees. NTT was interested in continuing its per-minute charge-based ISDN service,
and wanted to move directly into a proprietary fiber optic service.51
A series of government actions rapidly improved the competitive landscape for DSL
providers. First, in July 2000, noting that Japan lagged behind many other industrialized nations,
including Korea, in international IT statistics such as Internet penetration, usage, and broadband
diffusion, the political leadership initiated a policy drive to catch-up in IT. The Cabinet Office,
newly strengthened in its policymaking capacity, established an “IT Strategy Headquarters,”
within the Cabinet Office.52 It produced the “e-Japan strategy,” explicitly recognizing Japan’s
late start in IT, and stipulating a specific timeline to create a market environment providing low
cost, fast Internet access.53 Later that year, the Cabinet Office passed the “Basic IT Law,” which
allowed MIC (successor to MPT) a broad framework within which specifics could be determined
via Ministerial Ordinances.54
Second, in October 2000 the FTC made a rare foray into telecom policymaking by
issuing an unprecedented warning to NTT over its treatment of DSL providers, such as Tokyo
Metallic and eAccess. At the same time, MIC revised several of its Ministerial Ordinances,
forcing NTT to clarify the terms it offered collocation, and its methodology for calculating fees.
51 NTT had invested a total of approximately 9 billion dollars in its ISDN infrastructure (Cole 2006, citing Nezu
2002). Van der Staal, Grassmuck, and Hatta (1995) cite that in 1992, NTT invested 52 billion yen, and 30 billion
yen in 1993 as it began to slow down its investments.
52 See Pempel (2006) for details on how the Cabinet Office was strengthened, including increased personnel and
expanded policymaking capabilities.
53 See full text at the website of the IT Strategic Headquarters. Cabinet Office. IT Strategic Headquarters. [accessed
5/23/2006] Tilton (2004) argues that the e-Japan
strategy conforms to the key characteristics of traditional “industrial policy” with a catch-up objective, explicit goal,
and timeline to achieve specific outcomes.
54 Ministerial Ordinances are legally binding, but can be decided by the ministry in charge working by iself, with no
need to coordinate with other ministries, such as the Ministry of Justice to ensure coherence in Japan’s civil law.
In the government reorganization in 2000, MPT merged with the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Management
and Coordination Agency and was given the unwieldy English title of “the Ministry of Public Management, Home
Affairs, and Posts and Telecommunications” (MPHPT, Soumusho in Japanese). It made the sensible move to
simplify its English name to the “Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) in 2004. In this paper, for
simplicity, we refer to the successor of MPT as MIC.
27
It also forced NTT to lease out its unused fiber optic infrastructure (known as dark fiber) at low
prices, as well as access to its local “last-mile” infrastructure (known as “unbundling the local
loop”).55
In 2001, MIC established a Dispute Resolution Commission (DRC), located within the
ministry, but presented as an objective third party dispute mediator that revealed all its
deliberations proceeding to the public – a shift from the negotiated settlements behind closed
doors of the past. Among the early cases that the DRC dealt with were DSL providers
complaining that NTT was slow to act on collocation, in which the DRC ruled against NTT.56
In 2003, MIC continued its deregulation by abolishing most of the classification,
registration, and notification requirements for carriers, going so far as to remove the
classification of carriers, and officially announcing that it did not limit the scope of carriers’
activities.57 MIC in essence announced that it would no longer compartmentalize the sector, and
gave up many of its policy tools to manage competition.
Thus, by 2001, the competitive landscape facing Japanese DSL providers was
considerably different from that in 1999, when the first firms began offering services. A whole
set of regulations, backed by a political drive, seemed to back their business. Son Masayoshi,
ethnically Korean and born in Japan, who founded Softbank in the 1980s, to become a star child
of Japan’s dot-com era in the late 1990s, took advantage of this new regulatory and market
environment to its fullest extent.58
55 See Kushida (2006), Fuke (2003)
56 See website of the DRC at though summaries and minutes in
Japanese.
57 Fuke (2000)
58 For details on Softbank’s activities, see Vogel (2006) pp. 189-193. For a brief overview of Son Masayoshi, see
Nathan (2004), esp. pp 99-119.
28
Softbank was an early investor in Yahoo!, and in September 2001, Softbank entered the
DSL market through its subsidiary, Yahoo!BB. It created a price shock by setting its monthly
subscription price at about half of the going market rate (2400 yen, approximately 22 dollars at 1
USD = 110 JPY), and engaged in an aggressive marketing campaign, including giving out $100
DSL modems for free at train stations. Softbank’s price was the lowest in the world, forcing
other DSL providers, including NTT regional companies, to lower their prices, and sparking a
rapid increase in DSL adoption by Japanese.59 Son then delivered a second price shock by
bundling free IP telephony subscriptions with its DSL service, allowing Softbank subscribers to
call each other without charge, setting flat rates for long distance calls to non-subscribers, and
setting international calls at a fraction of the prevailing market rate.60 Softbank was able to set
this type of pricing because it leased dark fiber from NTT to create its own IP-switched
backbone.
The sudden public interest in IP telephony was supported surprisingly quickly by MIC.
Without political protest that one might have expected from NTT, which had the most to lose if
its circuit-switched telephony infrastructure were bypassed completely, MIC assigned a
dedicated array of numbers to IP telephones (a 050 prefix). It later went on to allow IP
telephones to obtain telephone numbers within the existing numbering scheme if they met
quality standards.61
59 MIC officials, among others, were taken by surprise at Son’s aggressive pricing, and many voiced concern that
Son was waging a dangerous price war, which would make the operation of infrastructure unprofitable to the point
of threatening future investment into next generation networks. It is not clear that Son would have been allowed to
wage this type of dramatic price war had the government retained its policy tools of “controlled competition.”
60 Flat-rate telephony was virtually unheard of in Japan at the time, since NTT’s infrastructure dominated the lastone-
mile, and its interconnection fee structure did not allow competitors utilize conventional telephone networks to
offer flat-rate services. Son set IP telephony calls to the US at below cost prices, at 8 yen a minute (6-7 cents),
compared to the 200-300 yen for 3 minutes charged by competitors.
61 IP denwa demo bangou ga kawaranai riyuu: mittsu no kufuu de soumushou no jouken wo kuria. 2003. Nikkei
Communications Nov 24: 66-68. Some MIC and former MPT officials have expressed the view that MIC was quick
29
Softbank’s market strategy in DSL profoundly affected Japan’s FTTH (Fiber-to-the-
Home) service market. Encouraged by industrial policy measures by the government such as
subsidies, and loans from the Development Bank of Japan, and with extensive investment by
NTT, Japan had been developing fiber optic infrastructure since the early 1990s. Just as DSL
markets were taking off, fiber had reached the last-one-mile of most urban areas in Japan. 62
NTT had been planning to offer a proprietary service based on an alternative underlying
technology than the Internet, expecting to combine video, telephony, and data in one line. They
also expected to charge high fees for this service.63 As Takanori Ida points out, the failure of
Japan’s government to completely break up NTT gave it the financial strength to engage in an
extensive nation-wide FTTH buildout.64 However, NTT was preempted by Usen (pronounced
Yu-sen), a landline music broadcasting company that owned its own telephone pole and fiber
infrastructure in urban areas. In March 2001, Usen began offering household FTTH services at
the speed of close to 100 mbp/s (versus 2 to 15 or so for DSL) for approximately 6000 yen, only
slightly more than double the price of Softbank’s DSL.65 Other competitors began to enter the
FTTH market at a similar price range, dashing NTT’s hopes of offering a much more expensive,
proprietary service. FTTH providers also began offering IP telephony, contributing to a rapid rise
in household IP telephony subscribers.66 The advent of low-priced FTTH services is best
to adopt IP telephony because it was still under the public radar, and that NTT was not in a position to launch a
major public protest, since nobody foresaw the rapidity with which IP telephony spread.
62 According to MIC document, by the end of 2001, FTTH networks covered 95% of metropolitan areas (MIC 2003).
63 For details, see Kushida (2006)
64 Ida points out that NTT DoCoMo financial success in the booming cellular markets provided NTT regional
carriers, NTT East and NTT West with de fact subsidies (Ida 2006).
65 For a wealth of information on details and the variety of FTTH networks to households, apartment buildings, and
offices, see MIC (2005).
66 Government numbers show two hundred thousand subscribers by mid-2004. This is not a large number, but given
that a US investment bank estimated that 6 million users, or 12 percent of households used VoIP at the end of 2003,
and that it is safe to assume that a large proportion of the 12 million DSL subscribers have DSL modems capable of
IP telephony, the potential number of users is large. Moreover, Nikkei Communications estimates that by the end of
2003, over 3 million users out of 4 million plus users had IP-phone enabled DSL modems. "Setogiwa Ni Tatsu Ip
Denwa Sougo Setsuzoku," Nikkei Communications, February 9 2004.
30
characterized as having its roots in NTT’s traditional pattern of investment, coupled with
industrial policy from the “controlled competition” regime of the late 1980s to 1990s, but whose
market dynamics were strongly shaped by the DSL service market.67
Citing difficulties in competing in the telephony and broadband markets, NTT announced
in early 2006 its intent to restructure itself under the existing holding company structure. Its
attempt is to engage in reform without revising the NTT Law, which would clearly become a
protracted political battle.
Conclusion
Understanding the Roles of the Politics, Governments, and Markets
Let us now sum up our findings, addressing our initial question of how exactly the
governments, markets, and politics interacted in the two countries as their broadband markets
developed rapidly. First, at a market level, we see that in both countries, new entrants offered
broadband services, delivering a price shock to the Internet access market – especially Hanaro
for Korea, and Softbank for Japan. The wild success of the newcomers forced the incumbents,
KT and NTT, to realign their strategies towards deploying DSL. The specifics of the market
dynamics were not micromanaged by either government. So far, we agree with market-led
expectations.
Second, our close study of the policies shows that, in both countries, the governments’
approach towards liberalization, an increase in the level of competition, was a conscious strategy
of both deregulation, a relaxing of rules, as well as reregulation, a strengthening of rules. Here
we disagree with simple market-led explanations of government-market interactions. Both
countries set up “managed competition” regimes with similar policy tools to orchestrate
67 See Kushida (2006) for an extended version of this argument.
31
competition into the sector, actively using those tools to incrementally increase and adjust levels
of competition.
The Korean government, in allowing Hanaro to enter the local telephony market, did not
“open” the market per se, but used the existing regulatory framework in introducing a competitor
to KT. When they deemed the level of competition insufficient in the broadband market, they
shifted the Internet service provider subsector into a more regulated compartment of the sector in
order to exercise stronger authority over KT.
In Japan, the regime shift entailed a significant amount of deregulation as the government
removed much of the policy framework of “managed competition.” However, it also entailed
significant reregulation, creating a new set of institutions such as the Dispute Resolution
Commission to better engage in ex post regulation, and promulgating new policies to facilitate
local loop unbundling and collocation. The government was also extremely quick to create
regulations in support of services such as IP telephony which had the potential to significantly
alter the terms of competition.68
Thus, we differ from the strongest of state-led expectations by being careful not to
exaggerate the effect of state policies, but showing how they interacted with market
developments, which were often startling to government officials in the speed with which they
developed. However, the broad goals that each of the governments held – to facilitate the
deployment and diffusion of high-speed Internet access – was firmly entrenched in their policy
orientations, and both governments actively promoted broadband penetration as the market
68 One might debate whether IP telephony can be considered a “disruptive technology” a la Christensen (2000).
However, as Weber (2005) points out, Christensen’s definition of disruptive technology is problematic because the
capacity of incumbent businesses to adapt their business models to the new technology is the critical variable in
determining whether a technology is disruptive or not. Therefore, if incumbents successfully adapt to the new
technology, it is not a “disruptive technology.” The definition lies in the business model rather than the technology.
32
developments unfolded. This leads us to conclude that both governments are best characterized
as being engaged in strategic liberalization.
We also discovered a significant divergence in the two countries’ regulatory regimes, a
fact not obvious by reading existing single-country analyses of their respective ICT sectors or
broadband development. While Korea used its existing policy framework to facilitate strategic
liberalization, Japan underwent a regime shift that altered institutions and policy tools.
We found an explanation to this divergence in the politics driving each of the regulatory
regimes. Beginning with different institutional configurations at the point of origin for the
telecom sector, different political bargains at major junctures led to distinct sets of political
dynamics, causing different outcomes in subsequent junctures. Korea’s lead bureaucracy was
able to establish a strong hierarchical relationship with the incumbent early on, assisted by a
relatively weak incumbent, and later further strengthened by a politically driven focus on
empowering the ministry. Japan’s telecom politics involved a more complex struggle over power
relations between the regulator and a more powerful incumbent, other government bureaucracies
and actors, and a long chain of negotiated settlements.
As a building block for future scholarship, this comparative study also raises further
questions. If we were to consider the telecom policies of Japan and Korea as comparatively
“successful” in facilitating rapid development of the sector, what differentiates the ICT sector
from other sectors whose policy and market outcomes cannot be considered as a success (such as
macroeconomic policy in Japan)? To adequately address this question, we would need a sharper
focus on differences in policy regimes, markets and politics, across sectors as well as policy
33
functions.69 In other words, we would need to situate the sectors within the broader political
economic context, and analyze the performance attributes required to facilitate the type of rapid
broadband growth the two countries experienced. That being said, this study does point to factors
such as the political impetus strengthening lead bureaucracies, and their intent to facilitate
competition as a means rather than an end, the availability of technology favoring business
models of new entrants, and an upsurge of entrepreneurs as the economies strove to adjust to
new terms of international competition.70
Second, one might ask how the broadband services subsector fits within the broader
context of the ICT sector as a whole. Again, this is material for further research. We might
suggest that the policy tools across landline and wireless networks differ, and that differences in
the strengths of market players (NTT “family” firms in Japan versus the chaebol in Korea)
relatively to governmental actors may create a somewhat different set of political and market
dynamics. Governments may have stronger policy tools on the one hand, but especially in the
case of Korea, the chaebol would be much more powerful market players than KT. Deriving a
fuller picture of the political dynamics in telecom policymaking for each country would require
comparing our findings from this paper to those of the wireless subsector as well.
Implications: A New Playground for Experimentation
Let us conclude by noting that the development of high-speed network broadband
environments in Japan and Korea has important implications for innovation and value-creation in
the two countries, as well as international competition in ICT. The process of lead users putting
69 Vogel and Zysman (2002) point out that different national governance structures are particularly suitable for not
only particular sectors, but particular functions as well. Kitchelt (1991) notes the importance of taking this type of
analysis to the sectoral level as well.
70 For the change in terms of competition embedded in the digital production paradigm, and national asjustments,
see various chapters in Zysman and Newman ed., (2006).
34
technologies to new uses was an essential component of the IT revolution which originated in the
US.71 The US, which was a playground for experimentation and innovation in the initial phase of
the Internet revolution, has fallen behind many other countries in terms of network speed and
penetration.72 In the next round of competition, Japan and Korea’s new high-speed, broadband
environments promise to offer new “playgrounds” for experimentation and innovation.
71 Cohen et al. (2000)
72 Firms such as Microsoft, Cisco, Yahoo, Amazon, Google, and eBay faced the most advanced and sophisticated
domestic market in terms of PC penetration, Internet usage, etc.
35
Appendix: Expectations for Market-led and State-led perspective of development applied
to broadband.
First, in what we dub a market-led explanation, we would expect that some combination
of new technology, new entrants, new corporate strategies, and the governments’ retreat from
market-distorting regulations produced a “market-friendly” environment from which broadband
services developed rapidly. One might expect a spectrum of positions with respect to the actual
relationship between governments and markets, even within the market-led perspective. At one
end, one could follow the OECD in arguing that Korea successfully deregulated its telecom
sector, and Japan created a better regulatory environment for market competition.73 At the other
extreme, one could invoke the arguments about globalization undermining government capacity
to manage markets altogether – that factors such as increased trade, financial flows, and a
dominance of neo-liberal ideology interconnected in new ways via information technology
resulted in inevitable pressures on national modes of regulation, if not the conception the nationstate
itself in a “flat” world. 74 One might envision how Korea’s financial crisis and Japan’s
prolonged stagnation robbed them of rationale and legitimacy for continued intervention in
various markets, or that the crisis and stagnation were the culminations of paralyzed states.75 In
this scenario, we would expect a new set of dynamic market forces as a result of the
73 OECD 1999 (Korea), OECD 2000 (Japan).
74 Friedman (2005) contends that the competitive landscape across the world has been “flattened,” or set on an even
playing ground. Other notable works include; Strange (1996) who argues that states have ceded much of their
domain to non-state actors; Milner and Keohane (1996) bring into question whether Japanese and Korean-style
government-led altering of comparative advantage (at least, in the short term) can persist in the face of capital
mobility; Cerny (1995) argues that the states’ ability to provide public goods, such as infrastructure, in addition to
other factors including national identity, will be challenged, though he does mention in passing that policymakers
will attempt to reinvent the state; Ohmae (1995) argues that the state is no longer the dominant actor nor business
unit in the world; and Castells (1996) provides a vision of networks rather than states as the locus of dominant
functions and processes.
75. For example, for Korea, Weiss (1998) argues that by the crisis, Korea had lost much of its state capacity, and
Woo-Cumings (1999b) argues that the Korean developmental strategy led it to a bind in that it was wedded to large
business, but politically paralyzed to enact bureaucrat-led reform. For example, for Japan, Katz (1998) argues that
Japan’s state, which had been development, became consumed by clientilistic interests over time, Castells (1998)
argues that the very success of the Japanese developmental project led to forces thrusting it into crisis, and Van
Wolfren (1990) finds no real center to the Japanese state.
36
governments’ retreat from active attempts to manage their telecom sectors. It would be these new
sets of market dynamics conducive to new entrants and price-based competition that yielded low
service prices, which in turn drove rapid population penetration.76
Second, what we call a government-led expectation would lead us to expect that the
Japanese and Korean governments intervened quite heavily in the telecom markets, strategically
altering investment profiles to foster rapid broadband diffusion.77 On the one hand, one could
point to the nature of the telecom sector, which involves incumbent firms requiring strong
regulation to foster competition, significant network investments in which private firms might be
unwilling to invest, and existing institutions and histories of heavy government intervention and
lead bureaucracies in charge of managing the sector. One might draw from broader scholarship
contending that the salience of national governments persists in the face of globalization,
technological shifts, and economic downturns -- perhaps even by acquiring new goals and tools
along the way.78
76 This logic tends to be more prominent in analyses of Korea. For example, see OECD (2000), Tcha, et al. (2000),
Lee (2002), Choudrie and Lee (2004).
77 This logic is found in several analyses of Korea’s broadband development, including Fackler (2006), Frieden
(2005), Lee and Olmsted (2004), Lee et al. (2003), Tcha et al (2000), Choudrie and Lee (2004) for Korea. For
Japan’s broadband development, Bleha (2005), and Tilton (2004) make strong arguments along this vein.
78 Weiss (1998), Levy (2006)
37
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Development: Strategic Liberalization of the Telecommunications
Sectors
BRIE Working Paper 175
June 29, 2006
© Copyright 2006 by the Authors
Kenji Kushida and Seung-Youn OH*
PhD Students
Travers Department of Political Science and BRIE
UC Berkeley
kkushida@berkeley.edu
ohusky@berkeley.edu
* The authors would like to thank members of the ICT Competition Policy Research group, Professor Toshihiko
Hayashi, Ichiya Nakamura, UC Berkeley Kinyukai members, the Berkeley Political Science Graduate Student
Association Conference participants, Steven Vogel, and John Zysman, and Cynthia Okita for feedback on earlier
drafts of this ongoing research project.
1
Abstract
The ICT sectors of both South Korea and Japan developed rapidly, especially in
developing high-speed, low priced broadband services. These networks can potentially provide
both economies with new playgrounds for experimentation and innovation. Existing explanations
of how these broadband networks and services were created tend to be confused and
contradictory regarding 1) the roles played by the states, 2) the exact mechanisms of interaction
between governments policies and programs, regulatory frameworks, and market dynamics, and
3) the politics driving each of the state-market interactions.
We find that differences in the institutional configurations of the two countries since the
inception of their ICT sectors created a distinct set of political dynamics in each country. The
initial telecom policy regimes of the two countries in their initial stages of liberalization were
strikingly similar. However, the contrasting political dynamics drove Japan and Korea’s policy
regimes along different trajectories. Driven by politicized conflicts and a series of negotiated
compromises between the former incumbent and lead bureaucracy, Japan’s ICT sector
underwent a regime shift, from which the market dynamics giving rise to broadband services
developed. By contrast, Korea’s managed competition policy regime, once established, was
stable and hierarchical, with a strong lead bureaucracy managing the sector and former
incumbent, without significant political battles. The market dynamics in Korea, from which its
broadband services developed, occurred within its existing policy regime without a shift
comparable to that in Japan. Differences in the politics, stemming from initial institutional
configurations and subsequent political bargains at key junctures drove the two regimes along
different trajectories.
2
Introduction
The rapid economic development of both Japan and South Korea (hereon, Korea) partly
hinged on their success in developing lead sectors that became globally competitive. Light
industries such as textiles were followed by heavy industries such as steel, autos, and then
electronics and semiconductors. Much ink has been spilled in attempting to explain the two
countries’ rapid growth, especially regarding the governments’ roles, their capacities, and their
relationships to markets.1 Our inquiry is aimed at understanding the two countries’ rapid
development of the latest lead sector – Information, Communications and Technology (ICT).
In fact, ICT has been recognized worldwide as not only a lead sector, but a broadly
transformative sector capable of driving productivity, innovation, and growth in a wide range of
industries.2 While most advanced industrial countries have attempted to nurture their domestic
ICT sectors, Japan and Korea are notable in their rapid and extensive deployment of broadband
services. As we describe in the next section, neither country had broadband markets before
1999,3 but by 2002, they were at the forefront of global price-performance and leaders in
population penetration. Although the full potential contributions of broadband networks to the
two countries’ international competitiveness have yet to be discovered, few countries would
regard their rapid broadband penetration with anything less than envy.
We find an analytical comparison between Japan and Korea’s broadband development
especially useful because they are often considered to have shared key patterns of state-market
interaction in their overall economic growth, at least for a significant time period, and regardless
1 For excellent overviews of the scholarship, see Noble (1989), Onis (1991), Wade (1992), and Woo-Cumings
(1999).
2 Cohen, et al. (2000).
3 A variety of definitions for “broadband” exist, but we follow the OECD in refering to services that offer more than
256Kbps downstream access. We also exclude ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network), an alternative, slower
technology than DSL, despite requiring fiber optic cables to the home. See OECD (2002), p.6.
3
of the precise conception the analyst chooses to use.4 Thus, in this paper we seek to understand
and compare the exact manner in which the two governments interacted with their respective
markets in the course of developing broadband networks and services, with special attention to
the politics driving those interactions.
Korea and Japan’s Rapid Development of Broadband
From the late 1990s, the ICT sectors of Korea and Japan developed rapidly, propelling
them to the forefront of advanced industrial nations in terms of high-speed landline and wireless
Internet connectivity. Since the market dynamics, policies, and politics behind the landline and
wireless segments of the sector differ considerably, despite their increasing convergence, in this
paper we limit our focus to the area with perhaps the most spectacular, if not sudden growth –
broadband services.
As Martin Fransman points out, no existing measures of national performance in
broadband are perfect. Of the most common measures, Korea far exceeds all other nations in
terms of penetration, and Japan leads the world in terms of speed and price. 5
Korea moved first, with the rapid growth of DSL (Digital Subscriber Line), a technology
involving sending high frequency signals over existing copper telecommunications infrastructure.
With consumers enjoying the cheapest prices in the world, Korea’s broadband penetration
became the highest worldwide by 2001, where it has remained through the date of this
publication. Considering that there was no market for broadband before 1998, the fact that 70 out
of 100 households sported broadband subscriptions by 2002 is nothing short of astonishing (See
4 In addition to citations in footnote 1, see Cumings (1984). Conceptions include economic perspectives stressing
export-led growth, import substitution with credible threats of removing protections, political economic conceptions
of “developmental,” “non-liberal,” “coordinated market economies,” “network states,” et cetera.
5 Fransman points to 1) availability, 2) penetration, 3) capacity/speed, 4) price, and he calls for the adoption of 5)
quality of access, and 6) goodness of fit with the needs of users. (Fransman 2006: 7)
4
table 1, which shows penetration rate per 100 inhabitants, rather than households, due to data
limitations).6 In the one year between 1999 and 2001, the number of DSL subscriptions in Korea
rose from 97 thousand to 2.7 million, and cable modem subscriptions increased from 17
thousand to 1.5 million.7
Table 1: Broadband Penetration Rate per 100 Inhabitants
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 6/2005
Korea 9.2 17.2 21.8 24.2 24.9 25.5
Japan 0.2 2.2 6.1 10.7 15 16.4
USA 2.3 4.5 6.9 9.7 13 14.5
OECD
average 1.27 2.9 4.9 7.3 10.3 11.8
Source: OECD
Table 2: Broadband Subscriptions, Japan 1999-2005 (millions)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total
broadband - 0.63 2.83 7.81 13.64 18.66 22.37
Cable
Internet 0.15 0.63 1.3 1.95 2.48 2.87 3.23
DSL Lines <.01 0.01 1.52 5.65 10.27 13.33 14.48
FTTH - - 0.07 0.42 1.45 2.43 4.64
Note: for FTTH, 2001-2003 indicate end of FY rather than calendar year
Sources: 1999-2003: OECD 2005, 2004-2005: MIC
Table 3: Broadband Subscriptions, Korea 1999-2005 (millions)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total
broadband - 3.92 8.14 10.4 11.61 12.17 12.46
Cable
Internet 0.17 1.56 2.94 3.55 3.94 4.24 4.15
DSL Lines 0.97 2.35 5.18 5.66 6.57 6.72 6.42
other - 0.01 0.03 1.18 1.09 1.21 1.88
Note: number for 2004 is one month after end FY 2004, 2005 is end of FY 2005
Sources: 1999-2003: OECD 2005, 2004: MIC, 2005: NCA
Japan followed suit in the early 2000s. In 1999, when DSL was first introduced, Japan
was one of the most expensive OECD counties for Internet access. However, penetration grew
6 NCA (2004:15)
7 OECD (2002b) p.13.
5
rapidly after 2000, with DSL subscriptions between the end of December 2000 and June 2001
increasing by over 4000 percent.8 By 2002, Japan had the lowest prices for DSL in the world, as
well as a market for FTTH (Fiber-to-the Home) services, high-speed fiber optic lines connected
directly to households. FTTH services, offering transmission speeds of up to 100 Mbps (several
times that of DSL) gave Japan the fastest household broadband networks worldwide. 9 By the
end of 2005, over 44 percent of households had broadband access, and at the end of 2004, the
ITU ranked Japan third in the number of total broadband subscribers.10 Thus, by 2004, after a
period of extremely rapid growth, Korea and Japan’s broadband networks were at the forefront
of broadband price-performance (see table 2). 11
Table 4: Comparison of Prices per 100kbps, as of July 2003
Country US$
Japan 0.09
Korea 0.25
Belgium 1.15
Hong Kong 1.27
Singapore 2.21
New Zealand 2.71
China 3.07
Canada 3.25
Netherlands 3.36
US 3.53
Germany 4.42
Source: MIC 2004
8 OECD (2002b: 14)
9 DSL services in Japan ranged from 1 to 8 mbps in 2001, though they increased to 50 by 2003. See IICP (2005) for
details on transmission speed increases. The OECD figures on penetration per 100 inhabitants do not capture the
rapid increases in speed, which are a critical characteristic differentiating the Japan from the US, with roughly
similar penetration proportions.
10 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan. Information and Communication Economy Office,
Information and Communications Policy Bureau. Main Data on Information and Communications in Japan.
11 In addition, by 2004, Japan and Korea had the cheapest cost for 100kbit/s as a percentage of monthly income.
(ITU 2004: 25)
6
Governments, Markets, and Development in Korea and Japan – Expectations
Our interest in understanding how and why Korea and Japan’s broadband networks
developed so rapidly thrusts us into an ongoing theoretical debate regarding the role of
governments and markets. Given that the rapid developments occurred after Korea’s financial
crisis and Japan’s decade-long stagnation, how exactly did the governments and markets interact
to produce these outcomes? How similar were Japan and Korea’s roles of the governments and
markets in their development of broadband? What were the politics driving each of the
governments, and how do they compare to one another?
Theoretical debates over whether Japan and Korea’s overall economic development were
primarily due to market-led or state-led forces have been hashed out extensively. In applying
these theoretical positions to broadband development, let it suffice to say that support can be
found for both expectations – markets and technological developments affecting policy choices,
as well as government actions shaping markets.12 Our position is that both Japan and Korea’s
government were strategic in their liberalization of markets surrounding broadband.13 By
strategic, we mean that they had concrete goals in mind, and were capable of channeling policy
and institutional change towards those goals. However, we are careful to recognize that the
governments were far from omniscient nor monolithic; they were sometimes taken by surprise
12 See Appendix for a more detailed treatment of the market-led and state-led expectations that grow out of these
debates.
13 The intellectual antecedents of our study are the following works of scholarship. Following Karl Polanyi, who
recognized that markets must be created and sustained by continuous government intervention, we expect the
government to play a strong role in shaping the actors and terms of competition (Polanyi 1944). Taking after Steven
Vogel’s analysis of liberalization in advanced industrial democracies, we also expect that liberalization, an increase
in the level of competition, can be accomplished through both deregulation, a relaxing of rules, as well as reregulation,
a strengthening of rules (Vogel 1996). Influenced by Suzanne Berger, who pointed out that institutions
can shape politics, and John Zysman, who argued that the strategies available to governments were influenced by the
architecture of their financial systems, we expect the interaction of institutions and politics in the ICT sector to
influence the strategies taken by governments. Berger (1972) esp 145-177, Zysman (1983).
7
by actual market developments, and political processes interacted with bureaucratic
policymaking.
Existing analyses of the two countries’ broadband development provide a confusing and
contradictory picture, since they tend to contain the logic of either the market-led or governmentled
analysis, which essentially predict the opposite role of the state – withdrawing from markets,
or actively intervening in them. Worse yet, some embed both within a single explanation.14
Empirically, the market-led explanations tend to ignore bountiful examples of re-regulation,
while state-led explanations tend to list government programs and outcomes with little regard for
market dynamics. Both tend to downplay the political dynamics driving policies and regulatory
regimes, an aspect we view as critical to understanding changes in policies, and the trajectories
of such change. Therefore, neither can understand the precise nature of interaction between the
governments and markets over time, nor can they accurately characterize the similarities and
differences between Korea and Japan’s broadband development.
In this paper, we closely examine the interaction between the governments and markets in
the development of Korea and Japan’s broadband services markets, focusing on the politics and
institutional configurations that drive government policies and institutional change.
The Argument in Brief
We find that differences in the institutional configuration of the two countries since the
inception of their ICT sectors created a distinct set of political dynamics in each country.15 The
initial telecom policy regimes – the set of institutions and policies that provide incentives and
14 Tcha et al (2000), Lee (2002), Choudrie and Lee (2004), OECD (2000), are the most clear examples of this
conflation. Fransman (2006), which appeared in print after we finished this manuscript, is perhaps the most evenhanded
account we have seen, splitting the credit between market and governmental factors. Chung (2006) in
Fransman’s volume, lists all possible contributory factors for Korea without a clear causal argument.
15 In this paper we take a relatively narrow definition of institutions, referring to formal government organizations.
8
constraints for firms in determining their strategies – of the two countries in their initial stages of
liberalization were strikingly similar, with a lead bureaucracy in each country closely
micromanaging the telecom markets. However, the contrasting political dynamics drove Japan
and Korea’s policy regimes along different trajectories. Driven by politicized conflicts and a
series of negotiated compromises between the former incumbent and lead bureaucracy, Japan’s
ICT sector underwent a “regime shift,” from which the market dynamics giving rise to
broadband services developed. By contrast, Korea’s “managed competition” policy regime, once
established, was stable and hierarchical, with a strong lead bureaucracy managing the sector and
former incumbent, without significant political battles. The market dynamics in Korea, from
which its broadband services developed, occurred within its existing policy regime without a
shift comparable to that of Japan. Differences in the politics, stemming from initial institutional
configurations and subsequent political bargains at key junctures drove the two regimes along
different trajectories.
In both cases, however, we find that the market-led and state-led expectations are not
entirely wrong, but are limited in their applicability to the entire sector. We argue that both
governments engaged in deregulation as well as re-regulation in particular segments of the
sector, in a strategic attempt to facilitate broadband networks. Japan did so in the context of a
regime shift, while Korea did so within its existing policy regime.
Institutional Origins and Political Dynamics: Privatization and Liberalization
The telecom sectors of both Japan and Korea began under the auspices of direct
government ownership and operation. The next step for both countries was to set up a monopoly
9
corporation as the state-owned carrier – NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone) for Japan and
KTA (Korea Telecommunication Authority) for Korea – a typical step for many industrialized
countries other than the US.16 Then, a combination of international, domestic, and technological
developments sparked Japan and Korea’s political process of privatizing their monopoly carriers
and liberalizing the sector. International events included the privatization and breakup of AT&T
in the US and the wave of liberalization and privatization across the world in the 1980s.
Domestic developments included the completion of their respective national telephony
infrastructures, and technological developments included value-added networks linking
computers via telecom infrastructure.
The political dynamics of privatization and liberalization differed between the two
countries. Japan’s privatization of NTT, coinciding with liberalization measures, was a
politically messy affair involving a reconfiguration of power between institutional actors. In
contrast, Korea’s privatization was a relatively smooth process, followed by a politically driven
initiative to strengthen the lead bureaucracy. These differences were driven by the initial
institutional configurations of the telecom sectors in the two countries, and the ensuing political
dynamics that developed.
Japan: the Political Battle Creating MPT as a “Policy Bureaucracy”
In Japan, the political battle over privatizing NTT and beginning to liberalize the sector
was complex and contentious, involving a dramatic power grab by the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications (MPT).
16 For most countries, the massive, coordinated infrastructure investment requirement made direct state ownership
attractive, and the economies of scale in the business made a monopoly structure the logical choice.
10
In 1889, the Japanese government established the Ministry of Communications (MoC) as
the owner and operator of Japan’s telecommunications networks. Due to its involvement in
propaganda during the war, the MoC was disbanded by the Allied Occupation government. In
1952, after political wrangling over the form it would take, the telecom functions of MoC were
transferred to NTT, newly established as a public corporation. NTT then proceeded to become
the dominant actor in telecom sector until the 1980s.17 For example, though formally under the
jurisdiction of MPT, NTT was able to essentially regulate itself for a number of reasons. First,
MPT, which had been created from the Ministry of Postal Affairs, lacked expertise to effectively
regulate NTT. Since NTT had been the prewar Ministry of Communications, MPT often lacked
the staff with proper expertise in communications technology, leading to a situation in which
NTT personnel sent to MPT were in charge of approving NTT’s requests.18 NTT also received
budget allocations from the Diet, and MPT did not have the array of policy tools related to
funding allocations enjoyed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) or Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI). NTT also used its substantial R&D budget to keep a set of equipment
suppliers, the “NTT family,” including firms such as NEC, Fujitsu, and Oki, to supply equipment
tailored to its specifications.19
The battle over NTT’s privatization was fought among actors including the Second
Administrative Reform Commission (Rincho), MPT, NTT, the Ministry of Finance, NTT
“family” firms, retired NTT executives, NTT’s union (Zendentsu), and several key LDP (Liberal
Democratic Party) politicians. This battle was closely intertwined with a bureaucratic turf war
between MITI and MPT over jurisdiction of the rapidly expanding telecom sector. This turf war
17 For details on the early political and market dynamics of Japan’s telecom sector, see Vogel (1996), esp. pp 137-
145, Johnson (1989), Anchordoguy (2001), and Fransman (1995).
18 Johnson (1989), p.190
19 For details on the dynamics between NTT “family” firms and NTT, see Anchordoguy (2001), Fransman (1995).
11
involved many of the same political actors, with MPT leaning heavily on policy specialist
politicians from the ruling LDP party (known as zoku politicians), with MITI attempting to bring
the US into the policy debate on its side through American trade policy interests. Details of the
battle have been documented elsewhere, but in short, the outcome was a dramatic gain in
regulatory authority and policymaking power by MPT.20
MPT succeeded in rising from a “regulatory” bureaucracy with largely nominal power, to
a full-fledged “policy” bureaucracy capable of MITI-style industrial policy. In a regulatory
regime labeled by Vogel as “controlled competition,” MPT compartmentalized the sector,
orchestrated competitors, and used extensive licensing authority over matters such as pricing to
micromanage competition.
Put simply, the outcomes of privatization and initial liberalization were somewhat of a
reversal in MPT and NTT’s power relations. NTT had escaped the fate of AT&T, which had
been completely broken apart, but much of the regulatory oversight was transferred from the
Diet to MPT. This outcome set up the political dynamics that drove Japan’s telecom
policymaking thereafter. MPT, as the lead bureaucracy, attempted to exert its will over NTT
through different sets of policies, and unambiguously calling for a complete breakup of NTT
when the issue arose in 1990, and again in 1996. NTT resisted, at times mustering political
support within the LDP to compromise with MPT and soften its proposed measures.21
20 For detailed accounts of the political battles, see Vogel (1994), Johnson (1989), Takano (1992), and for a longer
overview, see Kushida (2005).
21 For details on such policy battles, see Kawabata (2004), esp pp. 32-34.
12
Chart 1: The Evolution of Japan’s Lead Bureaucracy and Incumbent
Prewar Postwar - 1985 1985 - Present (2006)
Ministry of
Communications (MOC)
􀃆 NTT Public corp 􀃆 NTT (NTT Holding Company after 1999)
Ministry of Postal Affairs 􀃆 MPT (administrative
bureaucracy)
􀃆 MPT (policy bureaucracy)
Korea: Hierarchy and The Creation of a Strong Lead Bureaucracy
In Korea, the Ministry of Communications (MOC) was the bureaucracy that directly
operated telecom services from 1948 until 1981. In 1981, as in Japan, telecom services were
spun out into a state-owned monopoly carrier, KTA. However, unlike the case of Japan, KTA
did not have the type of policymaking clout or supplier relations that NTT had enjoyed. MOC
had real power and oversight over KTA, which facilitated a smooth privatization process.
The government decided to privatize KTA in July 1987 with little political resistence, and
spent a decade slowly divesting itself from the company while it introduced competition into the
sector. Along the way, key political actors supported increasing privatization and liberalization,
including Presidents Roh Taewoo (1987-1993) and Kim Young-Sam (1993-1998), the Economic
Planning Board (EPB), the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MoFE), and the industrial
conglomerates, chaebol, made the process relatively free of conflict. The main political bargain
during the privatization process was between the government and KTA’s labor union, which
agreed to the privatization on the condition that KTA would not be sold to chaebol or foreign
interests, in order to assure stable employment.22 In 1997, the government abolished the KT law
that had governed KTA’s activities, and they renamed it Korea Telecom (KT). By 2000, they had
fully privatized the company.
22 For each actor’s preferences and strategies in privatizing KTA, see Bae and Chu (2003) and Sung et al. (2005).
13
Although the privatization process was relatively smooth, some conflict between
bureaucracies did occur over the issue of liberalization, regarding how to introduce competition
into the sector. Though not as extreme as the politicized turf war between Japan’s MPT and
MITI, there was some cleavage in the early 1980s between bureaucrats who preferred market-led
liberalization and those who envisioned state leadership in high-tech industries. The cleavage
developed into bureaucratic conflicts between the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy
(MoTIE), and Korea’s MoC, with further policy coordination difficulties caused by software
industrial policy being under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Science and Technology
(MST).23
In 1994, a politically driven focus on IT development by the Korean political leadership
strengthened the lead bureaucracy for telecom policymaking.24 In an administrative reform drive
to coordinate high-tech policy, the Kim Young-Sam administration expanded the power,
jurisdiction, and functions of MOC, creating the Ministry of Information and Communications
(MIC). MIC was given sole responsibility for the IT sector, absorbing the industrial policy
functions from MoTIE and MST. A series of politically driven policies – the “Framework Act on
Informatization Promotion” in 1995, and an “Information Promotion Fund” in 1996 –
strengthened MIC’s legal and financial tools to guide IT policy. Another difference between
Japan’s MPT and Korea’s MIC was that the Minister of MIC, appointed by the president, were
always distinguished experts in IT, facilitating decisive policymaking and strengthening the
legitimacy of MIC’s policies. The contrast with Japan is clear, since the Ministers of Japan’s
23 For details, see Hong (1998).
24 For details on the bureaucratic conflicts and establishment of MIC, see Hong (1998).
14
MPT tended to be politicians serving their rotation in Cabinet positions, with the real power
often residing in the top bureaucrats.25
Thus, the initial institutional arrangements differed between the two countries, which
shaped the actors responsible for driving political dynamics at key junctures. Despite these
differences in the politics of telecom policymaking, however, the policy regimes that each
country developed during the course of their liberalization converged to a remarkable degree.
Chart 2: The Evolution of Korea’s Lead Bureaucracy and Incumbent
􀃆 MOC (1981 - 1994) 􀃆 MIC (1994 - Present ) Ministry of Communications
(MOC)
(1948-1981)
􀃆
KTA (1981 - 1997)
􀃆
KT (1997 - Present)
The Regulatory Frameworks: “Managed Competition” Regimes
The regulatory regimes of Japan and Korea resembled each other quite closely in the first
phases of liberalization. We conceptualize regulatory regimes as the policies, regulations, and
institutions that shape the terms of market competition and private actors’ incentives and
constraints. Both had a strong lead bureaucracy that compartmentalized the sector, orchestrated
new competitors, and micromanaged the terms of competition. In short, the regulatory regimes of
both countries were geared towards “managing” competition.
25 The first minister of MIC in 1994 was Mr. Sang-Hyon Kyong. He received a B.A. from Seoul National
University, a B.S. from University of Rhode Island and a Ph.D. from Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
all in engineering. Between 1965 and 1975, he was on the technical staff at Argonne National Laboratory, Bell
Laboratories, and at Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) of Korea. Before serving
as the minister, he was a Vice President of Korea Telecom, the President of ETRI and National
Computerization Agency (NCA), and vice minister of MOC .
The most recent minister was Mr. Dae-Je Chin who earned a B.A./ M.A. at Seoul National University, another
M.A. at the University of Massachusetts, and a Ph. D at Stanford, all in electronic engineering. He began as an
engineer at Hewlett- Packard 's lab and IBM's Watson Research Center. Prior to being named to head the
Ministry, he served as the President and CEO of Samsung Electronics' Digital Media Network Business. In his
long career at Samsung, he served in a series of increasingly important positions in several Samsung business
units including: vice president of Memory Business; senior vice president of Semiconductor Business;
executive vice president of System LSI Business; president & CTO of Corporate R&D Center; and president
of Digital Media Network Business. In recognition of his many achievements in industry, he was named the
Techno CEO of 2002 by the Ministry of Science & Technology. He has 6 overseas patents and 15 domestic
patents.
15
In Japan, the Telecommunications Business Law governing the sector allowed MPT to
divide carriers into three types based on whether they owned or leased infrastructure, and to
exercise more control over carriers possessing infrastructure.26 MPT also used administrative
guidance to limit the scope of businesses to long distance, local, or international.27 MPT
exercised discretionary authority in allowing new competitors into the sector through a “Supply
Demand Adjustment” clause in the Telecommunications Business Law. The clause enabled them
to deny market entry to firms by citing excess supply or insufficient potential demand, without
offering specific criteria. Interconnection rates charged to competitors for accessing NTT’s
infrastructure were arbitrated by MPT behind closed door negotiations in contentious annual
negotiations between NTT and its competitors. MPT also managed prices set by carriers through
its licensing authority, carefully weighing the expected effect of price change proposals by
competitors and NTT on the competitive landscape before giving approval. Prices therefore
came down gradually, and in lock-step, with competitors lowing their prices incrementally,
followed closely by NTT.28
Korea’s regulatory regime from the late 1980s was extremely similar. It also had a
Telecommunications Business Law, and in 1990, the government compartmentalized the sector
by dividing services into “facilities-bases” and “value-added” services, and creating a number of
categories for service providers. 29 They also divided the sector along the lines of international,
26 “Type I” carriers owned infrastructure and consisted of NTT and the NCCs. “Type II” carriers leased facilities
from Type I carriers. “Special Type II” carriers could provide services across prefectures, while General Type II
carriers limited their operations to local areas.
27 Fuke (2000)
28 For details, see Kushida (2005), (2006), Fuke (2000), Vogel (1996).
29 The government re-categorized the service provides three times over the course of the 1990s. See Lee and Lie
(2000) for details on how the categories for service providers shifted from “General,” “Specific,” and “Value-added”
in 1990 to “Facility-based” and “Value-added, in 1994, and “Facility-based,” “Special” and “Value-added” in 1997.
16
long-distance, and domestic, progressively licensing competitors in each sector over time.30
Between 1990 and 1994, the government generally permitted only services that it had approved
(a “positive listing” system), and in issuing new licenses, until 1997 it only accepted applications
during a particular window of time allotted by the government (a “request for proposal”
system).31
In sum, let us note that the liberalization processes of both countries entailed increasing
the level of competition not simply by deregulation, but re-regulation – the creation of new rules
and institutions. Both governments used their policy tools to actively manage the dynamics of
market competition in their telecom sectors.
The Interaction Between Markets and Regulatory Regimes in Emerging Broadband
Markets
So far, we have seen how the political dynamics of privatization between the two
countries differed, though their regulatory regimes during the process of liberalization were quite
similar. Here we closely examine the interactions between politics, regulatory regimes, and
market dynamics during the advent of broadband markets. We examine Korea first, since it was
first in developing broadband markets, and we find that broadband developed within its existing
“managed competition” regulatory regime. We then examine the case of Japan, which reveals
that in contrast to Korea, it underwent a “regime shift,” and that broadband markets grew out of
this process. We argue that differences in politics driving telecom policymaking are likely to be
the root of the divergence in their regulatory regimes.
30 In 1990, the government licensed DACOM (Datacommunications company of Korea) to International service, and
in 1995 for long distance. In 1996, they licensed addition competition for international services, which Onsei took
advantage of, doing likewise for long distance in 1997. In 1996, the government licensed a competitor to domestic
telephony, Hanaro.
31 For details, see Lee and Lie (2000).
17
Broadband in Korea: From the Managed Competition Regime
The Korean government did not orchestrate broadband deployment from a master
blueprint to reshape its IT infrastructure. However, its policies strongly shaped the strategies
taken by service providers and the service providers themselves. The “facilities-based”
competition, in which different service providers competed with one another using separate sets
of infrastructure, was the government’s desire from the beginning.
In order to foster network infrastructure buildouts, MIC began using its newly acquired
resources and policy tools. In 1995, it began the Korea Information Korea Information
Infrastructure Initiative (KII; 1995-2005), which included in a variety of backbone building and
R&D facilitation programs.32 In order to directly foster facilities-based competition, MIC offered
financial support, granting preferential tax treatment and directly underwrote loans to service
providers building their networks.33
Broadband service began in Korea in 1998, when Thrunet introduced broadband services
over its cable infrastructure. After the government announced that it would issue a license to one
firm to lease out cable infrastructure, Thrunet was created in 1996 as a consortium of over one
hundred companies, under the auspices of Dacom (Datacommmunications company of Korea),
the long distance competitor to KT which had entered the market in 1995. The principal
shareholder turned out to be state-owned energy company KEPCO (Korea Electric Power
Company), and when Thrunet began its service, it used its own service and leased additional
32 KII consisted of three parts: “KII-Government” built a nationwide backbone for broadband, “KII-Testbed”
supported R&D to bring technologies to market, and “KII-Private” aimed to facilitate market competition in
such a way that it would bring broadband networks to large buildings and households through private sector
investment. See Lee and Chan-Olmsted (2004), pp. 658-659.
33 Other financial support went to R&D, technology demonstration projects, pilot programs and community
champions. For details, see Lee et al. (2004).
18
infrastructure from KEPCO. Incidentally, KEPCO had made a bold gamble to build its own fiber
optic infrastructure without explicit government permission.34 The broadband service became
quite popular among the Korean public, impatient with the slow connection speed of dial-up
services.
The entrance of a startup firm, Hanaro, into the broadband market is usually considered
the beginning of Korea’s broadband explosion. Hanaro was formed in 1997, after MIC’s
announcement in 1996 that it would license exactly one competitor into the local telephony
market. Dacom, KEPCO, and chaebol such as Samsung, LG, and Daewoo were initial investors,
and Shin Yun-Shik, former vice minister of MPT and top management of Dacom, was one of the
initial leaders. In an attempt to create a relatively even playing field, MIC created a new set of
regulations that prohibited KT from subsidizing its local service with profits derived from its
long distance or international operations.35
Upon entering the local telephony services market, however, Hanaro quickly found that
competing against KT was tantamount to taking on Goliath bare-handed. KT was able to offer
high quality services for competitive prices, and the lack of number portability caused Hanaro to
face network effects (consumers facing switching costs, keeping them in KT’s service). Driven
34 According to the following account by prominent government official, the story behind KEPCO’s ownership
of an extensive high-speed communications infrastructure serves as a check against the temptation to assign
too much foresight and omnipotence to the Korean government in its creation of the market environment from
which broadband developed. In around 1980, KEPCO installed fiber optic cables throughout its network,
gambling that once it had the infrastructure, the government would have no choice but to allow KEPCO to use
it more productively. This was interesting, given that KEPCO was fully government-owned and under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI). In the meantime, KT had its own incentive to
create fiber optic networks, and the government supported their build-out, partly through financial incentives.
A dispute ensued when both KEPCO and KT applied for a license to lease fiber to telecom carriers. From a
capacity standpoint, according to the government official, KT’s infrastructure was sufficient, and KEPCO’s
was redundant. However, both KT and KEPCO were fully government owned at the time, and although MOC
was pitted against MCI, they could not engage in a public battle, since public disclosure would have revealed
that MCI had allowed KEPCO to take matters into its own hands with taxpayers’ money.
35 Although the revenue often flows the opposite direction, with local service subsidizing long distance when
incumbents face competition in long distance services, a former top government official asserts that the
government wanted to ensure that flow of revenue within KT would be segmented in each market. Interview
with former top MIC official (November 4, 2005).
19
to desperation, Hanaro noted that its customer surveys revealed that KT’s data service
subscribers (including Internet services based on dial-up and ISDN – Integrated Services Digital
Network) lodged many complaints, mainly that access was slow and access fees were charged by
the minute. DSL technology, which utilized existing copper infrastructure, delivered higher
speed, and could be offered at flat rate fees, provided an opportunity Hanaro could not pass up.
The regulatory framework supported Hanaro’s strategy to begin offering DSL, since
Internet service provision was in a relatively unregulated segment of the market, requiring
neither permission nor licensing.36 Furthermore, in 1997 the government had switched from a
“positive list” system, allowing only government-specified activities by service providers, to a
“negative list” system, in which service providers could provide any service except governmentprohibited
ones.
Thus, in April 1999 Hanaro began offering broadband services utilizing both DSL and
cable, using its own DSL network, and leasing cable capacity from a subsidiary of KEPCO
(called Powercomm) and KT.37 With its entry into broadband service, Hanaro sparked intense
competition and created a price shock by providing the broadband service as a free addition to its
basic telephone subscription which amounted to $40 with free installation. This price shock
aided Hanaro in successfully gaining more than a million subscribers within 18 months of
introducing its DSL service.
36 It was classified as a value-added service, for Facilities-based Service Providers (FSPs).
37 In cable service, the Korean government required structural separation of conduit and content, the two stateowned
cable infrastructure owners of Powercomm and KT were not permitted to offer services, but instead
leased capacity to programmers. Therefore, new entrants to the broadband market, such as Thrunet in 1998 and
Hanaro in 1999, initially leased cable capacity to reach their earliest customers. This structural separation rules
in cable were relaxed in 2000 when KT sold its cable infrastructure to cable service providers.
20
Hanaro’s jaw-dropping DSL success profoundly influenced the strategy of KT, the
dominant incumbent carrier.38 Unlike NTT, KT had only begun investing in ISDN. It quickly
scrapped plans for further investments in ISDN and put its weight behind DSL, since users
clearly preferred its higher speed, flat-rate low subscription price, and always-on Internet
access.39 Fearing that it would be permanently left behind if it did not commence broadband
service, KT started ADSL service in June 1999. Competition further heated up when other firms,
including SK Telecom in 1999 and Onse Telecom in 2000, also entered the market.
Once it entered the market, however, KT’s status as the incumbent with nationwide
telephony infrastructure allowed it to quickly offer DSL service throughout the nation (Hanaro
was limited in its geographic reach). KT’s competitive pricing and rising demand for broadband
enabled it to quickly catch up and surpass Hanaro’s market share by June 2000, retaining a
dominant market share since. Tables 4 and 5 shows its dramatic gain in market share – from 5
percent in 1999 to 44 percent in 2000. With DSL being in a relatively unregulated market
segment, KT did not face policies designed to aid competitors at its expense. The smaller service
providers never had a chance.
Table 5: Total Subscribers of Broadband Carriers
Year 1999 2000 2001
Thrunet 142,168 760,999 1,317,624
Hanaro 84,249 1,056,724 2,070,552
KT 12,903 1,730,977 3,874,442
Others 13,662 394,300 580,382
Total 252,982 3,943,000 7,843,000
Adapted from Lee (2003)
38 We refer KTA as KT (Korea Telecom), because KTA was renamed as KT in December 2001.
39 As a clear indication of consumer preference, in 1999, there were about 175 thousand ISDN subscribers, with 97
thousand DSL subscribers in Korea. However, in 2000, the number of ISDN subscribers had shrunk to 100 thousand,
while DSL grew to over two million. (OECD 2005)
21
Table 6: Market Shares of Broadband Carriers (%)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Thrunet 56 19 17 13 12 10
Hanaro 33 27 26 28 25 23
KT 5 44 49 47 50 55
Others 5 10 7 13 14 11
Source: Lee (2003) and MIC (2005)
Industrial Policy with a Twist
Notable about Korea’s industrial policies towards broadband, within its strategic
liberalization drive, is its attempt to not only enhance supply-side investment in networks, but to
promote demand for their use as well. In its classical developmental strategy, Korea is usually
considered to have been producer rather than consumer-oriented, channeling peoples’ income
into relatively centralized banking systems by keeping individual access to other avenues of
investment such as securities or offshore markets relatively difficult, and then channeling those
savings into strategic sectors. The KII strategies fall in the line of this classical industrial policy.
However, in promoting broadband and the Internet, the Korean government enacted a
series of demand magnification programs. Several programs were designed to facilitate Internet
education, computer use in schools, homes, to offer computer purchase assistance, and even to
educate housewives, who tend to control household finances.40 Perhaps the most clever demand
magnification policy to was to deeply embed computer literacy in Korea’s ultra-competitive
40 Programs include the “Ten Million People Internet Education Project (2000-2002)” to provide Internet education
to approximately a fourth of citizens and “One Million Housewife Digital Literacy Education Project.” In terms of
Internet access to schools, the government offered discounts for the provision of Internet access in primary and
secondary schools under a special agreement with KT, leading to 100% penetration of schools with broadband by
the end of 2000, though of course how it is used is another matter. (Choudrie and Lee (2004), p. 107.) In terms of
PC diffusion promotion, from October 1999, the “PC for everyone” program aimed to provide PCs at low-prices,
partly through a PC purchase installment saving system using the postal savings system. The Korean government
also provided subsidies for purchase of PC by low-income citizens. In 2000, the government itself purchased 50,000
PCs as a four-year lease, providing it to low-income families with full support for broadband fee for five years. MIC
(2001). With respect to housewives, government subsidies were granted to around 1,000 private training institutes
over the nation for the purpose of education housewives, in order to create demand in households. MIC (2001).
22
university entrance exams, making a home PC a prerequisite for any serious education-minded
parent, of which there is no shortage as evidenced by the extensive cram school industry.
Broadband access became part of the package of computer literacy, driving sales for households
with school-age children.41 While the effectiveness of these programs and policies in promoting
broadband cannot be determined decisively, it is noteworthy that the government adopted a range
of demand magnification industrial policies in addition to the usual supply-side facilitation
measures.
Re-Regulation: Managed Competition, Continued
If there was any doubt whether market developments in Korea’s broadband services were
an indication of government retreat, re-regulation by MIC in 2004 is strong evidence that the
government sees its role primarily as facilitating competition, keeping the existing regulatory
framework intact.
After the initial burst of growth, and after KT entered the broadband market, competing
broadband providers began to run into financial difficulties. In 2002, Thrunet declared
bankruptcy, and Hanaro found it increasingly difficult to sustain profitability.42 Seeing this
situation and deeming KT’s dominance as a barrier to competition, in 2004 MIC stepped in to
strengthen regulations in the broadband market. By shifting the categorization of broadband
service providers from a less regulated segment (“value-added”) to a more regulated segment
41 Aizu (2002) provides a nice overview of how computer literacy as an investment in education plugged into the
“education fever” caused by the rigorous entrance examination system. As the highly developed markets for cram
schools indicates, family culture focusing on facilitating the success of children in school. Specifically, to go beyond
Aizu’s analysis, the computer literacy certification could be converted to additional points which counted towards
university entrance exam scores.
42 In early 2005, Hanaro absorbed Thrunet, but still had difficulty competing with KT, even contemplating receiving
foreign funds to stay afloat (Fransman 2006:32)
23
(“facility-based”), the government designated KT as the dominant service provider in broadband,
making it subject to stricter regulations in terms of service and pricing.
Broadband in Japan: An Outgrowth of the Regime Shift
The Policy Drivers
In stark contrast to Korea’s development of broadband, which occurred within the
“managed competition” regulatory regime, Japan’s broadband markets grew out of a transition in
its regulatory regime away from “managed competition.” The regime shift was driven by
political dynamics in which MPT (reorganized in 1999 and renamed Ministry of Internal Affairs
and Communications – MIC) continually battled NTT, and Japan’s strengthened Cabinet Office
entered telecom policymaking in a strategic push to develop IT. The shift entailed the
government giving up many of the policy tools to manage competition, but adding new
institutions and regulations in a transition from ex ante regulation through licenses and approval,
towards an ex post mode of regulation relying on a dispute resolution commission and other
institutions.
Japan’s regulatory regime began a gradual transformation in the late 1990s.43 In 1996, the
battle between MPT and NTT over the divestiture of NTT – whether to break it up partially,
completely, or not at all – ongoing since the early 1980s, was finally settled. Political
compromises between a broad range of interested parties had been forged in 1983 and 1990, and
resolved in 1996. To give a flavor of the complexity of negotiations in these political
compromises, let it suffice to say that actors with often disagreeing interests included the MPT,
NTT, the LDP, the Prime Minister (Hashimoto), the NTT labor union, the Social Democratic
43 For gradual transformative institutional change and slow-moving causes and outcomes of change, see Streeck and
Thelen (2006), Pierson (2003).
24
Party, the Fair Trade Commission, the Ministry of Finance, Keidanren, MITI, NTT’s competitor
carriers, and numerous policy research and deliberation councils.44
The outcome in 1996 was a surprise agreement between MPT and NTT, which allowed
NTT to remain a single corporate entity united under a holding company. The tortured nature of
this political compromise may be inferred by the fact that it required the lifting of the post-war
ban on holding companies, one of the key tenets of the Allied Occupation in breaking up the
prewar zaibatsu. Members of the Telecommunications Deliberation Council learned of this
compromise in the newspapers after they thought they had secured an agreement to completely
break up NTT.45
With the battle over NTT divestiture settled, MPT began to take measures to further
liberalize the telecom market, through both deregulation and reregulation. In 1997, Japan signed
the WTO Telecom Agreement, which removed many of the restrictions on inward FDI,
especially regarding foreign ownership of infrastructure. 46 These new rules took effect in 1998,
and in the same year MPT relaxed many of its licensing requirements.47 MPT’s deregulation
measures were accomplished by altering the Telecommunications Business Law, a task made
easier by broad political support in the form of the “Three Year Action Plan for Deregulation”
spearheaded by the Cabinet Office in 1994.48
Interconnection to NTT’s infrastructure, a necessity for most competitors, since NTT
controlled the last-one-mile of infrastructure, had been a contentious political issue from the
44 See Bolin (1997), Vogel (2000) for an excellent overviews.
45 Interview, Toshihiko Hayashi, Professor at the University of the Air, former member of the Telecommunications
Deliberation Council. (5/2001) Nakamura Ichiya, former MPT official, contends that the sudden compromise was
the result of MPT shifting its focus from battling NTT to battling NHK, the national broadcaster under its
jurisdiction. (5/2001)
46 For details, see Kushida (2006)
47 For Type I carriers, most price changes and market entry only required notification, whereas they had required
approval prior to this. See Fuke (2000) for details.
48 For details, see Suda (2005).
25
introduction of competition in 1985. MPT’s basic stance was to force NTT to lower its
interconnection rates, and the US periodically got involved in trade initiatives to pressure the
Japanese government to force NTT to lower its interconnection rates. In 1998, MPT established
clear rules for interconnection based on a specific formula.49 In 2000, this formula was revised to
further favor competitors.
Market Interactions in Early DSL Markets
The interaction between new market entrants attempting to offer DSL, several
government actors, and a political drive to catch-up in IT not only to the West, but also to Korea,
drove the next phase of the regime shift. In this phase, the liberalization was strategic, in that the
government, while reacting to market developments, was clearly pushing for infrastructure and
service development towards broadband diffusion.
In 1999, startup firm Tokyo Metallic, followed by others such as Fusion Communications,
began offering DSL service. However, in order to do so, they required access to NTT’s switching
facilities to place their equipment within – a process known as collocation.50 Unlike Korea’s
Hanaro, these startup firms did not own their infrastructure, since they had not entered local
telephony markets. Unfortunately for these startup companies, the interconnection rules
established in 1998 did not cover collocation, and were essentially operating in unregulated
territory. Therefore, predictably, they were at the mercy of NTT, which delayed access and
49 Kushida (2006), Fuke (2000) pp 43-45, Vogel (2000). The formula was know as LRIC (Long Run Incremental
Cost), though the US immediately began arguing that Japan’s LRIC calculations were flawed.
50 DSL sends high frequency signals over conventional copper lines, requiring equipment on both the user’s side (the
box at home), and inside the carrier’s facilities (NTT switching stations).
26
charged high fees. NTT was interested in continuing its per-minute charge-based ISDN service,
and wanted to move directly into a proprietary fiber optic service.51
A series of government actions rapidly improved the competitive landscape for DSL
providers. First, in July 2000, noting that Japan lagged behind many other industrialized nations,
including Korea, in international IT statistics such as Internet penetration, usage, and broadband
diffusion, the political leadership initiated a policy drive to catch-up in IT. The Cabinet Office,
newly strengthened in its policymaking capacity, established an “IT Strategy Headquarters,”
within the Cabinet Office.52 It produced the “e-Japan strategy,” explicitly recognizing Japan’s
late start in IT, and stipulating a specific timeline to create a market environment providing low
cost, fast Internet access.53 Later that year, the Cabinet Office passed the “Basic IT Law,” which
allowed MIC (successor to MPT) a broad framework within which specifics could be determined
via Ministerial Ordinances.54
Second, in October 2000 the FTC made a rare foray into telecom policymaking by
issuing an unprecedented warning to NTT over its treatment of DSL providers, such as Tokyo
Metallic and eAccess. At the same time, MIC revised several of its Ministerial Ordinances,
forcing NTT to clarify the terms it offered collocation, and its methodology for calculating fees.
51 NTT had invested a total of approximately 9 billion dollars in its ISDN infrastructure (Cole 2006, citing Nezu
2002). Van der Staal, Grassmuck, and Hatta (1995) cite that in 1992, NTT invested 52 billion yen, and 30 billion
yen in 1993 as it began to slow down its investments.
52 See Pempel (2006) for details on how the Cabinet Office was strengthened, including increased personnel and
expanded policymaking capabilities.
53 See full text at the website of the IT Strategic Headquarters. Cabinet Office. IT Strategic Headquarters. [accessed
5/23/2006]
strategy conforms to the key characteristics of traditional “industrial policy” with a catch-up objective, explicit goal,
and timeline to achieve specific outcomes.
54 Ministerial Ordinances are legally binding, but can be decided by the ministry in charge working by iself, with no
need to coordinate with other ministries, such as the Ministry of Justice to ensure coherence in Japan’s civil law.
In the government reorganization in 2000, MPT merged with the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Management
and Coordination Agency and was given the unwieldy English title of “the Ministry of Public Management, Home
Affairs, and Posts and Telecommunications” (MPHPT, Soumusho in Japanese). It made the sensible move to
simplify its English name to the “Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) in 2004. In this paper, for
simplicity, we refer to the successor of MPT as MIC.
27
It also forced NTT to lease out its unused fiber optic infrastructure (known as dark fiber) at low
prices, as well as access to its local “last-mile” infrastructure (known as “unbundling the local
loop”).55
In 2001, MIC established a Dispute Resolution Commission (DRC), located within the
ministry, but presented as an objective third party dispute mediator that revealed all its
deliberations proceeding to the public – a shift from the negotiated settlements behind closed
doors of the past. Among the early cases that the DRC dealt with were DSL providers
complaining that NTT was slow to act on collocation, in which the DRC ruled against NTT.56
In 2003, MIC continued its deregulation by abolishing most of the classification,
registration, and notification requirements for carriers, going so far as to remove the
classification of carriers, and officially announcing that it did not limit the scope of carriers’
activities.57 MIC in essence announced that it would no longer compartmentalize the sector, and
gave up many of its policy tools to manage competition.
Thus, by 2001, the competitive landscape facing Japanese DSL providers was
considerably different from that in 1999, when the first firms began offering services. A whole
set of regulations, backed by a political drive, seemed to back their business. Son Masayoshi,
ethnically Korean and born in Japan, who founded Softbank in the 1980s, to become a star child
of Japan’s dot-com era in the late 1990s, took advantage of this new regulatory and market
environment to its fullest extent.58
55 See Kushida (2006), Fuke (2003)
56 See website of the DRC at
Japanese.
57 Fuke (2000)
58 For details on Softbank’s activities, see Vogel (2006) pp. 189-193. For a brief overview of Son Masayoshi, see
Nathan (2004), esp. pp 99-119.
28
Softbank was an early investor in Yahoo!, and in September 2001, Softbank entered the
DSL market through its subsidiary, Yahoo!BB. It created a price shock by setting its monthly
subscription price at about half of the going market rate (2400 yen, approximately 22 dollars at 1
USD = 110 JPY), and engaged in an aggressive marketing campaign, including giving out $100
DSL modems for free at train stations. Softbank’s price was the lowest in the world, forcing
other DSL providers, including NTT regional companies, to lower their prices, and sparking a
rapid increase in DSL adoption by Japanese.59 Son then delivered a second price shock by
bundling free IP telephony subscriptions with its DSL service, allowing Softbank subscribers to
call each other without charge, setting flat rates for long distance calls to non-subscribers, and
setting international calls at a fraction of the prevailing market rate.60 Softbank was able to set
this type of pricing because it leased dark fiber from NTT to create its own IP-switched
backbone.
The sudden public interest in IP telephony was supported surprisingly quickly by MIC.
Without political protest that one might have expected from NTT, which had the most to lose if
its circuit-switched telephony infrastructure were bypassed completely, MIC assigned a
dedicated array of numbers to IP telephones (a 050 prefix). It later went on to allow IP
telephones to obtain telephone numbers within the existing numbering scheme if they met
quality standards.61
59 MIC officials, among others, were taken by surprise at Son’s aggressive pricing, and many voiced concern that
Son was waging a dangerous price war, which would make the operation of infrastructure unprofitable to the point
of threatening future investment into next generation networks. It is not clear that Son would have been allowed to
wage this type of dramatic price war had the government retained its policy tools of “controlled competition.”
60 Flat-rate telephony was virtually unheard of in Japan at the time, since NTT’s infrastructure dominated the lastone-
mile, and its interconnection fee structure did not allow competitors utilize conventional telephone networks to
offer flat-rate services. Son set IP telephony calls to the US at below cost prices, at 8 yen a minute (6-7 cents),
compared to the 200-300 yen for 3 minutes charged by competitors.
61 IP denwa demo bangou ga kawaranai riyuu: mittsu no kufuu de soumushou no jouken wo kuria. 2003. Nikkei
Communications Nov 24: 66-68. Some MIC and former MPT officials have expressed the view that MIC was quick
29
Softbank’s market strategy in DSL profoundly affected Japan’s FTTH (Fiber-to-the-
Home) service market. Encouraged by industrial policy measures by the government such as
subsidies, and loans from the Development Bank of Japan, and with extensive investment by
NTT, Japan had been developing fiber optic infrastructure since the early 1990s. Just as DSL
markets were taking off, fiber had reached the last-one-mile of most urban areas in Japan. 62
NTT had been planning to offer a proprietary service based on an alternative underlying
technology than the Internet, expecting to combine video, telephony, and data in one line. They
also expected to charge high fees for this service.63 As Takanori Ida points out, the failure of
Japan’s government to completely break up NTT gave it the financial strength to engage in an
extensive nation-wide FTTH buildout.64 However, NTT was preempted by Usen (pronounced
Yu-sen), a landline music broadcasting company that owned its own telephone pole and fiber
infrastructure in urban areas. In March 2001, Usen began offering household FTTH services at
the speed of close to 100 mbp/s (versus 2 to 15 or so for DSL) for approximately 6000 yen, only
slightly more than double the price of Softbank’s DSL.65 Other competitors began to enter the
FTTH market at a similar price range, dashing NTT’s hopes of offering a much more expensive,
proprietary service. FTTH providers also began offering IP telephony, contributing to a rapid rise
in household IP telephony subscribers.66 The advent of low-priced FTTH services is best
to adopt IP telephony because it was still under the public radar, and that NTT was not in a position to launch a
major public protest, since nobody foresaw the rapidity with which IP telephony spread.
62 According to MIC document, by the end of 2001, FTTH networks covered 95% of metropolitan areas (MIC 2003).
63 For details, see Kushida (2006)
64 Ida points out that NTT DoCoMo financial success in the booming cellular markets provided NTT regional
carriers, NTT East and NTT West with de fact subsidies (Ida 2006).
65 For a wealth of information on details and the variety of FTTH networks to households, apartment buildings, and
offices, see MIC (2005).
66 Government numbers show two hundred thousand subscribers by mid-2004. This is not a large number, but given
that a US investment bank estimated that 6 million users, or 12 percent of households used VoIP at the end of 2003,
and that it is safe to assume that a large proportion of the 12 million DSL subscribers have DSL modems capable of
IP telephony, the potential number of users is large. Moreover, Nikkei Communications estimates that by the end of
2003, over 3 million users out of 4 million plus users had IP-phone enabled DSL modems. "Setogiwa Ni Tatsu Ip
Denwa Sougo Setsuzoku," Nikkei Communications, February 9 2004.
30
characterized as having its roots in NTT’s traditional pattern of investment, coupled with
industrial policy from the “controlled competition” regime of the late 1980s to 1990s, but whose
market dynamics were strongly shaped by the DSL service market.67
Citing difficulties in competing in the telephony and broadband markets, NTT announced
in early 2006 its intent to restructure itself under the existing holding company structure. Its
attempt is to engage in reform without revising the NTT Law, which would clearly become a
protracted political battle.
Conclusion
Understanding the Roles of the Politics, Governments, and Markets
Let us now sum up our findings, addressing our initial question of how exactly the
governments, markets, and politics interacted in the two countries as their broadband markets
developed rapidly. First, at a market level, we see that in both countries, new entrants offered
broadband services, delivering a price shock to the Internet access market – especially Hanaro
for Korea, and Softbank for Japan. The wild success of the newcomers forced the incumbents,
KT and NTT, to realign their strategies towards deploying DSL. The specifics of the market
dynamics were not micromanaged by either government. So far, we agree with market-led
expectations.
Second, our close study of the policies shows that, in both countries, the governments’
approach towards liberalization, an increase in the level of competition, was a conscious strategy
of both deregulation, a relaxing of rules, as well as reregulation, a strengthening of rules. Here
we disagree with simple market-led explanations of government-market interactions. Both
countries set up “managed competition” regimes with similar policy tools to orchestrate
67 See Kushida (2006) for an extended version of this argument.
31
competition into the sector, actively using those tools to incrementally increase and adjust levels
of competition.
The Korean government, in allowing Hanaro to enter the local telephony market, did not
“open” the market per se, but used the existing regulatory framework in introducing a competitor
to KT. When they deemed the level of competition insufficient in the broadband market, they
shifted the Internet service provider subsector into a more regulated compartment of the sector in
order to exercise stronger authority over KT.
In Japan, the regime shift entailed a significant amount of deregulation as the government
removed much of the policy framework of “managed competition.” However, it also entailed
significant reregulation, creating a new set of institutions such as the Dispute Resolution
Commission to better engage in ex post regulation, and promulgating new policies to facilitate
local loop unbundling and collocation. The government was also extremely quick to create
regulations in support of services such as IP telephony which had the potential to significantly
alter the terms of competition.68
Thus, we differ from the strongest of state-led expectations by being careful not to
exaggerate the effect of state policies, but showing how they interacted with market
developments, which were often startling to government officials in the speed with which they
developed. However, the broad goals that each of the governments held – to facilitate the
deployment and diffusion of high-speed Internet access – was firmly entrenched in their policy
orientations, and both governments actively promoted broadband penetration as the market
68 One might debate whether IP telephony can be considered a “disruptive technology” a la Christensen (2000).
However, as Weber (2005) points out, Christensen’s definition of disruptive technology is problematic because the
capacity of incumbent businesses to adapt their business models to the new technology is the critical variable in
determining whether a technology is disruptive or not. Therefore, if incumbents successfully adapt to the new
technology, it is not a “disruptive technology.” The definition lies in the business model rather than the technology.
32
developments unfolded. This leads us to conclude that both governments are best characterized
as being engaged in strategic liberalization.
We also discovered a significant divergence in the two countries’ regulatory regimes, a
fact not obvious by reading existing single-country analyses of their respective ICT sectors or
broadband development. While Korea used its existing policy framework to facilitate strategic
liberalization, Japan underwent a regime shift that altered institutions and policy tools.
We found an explanation to this divergence in the politics driving each of the regulatory
regimes. Beginning with different institutional configurations at the point of origin for the
telecom sector, different political bargains at major junctures led to distinct sets of political
dynamics, causing different outcomes in subsequent junctures. Korea’s lead bureaucracy was
able to establish a strong hierarchical relationship with the incumbent early on, assisted by a
relatively weak incumbent, and later further strengthened by a politically driven focus on
empowering the ministry. Japan’s telecom politics involved a more complex struggle over power
relations between the regulator and a more powerful incumbent, other government bureaucracies
and actors, and a long chain of negotiated settlements.
As a building block for future scholarship, this comparative study also raises further
questions. If we were to consider the telecom policies of Japan and Korea as comparatively
“successful” in facilitating rapid development of the sector, what differentiates the ICT sector
from other sectors whose policy and market outcomes cannot be considered as a success (such as
macroeconomic policy in Japan)? To adequately address this question, we would need a sharper
focus on differences in policy regimes, markets and politics, across sectors as well as policy
33
functions.69 In other words, we would need to situate the sectors within the broader political
economic context, and analyze the performance attributes required to facilitate the type of rapid
broadband growth the two countries experienced. That being said, this study does point to factors
such as the political impetus strengthening lead bureaucracies, and their intent to facilitate
competition as a means rather than an end, the availability of technology favoring business
models of new entrants, and an upsurge of entrepreneurs as the economies strove to adjust to
new terms of international competition.70
Second, one might ask how the broadband services subsector fits within the broader
context of the ICT sector as a whole. Again, this is material for further research. We might
suggest that the policy tools across landline and wireless networks differ, and that differences in
the strengths of market players (NTT “family” firms in Japan versus the chaebol in Korea)
relatively to governmental actors may create a somewhat different set of political and market
dynamics. Governments may have stronger policy tools on the one hand, but especially in the
case of Korea, the chaebol would be much more powerful market players than KT. Deriving a
fuller picture of the political dynamics in telecom policymaking for each country would require
comparing our findings from this paper to those of the wireless subsector as well.
Implications: A New Playground for Experimentation
Let us conclude by noting that the development of high-speed network broadband
environments in Japan and Korea has important implications for innovation and value-creation in
the two countries, as well as international competition in ICT. The process of lead users putting
69 Vogel and Zysman (2002) point out that different national governance structures are particularly suitable for not
only particular sectors, but particular functions as well. Kitchelt (1991) notes the importance of taking this type of
analysis to the sectoral level as well.
70 For the change in terms of competition embedded in the digital production paradigm, and national asjustments,
see various chapters in Zysman and Newman ed., (2006).
34
technologies to new uses was an essential component of the IT revolution which originated in the
US.71 The US, which was a playground for experimentation and innovation in the initial phase of
the Internet revolution, has fallen behind many other countries in terms of network speed and
penetration.72 In the next round of competition, Japan and Korea’s new high-speed, broadband
environments promise to offer new “playgrounds” for experimentation and innovation.
71 Cohen et al. (2000)
72 Firms such as Microsoft, Cisco, Yahoo, Amazon, Google, and eBay faced the most advanced and sophisticated
domestic market in terms of PC penetration, Internet usage, etc.
35
Appendix: Expectations for Market-led and State-led perspective of development applied
to broadband.
First, in what we dub a market-led explanation, we would expect that some combination
of new technology, new entrants, new corporate strategies, and the governments’ retreat from
market-distorting regulations produced a “market-friendly” environment from which broadband
services developed rapidly. One might expect a spectrum of positions with respect to the actual
relationship between governments and markets, even within the market-led perspective. At one
end, one could follow the OECD in arguing that Korea successfully deregulated its telecom
sector, and Japan created a better regulatory environment for market competition.73 At the other
extreme, one could invoke the arguments about globalization undermining government capacity
to manage markets altogether – that factors such as increased trade, financial flows, and a
dominance of neo-liberal ideology interconnected in new ways via information technology
resulted in inevitable pressures on national modes of regulation, if not the conception the nationstate
itself in a “flat” world. 74 One might envision how Korea’s financial crisis and Japan’s
prolonged stagnation robbed them of rationale and legitimacy for continued intervention in
various markets, or that the crisis and stagnation were the culminations of paralyzed states.75 In
this scenario, we would expect a new set of dynamic market forces as a result of the
73 OECD 1999 (Korea), OECD 2000 (Japan).
74 Friedman (2005) contends that the competitive landscape across the world has been “flattened,” or set on an even
playing ground. Other notable works include; Strange (1996) who argues that states have ceded much of their
domain to non-state actors; Milner and Keohane (1996) bring into question whether Japanese and Korean-style
government-led altering of comparative advantage (at least, in the short term) can persist in the face of capital
mobility; Cerny (1995) argues that the states’ ability to provide public goods, such as infrastructure, in addition to
other factors including national identity, will be challenged, though he does mention in passing that policymakers
will attempt to reinvent the state; Ohmae (1995) argues that the state is no longer the dominant actor nor business
unit in the world; and Castells (1996) provides a vision of networks rather than states as the locus of dominant
functions and processes.
75. For example, for Korea, Weiss (1998) argues that by the crisis, Korea had lost much of its state capacity, and
Woo-Cumings (1999b) argues that the Korean developmental strategy led it to a bind in that it was wedded to large
business, but politically paralyzed to enact bureaucrat-led reform. For example, for Japan, Katz (1998) argues that
Japan’s state, which had been development, became consumed by clientilistic interests over time, Castells (1998)
argues that the very success of the Japanese developmental project led to forces thrusting it into crisis, and Van
Wolfren (1990) finds no real center to the Japanese state.
36
governments’ retreat from active attempts to manage their telecom sectors. It would be these new
sets of market dynamics conducive to new entrants and price-based competition that yielded low
service prices, which in turn drove rapid population penetration.76
Second, what we call a government-led expectation would lead us to expect that the
Japanese and Korean governments intervened quite heavily in the telecom markets, strategically
altering investment profiles to foster rapid broadband diffusion.77 On the one hand, one could
point to the nature of the telecom sector, which involves incumbent firms requiring strong
regulation to foster competition, significant network investments in which private firms might be
unwilling to invest, and existing institutions and histories of heavy government intervention and
lead bureaucracies in charge of managing the sector. One might draw from broader scholarship
contending that the salience of national governments persists in the face of globalization,
technological shifts, and economic downturns -- perhaps even by acquiring new goals and tools
along the way.78
76 This logic tends to be more prominent in analyses of Korea. For example, see OECD (2000), Tcha, et al. (2000),
Lee (2002), Choudrie and Lee (2004).
77 This logic is found in several analyses of Korea’s broadband development, including Fackler (2006), Frieden
(2005), Lee and Olmsted (2004), Lee et al. (2003), Tcha et al (2000), Choudrie and Lee (2004) for Korea. For
Japan’s broadband development, Bleha (2005), and Tilton (2004) make strong arguments along this vein.
78 Weiss (1998), Levy (2006)
37
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